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ABSTRACT 
Zambia adopted the policy of internal contracts, as part of the broader health 
sector reforms. Drawing on insights from New Institutional Economics, this study 
investigated the policy of internal contracts between District Health and Referral Hospital 
Boards. The objectives of the study were: to describe the nature of contracts between 
districts and hospitals; assess the impact of different types of contract settings on 
referrals; and explore the processes through which contracts impacted on referrals. The 
study used a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. 
The study found that internal contracts had produced positive outcomes such as 
the delineation of service provision functions among providers, devolution of authority to 
devolved units, and increased interaction between districts and hospitals. These 
outcomes were, however, marred by a narrow decision making space, which was 
characterized by staff inadequacies and management difficulties and service delivery 
constraints. The juxtaposition of autonomous district and hospital units with hierarchies 
further limited the effectiveness of internal contracts. 
The study showed that referral inappropriateness was a pervasive problem and 
there were significant differences between public and NGO contracts. Both the districts 
and hospitals faced a combination of incentive structures which impacted on referrals. 
The contract payment method resulted in the district and hospitals' urge to maximise 
referrals and minimise referral care respectivley. The providers were more likely to 
respond to social than organisational incentives. Among NGO providers, the social 
incentives were more pervasive, the likelihood of congruence between provider and 
managerial objectives was higher, and there was a high level of social deprivation and 
low quality public health services, which generated referral pressures. The weak/lack of 
effective rewards and penalties perpertuated referral difficulties. 
The New Institutional Economics framework was helpful in understanding the 
difficulties of contracts by identifying the influence of incentive structures on referrals. 
The study recommended that: internal contracts could be more effective with the 
expansion of autonomy, improvement of service delivery capacity, and adoption of 
effective rewards and penalties. In order to monitor and improve the operation of 
contracts, the information system ought to capture referral data. 
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Chapter 1.00: Introductory chapter 
1.10: Introduction 
This introductory chapter outlines the background to the study, by firstly describing the 
geographical location of Zambia. This is followed by an overview of the economy, 
which focuses on the long term economic decline, and the resultant deterioration of 
social indicators. The impact of the increasing disease burden, especially the effect of 
HN/AIDS on the deterioration of social indicators is discussed and the combined impact 
on poverty highlighted. The consequent policy responses to worsening social indicators, 
and specifically health-sector reforms are described. The chapter ends with the 
identification of the research question and outline of the thesis format. 
1.20: The geo-political setting 
Zambia, which is located in the Southern part of Africa covers an area of 752,614 
squared kilometres. Growing at an annual rate of 3 %, the country's population was 
estimated at 12 million by 2005. Mining is the major economic activity, although since 
the middle 1990s, the government has targeted agriculture and tourism as sectors whose 
economic potential has not been fully exploited. The earlier development of the mining 
industry led to large urban settlements, which resulted in a high level of urbanization, 
making the country one of the most urbanized in Africa. Zambia shares borders with 
eight countries: Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zimbabwe. 
Zambia had been a British colony, until its independency in 1964. At independence, the 
country was ruled by the United National Independence Party (UNIP), initially under a 
multiparty democracy (1964-1972), and thereafter under a one-party political regime 
(1973-1991). Over time, the one-party political regime grew increasingly unpopular and 
repressive as it faced security and economic difficulties, arising from internal economic 
factors and external sources of destabilisation during the long liberation was in the 
neighbouring countries. In the face of economic collapse, domestic unrest and 
international pressure, the UNIP government reintroduced multi-party politics, which 
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culminated in the 1991 democratic elections. In the subsequent legislative and 
presidential elections, a newly formed Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) 
party secured an overwhelming majority, winning 131 of 150 National Assembly seats. 
Commentators on the political transition in Zambia have expressed both optimism about 
the dawn of a new political system and scepticism about the institutional weaknesses for 
sustaining political pluralism. What is clear, however, is that political pluralism has been 
entrenched. 
1.30: The economy 
Zambia was one of most prosperous African nations at independence in 1964, and 
remained that way for a large part of the sixties and early seventies. However, a 
combination of external factors such as the middle 1970s Middle East oil crisis and bad 
internal economic policies such as a rigid economic structure established through high 
protection, public sector dominance, and import substitution led to a precipitous 
economic decline that generated a severe economic crisis. Measures were, as a 
consequence taken to address the inherent weaknesses of the economy through 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank supported economic programs. 
Although the pre-1991 government adopted IMF/World Bank programs, these were not 
strictly adhered to and interruptions were common. Beginning 1992, after the political 
change, a new economic programme was embarked upon, under which comprehensive 
economic reforms were introduced (Soeters, 1997). 
The economic reforms marked a dramatic departure from the populist and consumption 
oriented policies of the previous UNIP political regime. Privatization of state-owned 
mines relieved the government from covering losses generated by the industry and 
improved the chances for the mining industry returning to profitability. Over time 
improvements in mining activities were recorded, which were further helped by the 
opening of new mines in the North Western region of the country. The liberalization 
policies in the agricultural sector spurred growth over the years, leading to the doubling 
of maize harvest in 2003, and helping boost a GDP growth rate of 5.0% by 2005 
(MOFNP, 1995). Owing, in part to the long period of economic stagnation, and despite 
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progress in key areas such as privatization and budgetary reforms, economic growth, 
though positive had by the time of this study not exceeded the 5-7% threshold which is 
necessary to significantly reduce poverty. As a consequence, poverty remained a 
daunting problem, and led to the implementation of various poverty mitigation strategies. 
A lot of hope was placed on the country reaching the Highly Indebted Poor Country 
Initiative (HIPC) completion point, which was expected to release resources away from 
debt servicing to development programmes. Together with HIV/AIDS, poverty was 
targeted under the Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme (PRSP), a precursor to the 
HIPC programme. The PRSP aimed to reduce the poverty rate to 65 per cent of the 
population by 2004 and achieve strong and sustained economic growth. However, while 
poverty remained stable throughout the 1990s, it was observed to have increased since 
then. The PRSP was criticized for not having adequately targeted sectors such as 
education and water and sanitation and for the failure of the government to provide 
adequate counterpart funding. The low level of knowledge and understanding of the 
PRSP at district levels weakened the linkages between district development plans and the 
national PRSP. 
As indicated above, poverty levels had increased since the 1990s (World Bank, 1994). 
The poverty levels provided a base for increasing disease burden, and the rising 
morbidity and mortality level in turn reinforced poverty. And the combination of poverty 
and disease, and especially HIV/AIDS has devastated the population. The HIV/AIDS 
has mostly affected the region along the major line of rail, which includes the 
Copperbelt, Lusaka, Central and Southern Provinces. The official statistics from the 
CSO puts the HIV prevalence level at 16 per cent of the population aged 15-49 (CSO, 
2002). The infection rate was substantially higher among women (18 per cent) than men 
(13 per cent). There were some indications that the HIV infection rate for young adults 
was decreasing. The most worrisome finding from the ZDHS was that almost 50 per 
cent of the women in the 15-49 age bracket in urban areas were infected with HIV. 
Although government and donor communities designed programmes and allocated 
substantial resources to fight the disease, specific policy responses have been delayed or 
only partially implemented. This is attributable to the low absorptive capacity of the 
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districts and hospitals. The introduction of ARVS, while improving the lives of People 
Living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHAs), may pose additional pressures on the already 
strained health delivery capacity. 
1.40: Health sector reforms 
As observed above in the introduction and in line with other African countries, the 
government opted for strong state involvement in economic affairs after independence. It 
was argued that this would assure development and safeguard the public interest. This 
public interest view of the state assumed that a group of decision-makers could identify 
the public good and use taxes, market regulation and public enterprises to produce goods 
and services (Soeters, 1997). A fairly vibrant economy at independence both provided 
the resources for expansion of health services and ironically also laid the bedrock for an 
inequitable health system that favoured urban areas. 
The World Bank (1994) observed that despite the fledgling economy in Zambia, the 
combined donor and government expenditure in the heath sector had remained fairly 
steady. Paradoxically, the country experienced a precipitous fall in health indicators. The 
main issue confronting the country' social sectors was not necessarily the lack of 
resources, but rather the allocation of these resources. The health reforms which were 
implemented from the early 1990s sought to address the problems caused by allocative 
and technical inefficiencies. The health reform agenda reflected the new government 
policy, which sought to make better use of resources in the sector and ensure access to a 
basic package of care for the population (Kalumba, 1997). These inefficiencies were 
manifested by excessive reliance on hospital care, and chronic shortages of staff and 
supplies at health centres, which had resulted in inappropriate use of hospitals. 
The health reforms while shaped by domestic circumstances had a lot in common with 
social policy changes that were taking place in other parts of the world. The global 
change in social policy followed the economic recession of the middle 1990s and the 
resulting ideological shift following the collapse of Eastern Europe. The dominance of 
the state in economic affairs increasingly began to be questioned. Questions were raised 
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not only about public enterprises but also the modes of social service delivery (Mills et 
al, 2001). These concerns led to policy changes in the management and delivery of 
social services, as part of a broader economic agenda. 
The wave of interest in changing the policies, practices and management systems within 
the health sector is often referred to as `health sector reform', which is described as a 
"sustained, purposeful change to improve the efficiency, equity and effectiveness of the 
health sector" (Berman, 1995). The most widespread elements of health sector reforms 
include: restructuring of the public sector, usually a form of autonomisation or 
corporatisation; getting the incentive structures right; liberalisation of the health market; 
broadening the sources of funding for the health sector; and increasing the role of the 
consumer in the health system. 
Zambia is one of the countries in which far-reaching health reforms were undertaken. 
The policies and strategies for the health reforms were outlined in the National Health 
Services and Strategies document of 1991 (MOH, 1993), which expressed the desire to 
build leadership, accountability and partnership in the management and production of 
health services. The MOH sought to attain a new leadership role in the health sector, by 
working with donors and national programmes in a coordinated way, as contrasted from 
the previous stand-alone donor supported programmes, which had limited impact on 
health outcomes. 
Furthermore, the health reforms aimed at improving accountability of health services. It 
was recognized that the past MOH patterns of financial and staffing allocations reflected 
years of giving priority to high-technology curative care, in response to political and 
popular pressures, despite official support for primary care. The reforms aimed to 
reorient the focus away from central levels to a client-focused system, where health care 
providers were accountable to local health boards. Local communities participated 
through representation on health boards and contribution towards the cost of health 
services. Although user fees served as means of community participation, the policy was 
criticised for creating a financial barrier against access to health services. Studies on the 
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impact of user fees on utilisation, however, showed that reductions in attendance were 
only noticeable immediately after introduction of fees, after which utilisation normalized. 
Although there had been a slump in health indicators, the reformers recognized that 
better health outcomes could be attained from improved coordination of the various 
actors in the sector. Under the reforms, the activities of national and international 
programmes were supposed to be harmonized in order to improve health outcomes. The 
partnerships also extended to the private sector, which was expected to complement the 
public sector in the provision of services. The polices sought to use market based 
policies such as subcontracting in order to improve the efficiency of public health 
services. Such policies included contracting within the public sector and between the 
private and public sectors. 
1.50: Contracting and referral policies 
The Zambian health sector was beset by financial and operational constraints, which over 
time manifested in an inefficient and less effective health delivery system. For decades, 
commentators (Freund, 1986; Kalumba, 1997; Soeter, 1997) on the Zambian health 
sector pointed to the inefficiencies of the system. For instance, urban based referral 
hospitals not only consumed a disproportionate amount of resources but also attracted 
skewed demand from an urban elite, to the disadvantage of the rural dwellers. 
Beginning from the early 1990s, reforms aimed at improving the health service delivery 
system were implemented. Such policies included contracting within the public sector 
and between the private and public sectors. Contracting was encapsulated within the 
broader policy reform of decentralisation by which major responsibilities for the delivery 
of health services were devolved to lower levels, especially the district, where a new 
implementation agency, the District Health Implementation Team (DHIT), forerunner of 
the District Health Management Team (DHMT), was constituted. By decentralising the 
delivery of health services, the policy makers expected to reap efficiency gains through 
splitting health service purchasing and provision functions. The relationship between 
purchasers and providers of health services was to be governed by contracts. A central 
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purchasing agency, the Central Board of Health (CBOH) was created. The CBOH in 
turn subcontracted providers of health services such as District Health Boards (DHB) and 
Referral Hospital Boards (RHB) to provide health services. Although DHBs, could in 
theory contract with any RHB, they were limited to a range of historically determined 
hospitals. 
Before the introduction of contracting, the players in the health system were governed by 
what might be termed implicit contracts1, which were replaced by explicit contracts 
following the implementation of health reforms. Whether the introduction of explicit 
contracts improved the relationship among contracting parties is yet to be assessed. The 
findings reported in this thesis attempted to answer this question by studying the 
relationship between DHBs and RHBs. In order for the health system to run effectively, 
district health facilities and hospital services ought to be supportive of each other. This, 
however, had been lacking and uncoordinated decision-making and actions, were among 
the outcomes, which limited the extent to which synergies for maximising health services 
delivery could be captured. 
The levels and patterns of referrals from lower level district health facilities to referral 
health facilities were a source of contention between managers at different levels of the 
health sector. In addressing these problems, policy makers implemented a range of 
policies and strategies aimed at influencing referrals. These policies included: improving 
the delivery capacity of health centres; introduction of by-pass fees; and closing of 
hospital outpatient departments (OPD). There was no clear verdict about the 
effectiveness of these polices. This study sought to contribute to knowledge regarding 
the difficulties of the relationships between DHBs and RHBs, using referrals as a tracer. 
With the aid of ideas from New Institutional Economics and empirical studies on 
contracting, the study attempted to understand the difficulties of contracting between 
DHBs and RHBs by explaining how the interaction of environmental factors, 
1 Any form of relationship involving the exchange of goods or services among parties, even when not 
formalized could be termed an implicit contract. Such relationships become explicit contracts once they 
are formalized. The issue then becomes whether formalizing an implicit contract has advantages over 
retaining the implicit form. 
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transaction/contract attributes, principal-agent relationships, and incentive structures 
impacted on referral levels and patterns. 
1.60: The Research Question 
The United Kingdom (UK) and New Zealand among a few other countries have 
pioneered the use of contracts in health sector internal markets, by splitting health service 
purchasing and provision functions. The original idea was that purchasers and providers 
would be governed by renewable annual contracts. Competition among providers was in 
part expected to be achieved through the threat of exit from contracts. However, the 
limited level of contestability marking the internal markets left purchasers in locked-in 
relationships, and consequently high transaction difficulties (Goddard and Manion, 1998; 
Howden-Chapman and Ashton, 1994). Over time there was preference for long-term 
contracts in both the UK and New Zealand, which opened the way for more contracting 
difficulties (Propper, 1995). 
The health sector reforms in Zambia had strands of internal market models developed in 
countries such as Sweden, the UK and New Zealand. As stated above, the CBOH 
contracted both DHBs and RHBs. District health boards, which were contracted for the 
provision of primary health care and first level referral services, in turn subcontracted 
with RHBs for the provision of first level referral services that they were not able to 
provide. Districts could contract with both government and non-governmental hospitals, 
the latter being predominantly missionary facilities. Internal contracting in the health 
sector had by the time of this study been operational for over a decade. This was the case 
despite research (Broomberg, 1994; Palmer, 2001) that questioned the applicability of 
internal contracts in Low and Middle Income Country (LMIC) settings. If contracting in 
developed countries such as the UK and New Zealand has faced marked difficulties, 
these may be still greater in LMIC countries. 
By using ideas from NIE, this study set out to investigate the difficulties of contracting 
between DHBs and RHBs, using referrals as a tracer. Despite the plethora of initiatives 
aimed at harmonising links within the sector and addressing the issue of referrals 
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between DHBs and RHBs, there had been no analysis of the institutional setting in which 
these programmes/policies had been tried. The studies undertaken on referral systems 
(Atkinson, et al, 1999; CBOH, c2000; Murray, 2001) assessed the health seeking 
behaviour, user and provider perceptions of quality of care, and effectiveness of referral 
assessment tools. This thesis set out to contribute to knowledge by analysing the 
institutional setting under which referrals take place. This was done by using NIE tools 
to analyse how the interaction of environmental factors, transaction/contracting 
attributes, principal-agent relationships, and incentive structures impacted on referral 
level and patterns. 
The research question that the study sought to answer was: What are the types of 
contracts between District Health Boards and Referral Hospital Boards; what difficulties 
do they encounter and how are these difficulties reflected in the levels and patterns of 
referrals between district health facilities and referral hospitals in Zambia? 
1.70: Organisation of the thesis 
The preceding Chapter 1 provided the background to the study by describing the 
geographical location of country, economic changes and resulting impact on social 
indicators. The impact of the increasing disease burden, especially the effect of 
HIV/AIDS on the deterioration of social indicators was discussed and the combined 
impact on poverty highlighted. The attendant policy responses to worsening social 
indicators, and specifically health sector reforms were described. 
Chapter 2 draws from the preceding introductory chapter, by summarising the policy of 
internal contracts, aims and objectives of the study. Thereafter, an overview of health 
reforms and referral policies is provided. 
Chapter 3 discusses the conceptual frameworks on contracting, by drawing from the 
theoretical works on agency and transaction cost economics. This is followed by a 
presentation of the analytical framework, aims, objectives and methods of the study. The 
chapter ends with a commentary on the quality of data. 
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Chapter 4 provides a detailed discussion of the theoretical and empirical literature on 
contracting and referrals. The chapter is divided into three sections: theoretical 
framework on contracting; empirical literature on referrals and contracting in the health 
sector; and the health sector reform of internal contracts. 
Chapter 5, which is the beginning of the results chapter presents findings on the 
difficulties of internal contracts between DHBs and RHBs. The first part outlines 
findings on the environmental factors, which is followed by a presentation of findings on 
the contracting/transaction factors, and manifestations of and responses to opportunism. 
The last part of the chapter presents district and hospital respondents' views on the value 
of explicit contracts. 
Chapter 6 presents findings on the capacity of the frontline health providers by 
reflecting on their educational and professional backgrounds. Thereafter the providers' 
knowledge and experience with the referrals decision making process is presented, which 
is followed by a discussion of sources of referral problems between district health 
facilities and hospitals. The section ends with a discussion of the providers' identification 
of referral problems contrasted by the type of contract. 
Chapter 8 presents findings on the patterns and levels of referrals by type of contract, 
using information obtained from hospital utilisation data and patient records. The 
chapter recasts the data, variables and methods which were used to study referral levels 
and patterns. Thereafter, the morbidity profile of the hospitals is shown and followed by 
a presentation of results on referral appropriateness. The last part of the chapter 
discusses the factors explaining the levels and patterns of referrals by contract type. 
Chapter 9 discusses the methods, conceptual framework, findings and contributions of 
the study. The first part analyses the methodology, focusing on the value of combining 
quantitative and qualitative methods. This is followed by a discussion of the usefulness 
of New Institutional Economics (NIE). The latter part makes an argument about how 
the study findings contributed to knowledge. 
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Chapter 10 outlines the recommendation, which are decomposed into: improving the 
links between DHBs and RHBs; raising the competencies of providers in both district 
and hospital facilities; and improving the information system between DHBs and RHBs. 
Figure 1.1: Map of Zambia 
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Chapter 2.00: Background to the study 
2.10: Introduction 
This chapter draws from the preceding introductory chapter, by focussing on the 
identified study area of internal contracts for referrals in the health sector. The chapter 
begins with a general discussion of the policy of internal contracts, and provides an 
overview' of selected literature on the subject matter. This is followed by a statement of 
the aims, objectives and scope of the study. The latter part of the chapter provides a 
brief description of the health reforms, health financing policy and referral policies and 
programmes. 
2.20: The policy of internal contracts 
One of the key policy changes that accompanied the health reforms in Zambia was the 
introduction of internal contracts, through which purchasers engaged providers. As 
indicated above, the CBOH contracted DHBs to provide primary health services and first 
level referral services, while RHBs were contracted to provide second and third level 
referral services. The funds from the CBOH were remitted directly to the DHBs and 
RHBs, as opposed to the pre-reform period when they were channelled through the 
Provincial Medical Office (PMO). 
In Zambia, referral hospitals comprised both public and private providers, although the 
latter were few. Services provided by not-for profit providers (mostly mission hospitals) 
were directly funded by the GRZ and thus considered part of the public sector (MOH, 
2000). The hospital sector was organised in a three tier system comprised of the district 
(first level referral), general (second level referral) and central/specialised (third level 
referral) hospitals. The district health facilities and first level referral hospitals were part 
of the district health system, while the general and central hospitals were autonomous. 
The DHBs were funded for the provision of primary and first level referral services, 
while the hospitals were directly funded for the provision of second and third level 
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referral services. The grants from the Government took the form of cash disbursements 
and in-kind payments, such as drugs, staff, and medical supplies (MOH, 2000). 
As indicated in the introduction, the rationale for contracting relates to theories of why 
governments fail in the provision of services. Contracting as a tool for managing the 
delivery of health services has its roots in the New Public Management (NPM) school, 
which posits that efficiency gains would accrue from adoption of market-based policies. 
This school of thought argues that exposure to the market and maintenance of public 
sources of funding would achieve the dual goals of realizing efficient production 
behaviors while simultaneously safeguarding the social goals of access and 
responsiveness to consumers. A central tenet of the new thinking is that the traditional 
organizational form of the public sector, hierarchical bureaucracy, is inherently 
inefficient and that the introduction of various market mechanisms will substantially 
enhance the efficiency of public service delivery. 
Two main schools of thought underpin this analysis. The first, the property rights theory 
contends that the main source of inefficiency in the public sector is the weakening of 
property rights, so that the decision makers face few incentives to allocate resources 
efficiently. This is contrasted with the incentives facing entrepreneurs or shareholders in 
the private sector (Mills and Broomberg, 1998). The second critique of the public sector, 
argued by "public choice" theorists, is that the politicians and bureaucrats who control 
bureaucracies cannot be assumed to be acting in the public interest, since they are more 
likely to serve their own interests, or those of powerful interest groups (Walsh, 1995; 
Smith, 1997; Frant, 1996). 
The use of contracting as a policy tool has been accompanied by the study of contracting 
difficulties. Such difficulties include the costs involved in creating and maintaining 
contracts. The extent of such costs will depend on the numbers of contracts that are 
written, the extent of detail in the specification and the intensity with which 
implementation is monitored. Transaction cost economics emphasizes the limitations of 
contracts and the need for flexible means of coordinating activities. 
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The principal-agent theory has been widely used in the health sector to illustrate the 
difficulties of one party engaging another to provide goods/services, in return for a 
mutually agreed reward. The principal usually needs the efforts and expertise of the 
agent, but has limited ability to monitor the agent's actions or evaluate whether the 
outcome is satisfactory. Agents are assumed to be opportunistic and unless they are 
closely monitored, may be unreliable, engaging in opportunistic behaviour. Principals 
too may maximise their benefits to such an extent that the relationship becomes 
untenable for the agent. The bodies of knowledge on contracting: property rights, public 
choice, transaction cost economics and principal-agent theories, collectively referred to 
as the New Institutional Economics have been widely used in studying institutions. A 
review of literature on these issues is provided below. 
2.30: Aims, objectives and scope of the study 
The aim of study was to analyse the nature and difficulties of contracting between DHBs 
and RHBs in Zambia, using referrals as a tracer. With the aid of ideas from New 
Institutional Economics and empirical studies on contracting, the study explored the 
difficulties of contracting by explaining how the interaction of contract/transaction 
attributes, incentive structures, information and sanction systems impacted on referral 
levels and patterns. 
2.31: General objectives 
A. Describe the nature of contracts between District Health Boards2 (DHB) and 
Referral Hospital Boards (RHB) and assess how this has changed over time. 
B. Assess the impact of different types of contracts on the levels and patterns of 
referrals between districts and hospitals. 
C. Explore the processes through which varying contracts impact on the levels and 
patterns of referrals between districts and hospitals. 
2 District Health Boards are legally constituted governing units responsible for overseeing the provision of 
district health services. Similarly, Referral Hospital Boards (or Hospital Management Boards) are 
governing units charged overseeing the provision of hospital health services. 
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2.32: Scope of the study 
As stated above, the first part of the study analysed the introduction of explicit 
contracting in the health sector, focussing on public-public contracts between DHBs and 
RHBs. This entailed understanding how the policy of contracting had impacted on the 
relationships between DHBs and RHBs. Secondly, the study used referrals between 
DHBs and RHBs as a tracer of the relationship between the two and explained the 
differences in referral levels and patterns against the contracting environment. 
The hospital study sites were chosen such that they represented the various referral 
contracting environments: contracts with improved health centre capacity, those not so 
supported, contracts with Non Governmental Organisations, and contracts with 
Government hospitals. Based on these criteria, four hospital case studies were 
purposively selected: University Teaching Hospital (UTH), Kitwe Central Hospital 
(KCH), Ndola Central Hospital (NCH), and Monze Mission Hospital (MMH). For each 
identified hospital, two DHBs, one in which the hospital was located and another nearby 
DHB were included in the study. 
The UTH is the national referral hospital, which is located in the capital city, Lusaka. 
Although it is supposed to serve as the national referral hospital, it in effect acts as a 
district hospital, since it is mostly utilised by the district in which it is located and a few 
nearby districts. The Lusaka DHB has a constellation of twenty health centres, eight of 
which were upgraded, under a UK DFID funded project3. The local DHB, Lusaka Urban 
and one nearby district, Kafue were included in the study. 
A second set of hospitals from the Copperbelt were included in the study. Ndola CH is 
located in Ndola district which is the commercial centre of the Copperbelt. The districts 
covered for NCH were Ndola Urban, and Masaiti. Kitwe CH is also on the Copperbelt. 
3 The UK Department of International Development (Dfid) funded project involved upgrading health 
centres in the district by expansion of physical space in order to increase the bed space, allocation of more 
diagnostic facilities and management skills in order to enhance their capacity to handle more patients from 
the district and in the process decongest the UTIL 
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Both had not had health centre upgrading programmes. For Kitwe hospital, Kitwe and 
Kalulushi DHBs were covered. 
Lastly, a rural based hospital, Monze was included in the study to highlight the issues 
surrounding contracting with a mission hospital. Monze mission hospital also had a 
HAHC, which was absent in the other hospitals. Monze DHB and Mazabuka DHB were 
included for this study site. 
2.40: Health reforms and referral policies 
2.41: Overview of health sector reforms 
Zambia is one of the LMIC countries in which far-reaching health reforms were 
undertaken. The push for reforming the health sector arose out of the need to address the 
constraints that had led to an inefficient and less responsive health delivery system. The 
health reforms, which were implemented from the early 1990s sought to redress these 
weaknesses by tackling the capacity limitations caused by allocative and technical 
inefficiencies and manifested by excessive reliance on hospital care and chronic 
shortages of staff and supplies at health centres (Kalumba, 1997). The health care system 
was imbued with inequities characterized by tertiary, largely urban based health 
institutions consuming a disproportionate share of the health budget. The highly 
centralised management system did not help matters either as lower levels of the system 
were delegated to implement plans in whose formulation they had no input. 
In order to depart from the high level of centralisation, lower levels of the sector were 
given more authority to provide and manage health services. In the place of direct 
management of health services, the reforms led to the devolution of management 
authorities to lower levels of District and Hospital Health Management Boards. The 
Provincial Medical Office (PMO), level was eliminated and in its place regional offices 
introduced. From an original nine PMOs corresponding to nine political boundaries, the 
health sector was subdivided into three regional health management blocks. However, 
the vastness of the country, and attendant difficulties of providing technical supervision 
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to health providers at the district level rendered the contraction of nine provincial offices 
into three regional offices unworkable. Subsequently and with the aid of leadership 
change in the MOH, the PMO office was re-instituted, but with reduced authority. 
While, the CBOH remained the central provider of health services on behalf of the 
MOH, the PMO was assigned responsibilities of providing technical backup services to 
DHBs and RHBs (Kamwanga, et al, 2000). 
In addition to decentralisation, which was the major reform element, parallel policy 
changes were effected in other areas such as financing and human resources. On the 
financing front, the major reform was the introduction of cost sharing, by which users 
were expected to contribute towards the cost of health services through part- payments 
(MOH, 1997). Community contributions to the cost of health services were expected to 
have a countervailing effect on the escalation of unnecessary utilisation of health 
services and also serve as means for mobilising additional resources for the public sector. 
With the devolution of authority to districts and hospitals, human resources management 
was left in the hands of local DHB and RHB managers (CBOH, 1998). The policy 
explicitly stated that the devolved units would take charge of their employment needs 
and policies. Through a process of delinkage, civil servants were intended to be retired 
from public sector employment and reengaged by autonomous boards. However, this 
process stalled. Not only did institutional factors, such as restrictive labour laws make it 
difficult to implement the delinkage policy, serious fiscal constraints rendered 
Government efforts at mobilising resources equally difficult. Thus, health reforms 
proceeded without changing the employment conditions of the majority of the workers in 
the public sector. 
Threats to health reforms arising from institutional rigidities and government fiscal 
difficulties were further compounded by fluctuations in the commitment of politicians to 
the reform process. Although the political commitment to the reform process was on 
average applauded, intermittent disruptions were observed (World Bank, 1994; Gilson L 
and Mills A. 1995). Thus there were periods of rapid movement of the reform process 
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coinciding with the appointment of reform minded ministers and times when the process 
stalled on account of ministry leaders who were less supportive of the reforms. The 
influence of political factors on the pace at which reforms proceeded was exemplified by 
the delays in passing the Health Services Act4, which was only passed after a change of 
minister. 
2.42: The health financing policy 
As indicated above, the policy of devolved management was accompanied by the 
introduction of new methods of financing. In the pre-reform period, the private health 
sector remained underdeveloped. This changed in the reform period, where health 
financing policy recognised the role that the private sector could play in not only 
augmenting public provision of health services, but also increasing private sources of 
financing to the public sector. To this end, a health financing policy was developed, 
which was based on cost sharing for the consumption of services within the BPC Sand 
cost recovery for services falling outside the BPC (MOH, 1998). 
The MOH explicitly observed that 2°d and 3`d level referral facilities would not be 
allowed to use public funds to offer health centre type clinics (only first referral level 
care) (MOH, 1998,23). Contracts, it was expected would oblige the health service 
providers to provide quality and quantity of services required by purchasers. Grants to 
RHBs were supposed to cover 2"d and 3`d level referral services and not first level 
services. If a hospital was providing first level care, it was obligatory to establish a 
contract fully covering this area, with the DHB requiring this service. This contract 
would be submitted to the CBOH for endorsement. Similarly, hospitals at 2°d and 3`a 
levels were not expected to run OPDs6, unless they were fully separated from the hospital 
and run in accordance with a contract between the district and the hospital and being part 
4 The health reforms were legally enshrined through the enactment of the National Health Services Act, 
1995. Through the act, the Central Board of Health, District Health Boards and Referral Hospital Boards 
were formally established. The act outlined the responsibilities of the various boards, employment terms 
for staff and relationship among actors in the health sector. 
5 The Basic Package of Care (BPC) describes a list of services and means by which the population gains 
access to the services, and for which public funds can be used. The package includes services at the first 
level of contact, first, second, and third referral levels. 
6 An Out Patient Department (OPD) is a unit within the hospital where outpatients could obtain hospital 
services without being admitted. 
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of the district plan (CBOH, 1998). In utilizing their budgets, the health units were 
expected to observe ceilings regarding how much they could spend on various items. 
Deviations from these limits could be allowed in justifiable circumstances such as during 
epidemics. The guidelines further stipulated that DHBs could spend up to an upper limit 
of 80 percent of moneys generated from user fees, while second and third level referral 
facilities were permitted to use all of the resources that they mobilise through fees 
(MOH, 1998). 
Whereas DHBs were funded for provision of PHC and first level referral services, some 
DHBs did not have district hospitals and relied on higher level referral hospitals to 
provide first level referral services (MOH, 2000). In such cases, the DHBs paid between 
20-40 % of their grants for the purchase of referral services from hospitals. How much 
was paid was an outcome of negotiations between DHBs and RHBs. Where DHBs 
collected additional funds through user fees, they were required to remit 40% of fees 
collected to RHBs. While acknowledging the autonomy of service providers, the 
contracting guidelines explicitly stated that the ministry of health would positively 
intervene in the activities of health providers and purchasers in order to monitor as well 
as play an arbitration role where parties to contract were in dispute (MOH, 1998). 
2.43: Referral policies and programmes 
The health system in Zambia followed a hierarchical organisational setup. Commentators 
observed that the various levels of the health sector hardly worked in unison and system 
failure was evident (MOH, 1992; Kalumba, 1997). The levels and patterns of referral 
was one such area through which this system failure was manifest. As indicated above, 
simple diseases and health conditions detailed in the Basic Package of Care (BPC) ought 
not to be treated in high level referral facilities, which is contrary to the situation at the 
time of the study (see Chapter 6). 
According to the BPC, the top ten diseases/health conditions which contribute most to 
the disease burden in Zambia were supposed to be treated at district level facilities (Table 
2.1). Only complicated cases of Acute Respiratory Infection (ARI); perinatal conditions 
(infant hydrocephalus, ICU, acute respiratory and renal support); tuberculosis (chronic 
34 
lung disease) gastro infections (surgery for intestinal complications); and maternal 
conditions (management of vesico-vaginal fistulas) could reach the second level referral 
points. And out of these, only perinatal conditions, gastro-infections, maternal conditions, 
should ideally reach third level health facilities (BPC reproduced in appendix 8). 
Table 2.1: Top ten diseases/conditions contributing to the burden of disease by level of 
care/service provision 
Disease/ 
Condition 
Community 
level HP 
Health 
Centre 
1' level 
hospital 
2 level 
hospital 
3 level 
hospital 
1996 
DALYS 
Malaria + + + 0 0 6,777,962 
ARI + + + 0 0 51451,037 
AIDS + + + 0 0 3 205 208 
Diarrhoea + + + + 0 2,146,002 
Perinatal + + + + 0 1320 444 
TB/Leprosy 
-0/+- 
+ 0 0 0 266 799 
- Malnutrition + + + 0 0 125,955 
Other GI 0/+ + + + + 106,150 
Maternal 
conditions 
+ + + + + 91,887 
Anaemia 0/+ + + 0 + 25 6516 
Source: MOH/CBOH, 2000, Basic health care package from Community to 3'd level 
+ Disease should be treated/attended to at this level 
0 Disease should not be treated/attended to at this level 
As was observed in the introduction, the problems regarding the level and patterns of 
referrals between district health facilities and referral hospitals led to the implementation 
of various polices and programmes. Community-focused programmes included 
awareness activities to reorient people's health seeking behavior and financial-based 
policies aimed at eliciting appropriate health seeking responses from the community. 
Where individuals self-referred to a higher level health facility for conditions that could 
be handled at lower service delivery points, they were required to pay cost recovery 
prices. Accordingly, where an individual sought to use hospital services, without passing 
through a health centre, they were required to pay a by-pass fee. As indicated above, 
user fees were introduced for the dual purpose of mobilising resources and achieving 
consumer responsiveness. On the downside, it was been observed that the policy of cost- 
sharing was implemented without sufficient guidelines and collaborative work with other 
ministries being put in place for providing exemptions, setting prices and monitoring the 
scheme. This resulted in a situation where people who were exempted from paying or 
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should have received exemption certificates from the Ministry of Community and Social 
Services (MCDSS), were charged, denied care or deterred from accessing care. In the 
same vein, although the policy explicitly stated that once a person had been referred, they 
would not be charged at the referral point, some were (MOH, 1998). 
One of the recent policies that had been implemented by the time of data collection for 
this study was "right-sizing" of hospitals. This policy was aimed at reaffirming the 
pyramidal referral system where the various levels were distinct and recognised as such. 
To this end, some hospitals were upgraded while others were down-sized. It was 
maintained that the down-sized hospitals did not have the capacity to function as second 
level referral facilities. The policy of right-sizing met resistance both from politicians 
and hospital managers. Political resistance rested on fears of local politicians losing 
support with communities, while managers feared the loss of power associated with 
managing a higher referral facility (a general hospital reports directly to the Provincial 
Health Director (PHD), whereas a District hospital reports to the local DHB). 
Although referral hospitals were supposed to cater for higher illness severity patients 
from across the regions, in practice, they mostly catered for populations of districts in 
which they were located. The most widespread policy by which efforts were being made 
to control local demand for hospital services was the creation of Hospital Affiliated 
Health Centres (HAHC)7; and closing of hospital OPDs. By the time of data collection, 
Monze and UTH had established a HAHC, and plans were afoot to close the OPD at 
Kitwe and Ndola. 
2.50: Conclusion 
It is clear from this review of health polices that referral issues are prominent. Policies 
and programmes targeting referrals have included rationalising access to hospitals 
through closing hospital OPDs, creating HAHCs, and introduction of by-pass fees. In 
line with the broader health sector reforms, the policy of internal contracts was 
7A Hospital Affiliated Health Centre (HAUG) is a health centre, which is located within hospital 
premises. Following the implementation of health reforms, hospitals were requested to cease providing 
OPD services. The IlAllCs were thus established to replace hospital OPDs and were managed by D1113s. 
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introduced to manage referrals between districts and hospitals. The plethora of 
programmes/policies targeting referrals is testimony to the centrality of these issues. 
Referrals could be used both as a policy instrument and as an indicator of policy 
outcome. 
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Chapter 3.00: Review of literature on contracts and referrals 
3.10: Theoretical Framework on contracting 
3.11: Introduction 
This sub-section of the literature review provides an overview of the conceptual 
frameworks on contracting. Drawing from theoretical works on agency and transaction 
cost economics, the section starts by outlining the behavioural and transaction factors that 
characterise contracts. The interaction of behavioural attributes of bounded rationality 
and opportunism and transaction characteristics of asset specificities are discussed in 
relation to the contracting difficulties and agency problems that arise. 
3.21: Transaction cost assumptions 
One of the basic tenets of neo-classical economics is that competitive forces in an 
optimally functioning market lead to efficient allocation of resources. The perfect 
competitive model assumes that: the goods are private goods (they exhibit excludability, 
rejectability and rivalry); rights can be perfectly delineated; and there are no transaction 
costs. A perfect competition model assumes spot transactions, where transacting parties 
have no long-term relationships. 
However, many goods and services are not bought in an instant and transaction costs are 
often substantial. Buyers and sellers may undertake an exchange of goods and services 
over a period of time and develop long-term relationships. Contracts are one method by 
which such relationships can be governed. The study of contracting has been aided by 
new institutional economics, which is a collection of theories which deal with 
considerations of information, motivation, and innovation and the implications for the 
best possible organisation of productive activity. 
Bounded rationality and opportunism 
Transaction cost economics is founded on two broad set of assumptions in behaviour and 
transaction dimensions (Williamson, 1985). While the perfect competition model 
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assumes perfect rationality, much of transaction cost economics assumes "bounded 
rationality". Bounded rationality is a semi-strong form of rationality in which economic 
actors are assumed to be intentionally rational but only limitedly so. An economising 
orientation is elicited by the rationality part of the definition, while the study of 
institutions is encouraged by conceding that cognitive competence is limited. Transaction 
cost economics is concerned with the economising consequences of assigning 
transactions to governance structures in a discriminating way. Confronted with the 
realities of bounded rationality, the costs of planning, adapting and monitoring 
transactions need expressly to be considered. Transaction cost economics seeks to find 
out what governance structures are more efficacious and for which transactions. 
As with rationality, three types of self-interest are identified. The weakest form of self- 
interest is obedience, which is marked by complete obedience and under which economic 
problems are greatly simplified. Simple self-interest is the mild form, assumed for neo- 
classical economic problems. A stronger version, obtains with the assumption of 
opportunism, on which transaction cost economics is based (Williamson, 1985). By 
opportunism is meant self-interest seeking with guile. This includes, but is scarcely 
limited to more blatant forms such as lying, stealing and cheating. Opportunism more 
often involves subtle forms of deceit. Both active and passive forms and both ex ante 
and ex post types are included. Opportunism refers to the incomplete or distorted 
disclosure of information, especially when calculated to mislead, distort, disguise, 
obfuscate or otherwise confuse. 
The combination of bounded rationality and opportunism gives rise to varying 
contracting situations (Table 3.1). If both assumptions are absent, contracting is in a state 
of bliss. When bounded rationality is present and opportunism absent, general clause 
contracting obtains. The absence of bounded rationality and presence of opportunism 
leads to comprehensive planning. However, when both opportunism and bounded 
rationality are present, serious contractual difficulties arise. 
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Table 3.1: Contractual difficulties under bounded rationality and opportunism 
Bounded rationality 
Absent Admitted 
Opportunism Absent Bliss General clause 
Contracting 
Admitted Comprehensive 
Contracting 
Serious contractual 
difficulties 
Source: Williamson 0, (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. The Free Press: New 
York 
Under transaction cost economics, it is maintained that there are rational economic 
reasons for organising some transactions one way and other transactions another. 
Williamson (1985) observes that a predictive theory of economic organisation requires 
that the factors responsible for differences among transactions be identified and 
explicated. The principal dimensions with respect to which transactions differ are asset 
specificity, uncertainty, and frequency. The first is the most important and most 
distinguishes transaction cost economics from other treatments of economic organisation, 
but the other two play significant roles. 
Asset specificity 
Transactions that are supported by investments in durable, transaction specific assets 
experience "lock in" effects, on which account autonomous trading will commonly be 
supplanted by unified ownership (vertical integration). Thus, although there may be 
large numbers of qualified bidders at the outset, if the winner of an original contract 
acquires a cost advantage, the contract may subsequently experience "lock-in" 
difficulties. This may arise by reason of location, or learning, including the acquisition 
of undisclosed or propriety, technical and managerial procedures and task-specific labour 
skills, which would result in bidding parity at contract renewal being upset with the result 
that ex-post contracting strains predictably develop if discrete contracting is attempted 
(Williamson, 1985). 
A transaction could either be based on general-purpose or specific assets. In the case of 
the former, interruptions to a contract do not pose much of a problem as the assets could 
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easily be deployed to alternative uses. However, the matter is more complicated when it 
involves transaction specific assets. There are four types of asset specificity: site 
specificity (successive stages of production located close to each other); physical asset 
specificity (assets are mobile and specificity is related to physical features); human asset 
specificity (skills and knowledge embedded in the labour force are specific) and 
dedicated asset specificity (for example investment in a plant for meeting the needs of a 
particular client). 
Uncertainty 
Williamson (1985) argues that the interesting issues with which transaction cost 
economics is involved reduce to an assessment of adaptive, sequential decision making. 
Contingent on the set of transactions to be effected, the basic proposition is that 
governance structures differ in their capacities to respond effectively to unforeseen 
disturbances. These issues vanish were it not for bounded rationality, since then it would 
be feasible to develop a detailed strategy for meeting all contingencies in the future. 
Interesting problems of economic organisation arise only in conjunction with uncertainty. 
The uncertainty of interest is that which is attributable to opportunism, which Williamson 
defines as behaviour involving guile, intended to further self-interest. 
Behavioural uncertainties would not pose contractual problems if transactions were 
known to be free from exogenous disturbances, since then there would be no occasion to 
adapt and unilateral efforts to alter contracts could and by assumption would be avoided 
by the courts or other third party appeal. Insistence on original terms would thus be 
observed everywhere. The influence of uncertainty on economic organisation is 
conditional. Specifically, an increase in uncertainty is a matter of little consequence for 
transactions that are non-specific. Since new trading relations are easily arranged, 
continuity has little value, and behavioural uncertainty is irrelevant. Accordingly, market 
exchange continues and the discrete contracting paradigm holds across standardised 
transactions of all kinds, whatever the degree of uncertainty. 
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Frequency 
The benefits of specialised structures are greatest for transactions supported by 
considerable investment in transaction-specific assets (Williamson, 1985). Whether the 
volume of transactions processed through a specialised governance structure utilises it to 
capacity is then the remaining issue. The cost of specialised governance structures will 
be easier to recover for large transactions of a recurring kind. 
Table 3.2: Contractual difficulties under bounded rationality, opportunism and asset 
specificity 
Behaviour assumption 
Bounded rationality Opportunism Asset specificity 
0 - + + Planning 
+ 0 + Promise 
+ + 0 Competition 
+ + + Governance 
Source: Williamson, 0. (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: The Free Press, New 
York 
3.23: Types of contracts 
The combination of bounded rationality, opportunism and asset-specificity imply varying 
governance systems as detailed in table 3.2 above. When bounded rationality is absent 
and asset specificity and opportunism present, the "planning" governance model applies. 
The absence of opportunism and presence of asset specificity and bounded rationality 
describes a "promise" design. A competitive governance structure obtains in the absence 
of asset-specificity and presence of bounded rationality and opportunism. However, 
when all the assumptions are present, the need for "governance" of contracts is 
introduced. The combinations of behavioural assumptions and transaction attributes give 
rise to three governance systems of hierarchy (where all transaction and behaviours 
assumption are present); hybrid (containing combinations of these assumptions); and 
market (absence of asset specificity). The three governance systems in turn imply 
different forms of contracts. 
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Mcneil (1978) has suggested a continuum of contract types corresponding to the three 
governance forms, which are classical, neo-classical, and relational contracts. Classical 
contracts govern truly discrete transactions, occurring between total strangers, brought 
together by chance and never to see each other again. Neo-classical contracting is 
characterised by greater flexibility and third party arbitration of disputes. A recognition 
that the world is complex; that agreements are incomplete; and that some constraints will 
never be completed unless both parties have confidence in the settlement machinery 
characterises neo-classical contract law. At the end of the contract spectrum is relational 
contracting. As opposed to neo-classical contracts where the reference point for effecting 
adaptation remains the original agreement, the reference point under a relational 
approach is the entire relationship as it has developed over time (Macneil, 1974; 1978). 
"Relational contracting" reflects progressively increasing duration and complexity of 
contract: contracts do not relate to a single discrete purchase, but to long term- 
agreements over many different exchanges. 
3.24: Incentive structures 
One major aspect in which hierarchies and markets differ is in respect of the incentive 
structures. As a general rule, incentives in hierarchies are flat or low powered. 
Asymmetries of information and divergence of objective functions between agents and 
principals are among the principal factors that affect incentive structures (McPake, et al 
2002; Smith, 1997). The principal usually needs the efforts and expertise of the agent but 
has limited ability to monitor the agent's actions or evaluate whether the outcome is 
satisfactory. Rosen (1993) observes that agents behave honestly if confronted by a 
scheme that makes such behaviour consistent with self-interest. Evidently, the scheme 
must either reward good behaviour or punish bad behaviour (malfeasance). 
Low and high powered incentives 
Both agency and transaction cost literature deal with incentive structures, which are 
associated with contracting. The incentive structure in part determines whether an 
activity would be better carried out in the market or through hierarchical organisations. 
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Frant (1996)8 refers to high powered and low powered incentives, the former being 
associated with market transactions in which the efficiency gains from a transaction flow 
directly to the transacting parties. In hierarchies (organisations) on the other hand, 
incentives are low powered. The particular individuals may get a raise, promotion, and 
so on, but generally are not able to personally lay claim to the gain from trade. 
In the private sector, high-powered monetary incentives promote efficiency in at least 
two ways (Frant, 1996). On the supply side, entrepreneurs are induced to find innovative 
and cost-saving ways to produce their goods. On the demand side, entrepreneurs are 
induced to produce goods that people value highly. Both of these are broader definitions 
of efficiency that are used by economists and that attach no significance to manufacturing 
a product cheaply unless it is a product that people want. Although high-powered 
economic incentives encourage efficiency in the production of goods and services, they 
may go against the social goals of ensuring access to services for needy populations. 
Social goals such as ensuring equity of access to services necessitate the attenuation of 
high-powered monetary incentives. 
Political levers may be used to safeguard social goals, where these are threatened by 
high-powered monetary incentives. However, perverse effects of political influences 
ought to be taken checked. In the public sector, high-powered political incentives do not 
appear to be a particularly effective substitute for the profit motive in promoting 
productive efficiency. But they do promote allocative efficiency by increasing the 
likelihood that the public sector's products will be valued by the people. As with high- 
powered monetary incentives in the private, so too with high-powered political incentives 
in the public sector, there may be perverse effects when monitoring of quality is difficult. 
Frant (1996) notes that one way of attenuating these high powered political incentives is 
8 Frant (1996) observes that while transaction cost economics has been successfully applied in studying the 
private sector, attempts at applying the framework to the public sector have been less successful. As a way 
of overcoming this difficulty, Frant proposes the concept of high-powered and low-powered incentives, in 
place of transaction costs. lie suggests paying attention to political opportunism, which may lead to 
politicians engaging in exploitative behaviour. He gives an example of the tendency for politicians to 
spend money on highly visible things, especially when voters are not well informed and not able to 
adequately monitor the activities of politicians. 
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through the appointment of independent public authorities, which compels voters and 
politicians to commit themselves in advance in order to avoid undesirable behaviours. 
Incentive management 
The mechanisms employed to affect incentives could be taken to be forms of incentive 
management9. As McPake et al (2002) have observed, the need to get the incentives right 
has become prominent within the health sector. Given the informational, transaction, 
administrative and political constraints, the question has turned to examining whether 
incentive management may better accomplish the objectives of regulation. Incentive 
management can be achieved through government subsidising or taxing regulated firms. 
Government subsidies may either take the form of direct subsidies, government loans at 
low interest rates, or government guarantees on the private market (McPake, et al 2002). 
Many subsidies in the health sector are not of a price subsidy nature but rather flat rate 
subsidies to specific institutions. Flat rate subsidies only work in the context of not-profit 
maximising behaviours. Government may also manage incentives through making 
transfers to participants through its purchasing role. This is not different from a subsidy 
in analytical terms but is associated with greater explicitness of contractual arrangements. 
This approach is analogous to what Smith et al (1997) call the behavioural approach to 
addressing PA problems, where an attempt is made to bring the behaviour of the agent 
closer to that of the principal using hierarchical chains of command. 
Regulation could be thought of as an action to manipulate prices, quantities and quality 
of products (Maynard, 1982). The action of agents and principals may be brought into 
alignment by effecting change in outcomes such as sharing and transference of property 
rights (Smith et al, 1997). Regulation may be accomplished by rules and regulations, 
public ownership/provision of goods, government expenditure and taxation. It may also 
take the form of legal restrictions, or incentive regulation. Incentive regulation involves 
the use of rules to regulate variables such as price. The need for incentive regulation 
could be limited by restructuring incentives such that both principals and agents are 
willing to work to together for a common goal. Within the design of a contract, each 
9 Deliberate attempts to manipulate incentives in order to achieve desired objectives. Source: McPake et al 
(2002) 
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person must be willing to participate - the participation constraint. Second, the contract 
needs to structure incentives in order to meet the desired objectives: the incentive 
compatibility constraint. 
3.25: Conclusion 
Spot transactions which are carried out on the market do not need contractual 
arrangements and thus no transaction costs are incurred. However, once the nature of the 
good or service is such that long term engagement between transacting parties is 
desirable, transaction costs assume greater significance and contracting becomes a 
preferred option. Contracts are, however, imbued with difficulties, which the theoretical 
bodies of transaction cost economics and principal-agent theories can help understand. 
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3.20: Empirical literature on referrals and contracting in the health 
sector 
3.21: Introduction 
The first section of this chapter provides an overview of selected literature on referrals, 
with a deliberate slant on literature from developing countries. The literature on referrals 
is discussed under three subjects of: community; provider; and institutional based 
determinants; The latter part of the section positions the issue of referrals in the broader 
policy context of health reforms, which leads to a discussion of contracting in the health 
sector, with a focus on internal contracts. 
3.22: National referral systems 
Given the scarcity of literature on referrals in developing countries, any traceable articles 
on referrals in LMICs was reviewed and summarised in table 3.1 below. The review 
shows that almost all the studies used routinely collected hospital data, which were 
augmented with data from health centres. The list of studies on referral in LMICs given 
in table 3.1 below shows that most of them focused on patients/minders (Atkinson, et al, 
1999; Bossyns and Van Lerberghe, 2004; Font et at, 2002; Nordberg et al, 1996; Siddiqi 
et al 2001); and frontline health workers (Atkinson, et al, 1999; Bossyns and Van 
Lerberghe, 2004; Ohara, 1998; Siddiqi et at, 2001), and only two included institutional 
managers ( Macintyre et al, 2003; Ohara, 1998). The studies can be meaningfully 
decomposed into two classes: those concerned with the patient/community interface and 
those focussing on service factors. There were hardly any focussing on institutional 
factors, a point noted by Bossyns (2004). The increasing importance of institutional 
actors especially under the now widespread sector reforms, which are characterised by 
the rolling out of the state and devolution of authority to autonomous institutions 
necessitates such institutional based investigations. 
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The reforms in the health sector were driven by the apparent inefficiencies of government 
provision of social services. The new thinking regarding the role of Governments in 
economic activities, under the New Public Management school spawned policy reforms 
aimed at improving efficiency, achieving equity and effectiveness of service provision. 
A key departure from previous policy shifts in the health sector was the use of market 
based approaches, either directly or indirectly. Since the patterns and levels of referrals 
could be used as indicators of how well a health sector is performing, they could be 
targeted either explicitly or implicitly as target variables. Furthermore, changes in 
referrals may indicate outcomes of underlying policy change. 
National referral systems are designed such that patients move `up' through a pyramid- 
shaped structure. Starting with the `typical' entry point at the base of the pyramid-for 
instance, the primary care clinic, dispensary, or health post in a community-the patient 
moves to a larger health facility in the nearest area, such as the district hospital or a 
private facility. Referral is warranted when the type or severity of illness presented 
supersedes the training or experience of the staff, or when appropriate drugs or 
equipment are not available at the basic health care level. The ideal-and most efficient 
arrangement for both the patient and the health system-is when patients receive the 
most appropriate care at the lowest level possible in the system (WHO, 1987). The 
assumption is that the lower level care is cheaper in terms of human and technical 
resources, and that patients pay increasing amounts and incur in-kind costs , the 
higher 
up the pyramid they seek care. 
An effectively running referral system was taken to be a fulcrum of an efficiently 
functioning PHC system. The Declaration of Alma Ata (WHO/UNICEF, 1978) stated 
that `primary health care (PHC) activities are supported by successive levels of referral 
facilities ... and [well-functioning referral systems] are essential to create confidence in 
the whole system. Ideally, there ought be no direct access to hospitals: the first contact 
of health centre level is the gate of entry into the system and the one which has the 
overall responsibility for the care of the community (Van Lerberghe, 1990; WHO, 1987). 
While recognising the importance of rationalising referrals from primary to secondary 
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and tertiary levels, the equally vital role of ensuring effective referrals for appropriate 
care (so called positive referrals, Van Laberghe and Pangu; 1988) ought not to be 
overlooked (Macintyre et al, 2003). 
Experience from around the developing world has showed that direct access to hospital 
was widespread (Atkinson, 1999; Akin and Hutchinson, 1991; Atkinson et al, 1999; 
Ohara et al, 1998; Sanders; 1998; ). Hospitals usually attracted a large number of people 
with problems that could be handled at the lower levels of contact. As a result of 
community preference for hospitals over health centres, the latter were often 
underutilised. The frequently cited reasons for by-passing health centres were: the poor 
state of many district-level secondary care facilities, inadequate training of primary care 
staff, the lack of economic resources, problems associated with physical transport and the 
state of the roads; and price differences between health centres and hospitals (Lerberghe, 
1990; Macintyre, 2003). 
Health systems which were characterised by unbridled access to hospitals are most likely 
to be inefficient, relative to those with gate keepers. Having hospitals involved in the 
delivery of primary health care had many pitfalls: it may result in lower quality of care; 
it disadvantaged health centres because they suffered from hospital competition for 
resources and prestige; and it made the hospital work below its potential because it was 
overloaded with primary care work (Van Lerberghe, 1990). In order to improve the links 
between layers of the health system, it ought to be ensured that the constituents 
performed tasks that they were best suited to; what was done at one level was not done at 
the other; avoiding overlaps; recognising that the health centre was the place where the 
synthesis was made and the hospital was the place where technical activities are carried 
out; and when human relations are more important and techniques less so, the health 
centre was a better place than the hospital and vice versa (Lerbeghe, 1990). 
Attainment of these ideals was, however, only feasible under qualified conditions: the 
need for a district system within a specified area for which the network of health centres 
and hospitals is accountable and avoiding intermediate structures, which may merely 
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delay a referral when it is needed. However, in some cases intermediate health centres10 
[called reference clinics in other literature] have been instituted precisely for the purpose 
of alleviating pressure on hospitals, with mixed outcomes. In Zambia they led to an 
increase in the uptake of services at health centres, reflecting unmet need, while leaving 
the pressure on the hospital unchanged (Atkinson et al, 1999), while a similar programme 
in Honduras was undermined by capacity limitations at the intermediate referral levels 
(Ohara, et al, 1998). While these case studies may, at face value, suggest limited impact 
of reference health centres on improving referral systems, they illustrate the intricate 
nature of factors affecting referrals. Recognition of these multiple factors is critical in 
order to evolve effective referral rationalisation policies. A comprehensive study of 
referrals would entail examination of economic, social, technical and psychological 
factors that explain the referral making process from primary to secondary levels of care. 
Macintyre et al (1999) suggested three approaches to studying referrals, all operating 
along interfaces-the individual/community, the patient/provider and the institutional 
links. The schema fits in perfectly with Thaddeus and Maine's (1994) classification of 
factors that affect the interval between onset of obstetric complications and its outcome: 
factors delaying the decision to seek care (individual/household); delay of arrival at a 
health centre (community factors); and delay in the provision of adequate care 
(/provider/institutional). 
3.23: The determinants of referrals 
The individual/household/community based determinants 
Medical anthropologists have focused on health seeking behaviour from the household or 
individual perspective, and have included some aspects of referrals in their studies. 
Studies focussing on individual factors that affect referrals noted that the decision to seek 
care and subsequently follow the referral route was determined by cost/income; 
perceptions of illness, social position of the ill person, and transport facilities (Macintyre, 
1999; Thaddeus and Maine, 1994). Such studies consistently showed positive 
10 Intermediate health centres are clinics designed to provide intermediary health services at a lower level 
than those provided by referral hospitals, but higher than those provided by health centres. They are 
established in order to rationalise access to hospital services. 
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associations between improved women's status, education level, and economic status and 
utilisation of health services. 
Individual factors impacted on referral decision making by interacting with household 
attributes. Bossyns and Van Larbheghe (2004) observed that in many developing 
countries, referral decisions and their management were a social event, involving the 
patient's family and friends. They recounted the situation in Niger where social norms 
resulted in minimal referrals for cases involving younger children or the elderly. As 
these were perceived to be at higher risk of dying, it was preferred to nurse them locally, 
so that if they died, they would be buried near their homes. 
Joint household decision making in identification of medical problems, and recourse to 
taking action impacted on referrals and had consequences for health outcomes. The 
importance of timely decision to seek care was especially important in the case of 
maternity cases, where such decisions impacted not only on the maternal but also on 
neonatal outcomes (Murray at el, 2001; Fawcus, et at, 1996). 
After individual/household determinants of health seeking behaviours, community 
factors are also critical determinants of health seeking behaviours and referral decisions. 
By far, the single most important community level factor that impacts on referrals is 
transport. Numerous studies have demonstrated how inadequate transport facilities and 
financial constraints limited referrals, by impacting on the rate at which individuals could 
seek and access care (Bacq and Rietsema, 1997; Nkyekyer, 2000; Macintyre and 
Hotchkiss, 1999; Thadeus and Maine, 1994). The spatial distribution of facilities and 
availability of transport means affected the extent to which referrals could be made. The 
impact of health facilities distribution and transport facilities had been particularly raised 
in studies on maternal mortality, where the impact was widely recognised (Bacq and 
Rietsema, 1997; Murray et al, 2001; Thadueas and Maine, 1994). 
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Provider based determinants 
Provider-based analyses are important in order to understand the impact of patient- 
provider relationships on referrals from primary to secondary levels of care. The very 
reason why patients have to be referred is that providers at lower health facility levels 
lack the requisite professional and practical expertise to provide the necessary care. The 
level and type of training of providers affected what they could, or felt able to treat 
(Maine, 1997; Koblinsky et al., 1999). Studies on provider attributes have documented 
high referral practices arising from limited experience, stress and heavy workload 
(Bachman and Freeborn, 1999). While improvements in professional competence and 
experience may improve the patterns and level of referrals, this is not sufficient for 
achieving desired provider behaviour. A reorientation of provider idiosyncrasies such as 
observed in Niger, where nurses were reluctant to refer, for fear of being labelled 
"incompetent" need to be addressed too (Bossyns and Van Lerberghe, 2004). 
Staff may gain in confidence and skill level merely through their length of practice. The 
longer they were resident in a primary care setting, the more conditions they felt able to 
diagnose or treat; on the other hand, habits of referring particular types of patients could 
also become ingrained (Omaha et al., 1998). Aside from professional qualifications and 
experience, provider perceptions about patient efforts to take care of their health was an 
equally important determinant of providers' referrals behaviour (Trevor, 1999; Leonard, 
2000). Where a provider perceived that a patient was not doing much to help maintain 
their health, the provider could react by referring such cases to other providers. 
Improving the capacity of providers to make appropriate referrals can be enhanced 
through retraining programmes and supplying of the requisite means with which to work. 
An all round approach to raising the capacity of providers would entail: availing the 
necessary resources to work with; training programmes to improve interpersonal 
relationships and responsiveness of care; regular support from trained supervisors; and 
development of appropriate incentive structures. 
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Institutional determinants 
As already outlined in the introduction, a review of studies on referrals illustrates the 
dearth of institution-focussed studies. The few institutional based studies on referrals 
focused on the receiving end, the referral hospital and recorded referrals as a percentage 
of all new patients seen at the secondary level, rather than the primary level (Atkinson et 
al., 1999; Sanders et al., 1998; Omaha et al., 1998). As a result, much of the referral 
research focused on patients that `by-pass' the lower level institutions. This occurrence 
was then interpreted as increasing the cost of health care both for the institution and the 
patient (Airey, 1989; Akin and Hutchinson, 1999; Mwabu, 1989; Sanders et al., 1998). 
Nordberg et al. 's (1996) study, which used patient referral data from patients already in a 
Kenyan district hospital together with census data, showed that 8.7 % of the cases were 
referred annually per 1000 population in the catchment area. The authors reported that 
between 0.28% and 1.8% (with a mean of 0.5%) of patients seen at the primary care level 
were referred for care at district hospitals. They observed that the rate was lower both for 
the average reported for Meru District in the early 1980s, which, according to the authors 
may reflect the high quality of staff training and supervision in the Kenyan health sector. 
Staff training and experience, as already stated are important determinants of referrals. 
Low quality of peripheral services is the most cited reason for people by-passing these 
facilities, in preference to the perceived better quality services provided at hospitals 
(Atkinson, 1999; Schwart, 1995; Sanders, 1998; Siddiqi, 2001). 
Since referrals have been identified as a source of inefficiency in the health sector and 
given that reducing costs is at the heart of reforms, it should logically follow that 
referrals would be both a policy instrument and a measure of policy outcome. The need 
to get referrals right is essential especially in the current context of major policy shifts in 
many developing countries, which to a large extent are premised on getting the PHC 
level coping with the majority of diseases, and in the process lessening the pressure on 
hospitals (Bias and Limbambala, 2001). This may improve technical efficiency by 
having health care services provided at appropriate levels and achieve effectiveness by 
responding to community needs. How then do referral issues feature in the health 
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reforms currently being implemented? The following section addresses this issue by 
reviewing the position of referrals in health reforms and the implications for referrals of 
the policy of explicit contracting. 
3.24: Health sector reforms 
Countries in Europe either follow a tax based Beveridge health system, which is based on 
universal coverage of all the population or the Bismark system, in which risks are covered 
by contributions deducted from income, with each sector of employment organising it's 
own insurance scheme . Today most 
Organisation of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries have achieved universal access to health care through a 
mix of public and private financing arrangements and providers. While the private sector 
is widely involved in the financing of health services of countries such as the USA, public 
financing of health services is the norm elsewhere in developed countries. 
The dominance of the state in the financing and provision of health services was mirrored 
in the health systems at independence of countries in the south. The need to develop and 
expand national health services was especially pronounced in newly independent countries 
which sought to redress decades of extreme inequities in health service delivery. Thus, 
vast investments were made to expand health service delivery facilities. The resulting 
growth in health facilities increased access for most populations. However, the expansion 
of services was later to provide a basis for the emergence of an inefficient and 
unresponsive public health service. These inefficiencies became evident following the 
deterioration of third world economies, which found themselves increasingly unable to 
adequately finance public services, amidst growing populations with the inevitable result 
of deteriorating quality of health services. 
Further, the expansion of health services, while designed to achieve improved access for 
whole populations, predominantly benefited urban dwellers. This arose partly out of 
colonial government policies that favoured urban areas and urban-biased development 
policies at independence. As a consequence, central and general hospitals in these countries 
absorbed approximately 30-50% of health sector expenditure; 50-60% of current 
government expenditure, 60-80 % of government national health facility expenditure and 
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possibly 70% of district-level health facility expenditure and around 60-80 percent of 
hospital expenditure (Mills, 1990). The management systems in most of the health sectors 
in LMICs, as a result came to be characterised by irrational utilisation of existing 
resources, fragmented implementation capacity, inadequate numbers and poor distribution 
of staff, chronic budget shortfalls (Mills, 1990; Segall, 2003), and excessive centralisation 
(Mills, 1990,2002). 
Such systems were evidently not sustainable and beginning in the nineteen eighties, 
emphasis shifted from across-the-board expansion of health services to a focus on low cost 
technologies to benefit the majority of the population. From the nineteen eighties, 
developing countries adopted the PHC model which recognised that much of the burden of 
disease in the developing countries could be addressed by minimum interventions, 
employing low cost technologies. The PHC model emphasised the role of the Government 
in achieving these tasks, and did not mention the private sector. The PHC campaign 
assumed active state involvement in both the financing and provision of health services, 
with the donor community being urged to provide contributions. 
The decline in third world economies and limited fulfilment of aid from developed 
countries thwarted the attainment of the PHC goals. Commentators on PHC have criticised 
the approach for placing too much emphasis on the role of government and neglecting to 
recognise the private sector. The World Bank's Investing in Health (1993), focused on 
achieving efficiency, effectiveness, and equity in the provision of health care services. The 
most important departure from the PHC model was the use of market based approaches to 
resolving health issues. The private sector would be encouraged to grow, while 
simultaneously exposing the public sector to market influences and increasing the voice of 
consumers in the production of health services. 
Ranging from African countries like Zambia, Uganda, and Kenya (Gilson L. and Mills A. 
1995; Jeppson, 2003; Mwabu, 1995) the Caribbean (Mills, 2002) the Philippines (Bossert 
et al, 2003), to Eastern Europe (Struyk, 2002), reforms with varying emphasis of the roles 
of the public and private sectors in the provision of health services have been implemented. 
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Such policies, encapsulated under the "New Public Management" school, sought to revisit 
the role of the state in the provision of social services. 
The policy changes that took place in the health sector were a microcosm of reforms in 
other hitherto government dominated areas such as water provision, maintenance of public 
housing, and marketing of agricultural products (Batley, 1997). The reforms were aimed 
at achieving the dual goals of inducing efficiency by increasing competition while retaining 
the well known equity advantages of the public sector. The poor economic performance 
and resultant social pressure enabled the absorption of external policy agendas on 
developing countries, and receptability among the population (Batley, 1997). The 
simultaneity in the timing of these reforms may reflect these underlying central pressures 
and/or the processes in lead reform countries may have provided a demonstration effect. 
As would be expected, the rationale and feasibility of applying market based reforms in 
developing countries has been questioned (Palmer, 2000; Broomberg, 1994; 
Chermochoscsky, 1995). 
Although the poor economic situation in developing countries provided a basis for 
external pressure and acceptability to the population, the process was not without 
problems. Indeed, during the process of reform, both social and political resistance was 
recorded in many countries. Not only did civil servants openly resist the pace of reforms, 
but in subtle ways thwarted their implementation (Abrantes, 1999; Jeppson, 2003). 
Reform, by its very nature meant a reorientation of the ways of doing things and 
invariable loss of power, especially for officers occupying privileged positions in civil 
service work. To get around this problem, in some countries such as Zambia (Soeters, 
1997) alternative implementation agencies were created in order to circumvent 
bureaucratic resistance. Elsewhere, reforms were suspended until reform minded 
governments were elected to office (Mills, 2002). 
From the outset it was imperative to identify circumstances that could frustrate or smooth 
the reform process. This entailed education and orientation programmes with key players 
who were likely to be affected by the reforms. How fast the reforms moved in a large 
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measure became dependent on identification of agents of change, who would be relied 
upon to ensure the process remained on course. The role of such agents of change has 
been recorded in countries such as Zambia, South Africa (Gilson L. and Mills A. 1995); 
and Uganda (Jeppsson, 2003). 
3.25: Conclusion 
The review of literature on referrals shows that despite their pivotal role in health 
systems, there have not been many studies in this area. The dearth of such studies is 
especially marked in developing countries. An overview of the studies on referrals 
shows that these have largely concentrated on individuallcommunity and frontline health 
provider perspectives. These studies illustrate dysfunctional referral systems and the 
urgency for reforms. The limited focus on institutional determinants of referrals 
highlights the urgency of carrying out such studies especially in view of the health sector 
reforms under which the role of various actors are being recast. 
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3.30: Reforming the health sector through the introduction of contracts 
3.31: Introduction 
This section of the chapter discusses the literature on the subject of internal contracts. 
The section begins by explaining the rationale behind opting for arms-length 
management of health services, which is facilitated by the introduction of internal 
contracts, and show cases countries in which such policies have been implemented. This 
leads to a discussion of the merits and demerits of introducing internal contracts, by 
drawing on the theoretical bodies of transaction cost economics and agency theories. 
3.32: Contracting policies 
As indicated in the section above, health reforms were part of a broader push to reorient 
the role of the state in the provision of services. Other than direct hierarchical 
management of public services, governments both in developed and developing countries 
were opting for an arms-length approach to health services management. This 
management orientation was based on market approaches for improving efficiency, 
ensuring equity and achieving consumer responsiveness to service provision. Contracting 
within the public sector through the creation of purchaser-provider splits and with the 
private sector became commonplace. 
In the health sector, internal contracting and contracts with the private sector were 
undertaken in various countries. In some countries, the private sector was contracted to 
provide clinical and support services, for example in Bombay, Thailand, Papua New 
Guinea and Bangkok; and Zimbabwe and South Africa, respectively (Mills, 1998). In 
other cases such as the UK, Finland, Australia and New Zealand, contracting was 
introduced within the public sector, through the separation of health service purchasing 
and provision functions (McPake, et al, 2002, Manson, 1995). 
In purchaser-provider splits, purchasers were expected to define health care requirements 
and identify opportunities for improving health status. They set priorities, developed 
specifications and contracted with providers for the delivery of health services. Providers 
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in turn delivered services against contracts or service agreements and were accountable 
to purchasers for the quality and quantity of services provided. Funders were a third 
element in the purchaser-provider relationship, and were responsible for obtaining and 
allocating funds to purchasers. To differing degrees, funders lay down policies and 
priorities, monitored purchaser performance and administered any regulations concerning 
purchaser-provider relationships. Purchaser-provider splits were often operationalised 
through the introduction of explicit contracts, under which service providers were 
commissioned. 
Enthhoven is widely considered to be the architect of the UK internal market model, 
which was implemented during the Thatcher Government. Le Grand and Bartlettt (1993) 
have widely used the concept of internal markets. Le Grand and Bartlett observe that 
internal markets are markets because they replace monopolistic state providers with 
competitive independent ones; and were quasi because they differed from strictly 
conventional markets as a result of., the participation of non-profit organisations; 
centralised purchasing power; and representation of consumers by agents. Harden (1992) 
observed that an internal market has three interlocking aspects: the creation of incentives 
for greater efficiency; the delegation of decision-making responsibilities to lower levels; 
and the principal of money following patients. Boyet and Finlay (1995) defined an 
internal market as a market for public goods where the state ceases to be both provider 
and funder. According to Walsh (1995), an internal market involves three key features: 
separation of purchaser and provider; contract to link them, and the development of 
charging and accounting systems. 
From these definitions of internal markets, it clear that whatever the emphasis, there are 
similarities for defining quasi markets: disengagement of the state from direct provision 
of services, retention of the funding role and assumption of a new role of regulation; 
appointment of agents; and involvement of the population. Reforms separating 
purchasing and provision functions were developed in various countries, prominent 
among which are New Zealand and the UK. In New Zealand, Health Regional 
Authorities were set up as purchasers of health services. In the first year, the purchasing 
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of secondary and tertiary health care entailed continuing the historical pattern with 
mainly public sector providers, which were transformed into Crown Health Enterprises, 
owned by the ministry of Crown Health Enterprises (Manson, 1995). In the UK, an 
internal health market was created through the separation of purchasers (District health 
authorities and GPFH) and service providers (GP, PHC, hospital and community trusts) 
(Cairns and Donaldson, 1994; Proppper, 1994). 
Mason (1995) observed that the separation of purchasers and providers exposed the issue 
of accountability, where providers were expected to measure up to public expectations. 
In the UK, Australia, and New Zealand, the purchasers were quasi-autonomous 
organisations appointed and funded by central or state governments; and in Scandinavian 
countries such as Finland, accountability was exercised through local government. 
However, there are questions about the extent to which these arrangements ensure 
accountability. Frant (1996), observes that high powered political incentives may result 
in decisions which do not serve the broader public good, but political interests. While the 
introduction of internal contracts may counter high powered political incentives, such as 
were evident in the pre-NHS era (Propper, 1995), new governance systems may still be 
vulnerable to political opportunism. This is borne out by the experience in Zambia, 
where hospital boards perceived to be sympathetic to opposition political parties were 
dissolved (Blasd and Limbambala, 2002; Kamwanga, et al, 2001). 
The purchaser-provider split model is premised on a set of assumptions: the market 
structure should be competitive or contestable; sufficient information for purchasers to 
make informed purchases; transaction costs should be low; motivation of providers 
should be partly financial; purchasers should be motivated to take consumer interests into 
account; and there should be no tendency to cream skim or dump (Le Grand, 1991). 
However, writers on internal markets have noted that competition is non-existent; 
monitoring roles introduce managements costs and are lacking in most countries; and 
payment systems may introduce perverse incentives (Manson, 1995; Smith, 1997; 
Broomberg). The precondition for the success of internal market while inadequate in 
developed countries are acutely absent in developing countries. 
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3.33: What are the benefits of internal contracts? 
Improving services through market based pressures 
Le Grand (1991) considered that the 1988/89 UK Acts in education, health care, 
personnel social services and public housing all had fundamental similarities, the 
introduction of quasi markets in the delivery of services. The basic premise on which 
these policies were based as has been shown above was that the state should disengage 
from the direct provision of services and concentrate on its role as financier, with 
provision of services being assigned to a commissioned body. Thus, through the 
separation of purchasing and provision functions, an internal market was created, which 
was expected to result in cost minimising behaviours. Where the private sector was 
contracted, it was hoped that benefits of private sector efficiency would be reaped. For 
quasi markets, created in the public sector, the benefits of competition were expected to 
induce managerial competence through the assignment of residual rights and 
redistribution of risks. 
In a study on contracting in New Zealand, Ashton (1997) found that in response to 
questions about whether contracting had been beneficial, respondents observed that there 
had been an improvement in accountability, which had encouraged greater efficiency. 
Other perceived benefits included improved quality of rest home services and greater 
transparency of the cost of mental health services. In the case of rest homes, improved 
quality was associated with the monitoring process. Whereas, there is evidence from 
countries such as New Zealand that contracting, under the right conditions, could 
improve efficiency in the delivery of health services, authors have questioned the 
desirability of contracting in developing countries (Broomberg, 1994; Mills, 1996; 
Palmer, 2001). The limited level of contestability necessary for the creation of an 
internal market, limited capacities, pervasive patronage systems in the public sector are 
cited as factors that may impede contracting in the third world. 
All 
T 
Clarifying purchasing and provision roles 
One of the ways in which technical efficiency is expected to be achieved is through the 
clarification of purchasing and provision roles. In addition to the clarification of these 
roles, internal markets would also encourage adherence to plans and priorities; and 
improve monitoring and evaluation. With the delineation made explicit, purchasers 
could concentrate on shopping around for the most appropriate quality care at the best 
price while providers could concentrate on providing services at the least cost and/or 
highest quality (Howden-Chapman and Ashton, 1994; McCoy, 2000). However, there 
may be difficulties in separating purchasing and provision functions where a provider 
had been performing both functions, for instance in the case of palliative care (Clark, et 
al, 1995). 
Being agents, purchasers were expected to act in the interest of communities. Where 
purchasers were not satisfied with providers' services, they would switch to others, 
reflecting consumer sovereignty (McCoy, 2000). In the NHS, the concept of money 
following the patient was expected to be achieved through provider competition, with 
fund-holders being free to contract with providers of their choice (Le Grand, 1993). 
While these expectations seemed rational, they failed to take account of the practical 
difficulties of consumers deciding whether it is the provider or purchaser responsible for 
failure; problems of estimating an individual's entitlement to public funding; purchaser 
difficulties in determining disease trends and hence service needs; risk of insuring small 
groups and the attendant management costs. 
McPake et al (2002) noted that in studying outcomes of internal contracts in the health 
sector, the question is not necessarily whether to contract or not, but rather whether 
formalising implicit contracts between those who pay for and those who provide public 
services brings more advantages or disadvantages. One argument for explicitness is that 
formal contracts clarify purchaser's objectives and more clearly specify distinct roles for 
purchasers and providers. The dysfunctional health system in most developing countries 
is in part due to the lack of clarity regarding roles of various actors. Thus, contracting 
ought, at the very least, to improve the linkages in the health system. The problem of 
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ineffective referral health systems alluded to in the section on referrals could in part be 
attributed to blurred distinctions of purchaser and provider roles. Over a long time, much 
effort has been concentrated on improving the delivery of services at lower levels of the 
health system. During the PHC period and the initial stages of health reforms, the 
emphasis was on devolved units of health delivery, with scant attention being paid to the 
hospitals sector (Blas and Limbambala, 2001 and Bossert et al, 2003, Hanson, 2002). 
Partly arising from this neglect of the hospital sector, an inefficient health delivery 
system developed, which was marked by bloated hospital costs and a broken down health 
care chain. In worse situations, hospitals increasingly provided PHC services, largely to 
urban populations, thus defeating the goal of ensuring equity of access. Through the 
explicit specification of purchaser and provider roles, the role of hospitals could be made 
more explicit and linkages between hospitals and other levels of health service provision 
improved. Such specification and delineation of roles could improve the efficiency of 
the sector, by pushing down costs. However, the imperative to achieve efficiency may be 
at the expense of attaining social goals of access. The equity questions that may 
accompany the achievement of technical efficiency ought to be considered (Howden- 
Chapman and Ashton, 1994). And this could be done through the explication of a social 
function, which specifies that the need for achieving efficiency should not compromise 
the poor' access to public health services. 
Reduction of bureaucratic inefficiencies 
Preker (2000) observed that public service delivery organisations had a propensity for 
capturing inordinate portions of the health sector budget, as well as influencing sector 
policy to their benefit, often against the public interest. In the health sector, provider 
organisations tried to gain advantages by affecting decisions on the distribution of 
resources or other benefits among providers. Such influence activities occur in all 
organisations, but countervailing forces were particularly weak in the public sector. 
Influence costs" were one of the most important costs of centralised control. 
11 The tendency of provider organizations to expend efforts to effect decisions regarding the distribution of 
resources or other benefits among providers to their benefit. The costs associated with such activities can 
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The centralised management styles which were the norm in most developing countries 
accentuated influence costs. Highly entrenched bureaucrats participated in both the 
production and provision of services, with the result that inefficient and highly expensive 
services obtained. Evidence of such activities in the health sector was seen in the 
tendency to allocate resources to tertiary and curative care at the expense of primary, 
preventive and pubic health services (Gilson L. and Mills A. 1995; Mills, 1990). 
Incidents of influence costs have been recounted in the pre-NHS sector: more funding 
directed to hospitals which were located in marginal areas or staffed by powerful staff 
and the collusion of regional authorities and local hospital managers to manipulate 
central government directives (Propper, 1995). The activities of powerful groups in the 
health sector may effectively undermine the authority of new structures, as was recounted 
in New Zealand where managers by-passed regional offices and sought audience with the 
minister (Howden-Chapman and Ashton, 1994). 
The behaviour of bureaucrats may either work to reinforce or minimise such influence 
costs. In the health sector, medical doctors often occupy influential positions and are 
able to bias the direction of policies in the sector. They not only choose the policy 
options to be pursued, but are also involved in implementation of the same, and thus lack 
the added advantage that may proceed from independent actors. It is precisely because of 
such conflicting roles, that the policy of splitting of purchasers and providers may help 
reduce the likelihood of influence costs and result in better allocation of resources, 
targeted at areas that address the health needs of a greater proportion of the population. 
However, the extent to which the influence activities are attenuated is dependent on the 
interaction of interest groups. Politicians, voter and professional groups all have their 
own interests to serve and try to influence decisions. Where professional groups such as 
doctors' associations wield a lot of influence, coupled with politicians' desire for political 
visibilities, influence activities would be perpetuated. The resistance to health reforms 
reported above attests to such costs (Jeppson, 2003; Mwabu, 1995; Soeters, 1997). 
be reduced by creating boundaries between the policy maker, the funder, and the provider. Source, Preker, 
S. P., A.. Harding, P. Travis, 2000 
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Increasing accountability to the population 
With the delineation of service provision and purchasing made explicit, purchasers are 
expected to act in the interest of the population to source services that they need. 
Purchasers would do this by assessing the needs of the population, appraising options 
available for the delivery of services, selecting providers and monitoring delivery of 
these services (Clark, et al 1995). In order to represent communities, some means of 
harnessing community views have to be developed, which is usually through the 
appointment of health boards. 
There is no ideal mechanism for representing community interests. Where there is more 
than one type of purchaser, as in the UK, equally varied bases for assessing needs would 
be used, for instance needs-based as contrasted with demand-led purchasing (Ham and 
Shapiro, 1995). Social functions are also critical determinants of the extent to which 
purchasers meet the population's needs. Ambiguities in defining what constitutes the 
social function complicates the work of purchasers, this being especially important in 
situations where board members have high local profiles and strong community networks 
(Ham and Shapiro, 1995). 
3.34: What are the difficulties of internal contracts? 
Direct management costs of contracting 
The introduction of contracts in the place of centralised management has been associated 
with an increase in management costs on both the provider and purchaser sides. Studies 
on the management costs of contracting have observed that these tend to be especially 
acute during the initial contracting periods. Such administrative costs have been noted 
settings as varied as New Zealand (Ashton, 1997); South Africa (Palmer, 2001); and the 
UK (Le Grande and J Le Grande J. Mays N. and Nixon J, 1998). Studies on contracting 
in New Zealand, (Ashton, 1997; Howden-Chapman, 1994), have categorised the cost of 
contracting identified by respondents as consisting of staff time, accounting and legal 
fees, consultancy fees, and travel costs. The transitional cost such setting up of 
information systems and staff training were also experienced. The time spent in 
preparing and negotiating contracts was most commonly reported by providers as being 
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the most significant management cost. In the UK while the fund-holders observed that 
collecting information was desirable in order to act effectively act as purchasers they 
were also concerned at the accompanying increase in costs (G Williams, 1977). 
Some calculations have been made of the costs of introducing and maintaining 
contracting. Walsh and Davis (1993, cited in Mills and Broomberg, 1998) estimated the 
costs of preparing for competitive tendering in the UK local government at 7.7 % of the 
annual contract value. They also found that the client costs of managing contracts were 
about 30% higher than the costs of managing the direct provision of service. The costs 
associated with contracting necessitate the development of information systems that 
could be used in checking undesirable behaviours among transacting parties. The 
difficulties of developing such systems have been recounted by various authors 
(Chernichovsky, 1995; Bennett Russell and Mills, 1999; Palmer, 2001). For instance, the 
new demands of contracting may exert additional demands on already out-stretched 
managers and in the worst situations redeploy medical staff away from provision of 
health services to administration, a real possibility as experienced in the NHS (Allen, 
2002). While some evidence from places such as Lesotho, SA and Thailand suggest that 
contracting assisted government to overcome public service restriction, experience from 
other places such as Ghana, Tanzania, Thailand and Zimbabwe suggest that the public 
procurement process itself can became highly bureaucratic, undermining the potential 
efficiency of contracted providers (Bennett, Russell and Mills, 1999; Gilson et al, 1997). 
In many countries where contracting out has been implemented, there is very weak 
government capacity to monitor the performance of both for-profit and not-for-profit 
contractors (Mills 1995, Bennett, Russell and Mills, 1999; Gilson et at, 1997; Bennett 
and Mills, 1998). 
The policy of explicit contracts is premised on the existence of a competitive or 
contestable market. It has been documented that while there was some competition on 
the provider side, this was not the case on the purchaser side, where the DHA dominated. 
The situation between the DHA and provider was one of bilateral monopoly, with one 
purchaser and a couple of providers (Le Grande J. Mays N. and Nixon J. 1998). Allen 
69 
(2002) observes that although there were a couple of providers, the local authorities 
perceived themselves to be in locked-in relationships with trusts. There were several 
reasons why the health authority behaved as if it had no alternative partners. The 
centrally dictated imperative of not destabilizing local trust was important. This 
phenomenon could be seen as the persistence of an older organizational culture, which 
predated the introduction of the internal market, as well as being an accurate reading of 
the many sometimes conflicting requirements of central government. Illife and Munro 
(2000) concluded that in reality the NHS internal market was not competitive 
management heavily outweighed competition - which meant paying for all the costs of 
competition, but getting little of the benefits. 
Contracting and the problem of agenCy 
Traditionally, principal-agent problems are pervasive in the health sector. The principal- 
agent problem arises when there exists between a principal and an agent, both asymmetry 
of information and a difference in incentives or objectives. Where asymmetry of 
information exists, agents may misreport their competence (adverse selection) or may 
mislead the principal about their level of effort (moral hazard). However, if the principal 
and agents' objective functions are in alignment, even in the face of information 
asymmetry, an optimal solution could be found since both have the same purpose. 
Similarly, where the objective functions are different, but there is no asymmetry of 
information, an optimal solution is still possible, since the principal would be able to 
ascertain whether an agent is behaving opportunistically or not. The problems of 
information asymmetries were highlighted in a study on GP fundholding (Williams et al; 
1997), where it was observed that a key element in the contracting relationship is the 
ability for purchasers to be satisfied that they were receiving the service required at the 
level and quality specified in the contract. However, the information system in 
community health services did not enable them to be confident about whether they were 
getting value for money, nor was it possible to define outcomes for patients. 
By bringing explicit contracts between contracting parties, additional PA relationships 
are introduced. The purchaser-provider split introduces an agency relationship between 
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purchasers as principals and providers as agents. After the first wave of reforms of the 
NHS in the UK, the DHA was expected to contract with any provider. It was originally 
assumed that there would be sufficient providers and some sort of provider competition 
would emerge (Butler, 1993). This, however did not happen, and the difficulties arising 
from there were compounded by the administrative difficulties regarding the requirement 
for annual renewal of contracts, which policy makers sought to resolve through opting 
for long term contracts (Dawson and Goddard, 1999; Goddard and Mannion, 1998), a 
trend that was observed in the New Zealand health sector as well (Ashton, 1997). 
It was expected that long term contracts would through brining trust to the fore avoid 
some of the disruptive effects of short term contracts. It was argued that such long term 
contracts would encourage collaboration and effective sharing of information and avoid 
excessive transaction costs (Robinson and Le Grand, 1995). Dawson and Goddard 
(1999) and Allen (2002) comment on the extent to which contracts between Trusts and 
DHAs shifted over time towards relational contracts, involving long term, trust based 
relationships rather than competitively awarded spot contracts. 
Goddard and Mannion (1998) noted that the move towards long term contracts and the 
emphasis on collaborative relationships may not represent a substantial change of 
direction for the NHS, but rather a continuation of a process, which had already been 
occurring because of the nature of the transactions between purchasers and providers in 
the market. While the advantages of long term contract such as enabling the parties to 
plan over a long term horizon are noted, there are some disadvantages such as the 
potential to encourage anti-competitive tendencies. As indicated above, with the 
tendency towards long term contracts, trust becomes an important aspect of the 
relationships between purchasers and providers. Goddard and Mannion (1998) identify 
three facets of trust which are important to understanding the difficulties of long term 
contracts: trust ranges from complete trust to complete distrust; trust is especially 
applicable to situations of ignorance or uncertainty about the known or unknowable 
actions of others; the concept of trust is also based on the expectation that an agent has 
sufficient freedom and predisposition to disappoint the principals' expectations. For trust 
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to be of relevance, the contracting parties must possess the freedom to choose whether to 
enter or not to enter into a relationship. 
Beyond the direct relationship between purchasers and providers, external sources of PA 
problems may be identified. Starting from the higher level of government, one set of 
relationships is that between political groups, ranging from Ministers/Secretaries of 
Health to local political/community representatives. Clarity about PA relationships is 
important in managing these relationships. As was demonstrated in the section on 
reforms, consumers are increasingly being involved in the delivery of services, in part so 
as to improve PA relationships. To this end, structures such as health boards have been 
established in countries undergoing health reforms. 
Given the myriad of PA relationships in the health sector, principals need to devise ways 
of bringing the action of agents in line with their expectations. The extent to which this 
is possible is dependent on: the nature of the service to be delivered; the principal-agent 
relationship; and the competence of the principals and agents (Batley, 1997). Where the 
service or product to be provided can be easily defined, it is much easier for the principal 
to hold the agent accountable for their actions. Services and products that are relatively 
easy to define make the process of information gathering for measuring performance 
much easier. Similarly, where assets employed in a transaction have value in alternative 
use, the hold-up costs are minimized since the provider can shift their production to a 
new purchaser. 
ne incentives of contract navment methods 
Where explicit contracts have been introduced, this has gone in hand in hand with 
modifications to payment mechanisms, which send varying signals to purchasers and 
providers. There are three basic questions that need to be addressed when assessing the 
impact of contract payment systems: does the provider payment mechanism promote the 
right mix of provider incentives; are residual claims great enough to attract good 
providers and influence their behaviours; and does the public purchaser provide enough 
funding to influence provider behaviour (Slack and Savedoff, 2001). Just as important is 
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the need get the pricing right in order for signals to produce the appropriate mix of 
activities. 
In the UK, providers are required to set prices for their services that are the same as cost, 
which gives them no incentive to promote innovative and perhaps cheaper services that 
might attract income and strengthen the provider organisation as a whole (Cairns, 1993). 
On the positive side, progressive changes in prescription and referral habits of GPs have 
been recorded. For instance it was documented that the proportion of generic 
prescriptions increased at a slower rate in fund-holders relative to non-fund-holders and 
prospective fund-holders who appeared to have significantly higher referral rates reduced 
these on gaining trust status (Golden and Torgerson, 1997; Crump et al 1995). 
The choice of payment method should make a trade-off between cream-skimming and 
cost reduction. In population-based/historical contracts, the provider is allocated a fixed 
amount of funds, based more or less loosely on the size of the population to be served. 
The provider bears the risk of any deficits but also keeps any surplus. This type of 
contract may provide an incentive for providers to shift costs to other providers or 
minimise on the amount of care accorded to patients. Under block payments, the whole 
service is purchased at a fixed price over a set of time. Block contracts may minimise 
risk and disruption for purchasers and providers but could militate against strategic 
changes that either side may wish to promote (Manson, 1995). 
Failure to adopt effective payment methods may undermine some positive impacts of 
internal contracts. For instance, Williams (1997), observed that while internal contracts 
had led to desirable effects on GPFHs (such as more practice-based rather than hospital 
outpatient-based therapy services), it had been less successful in influencing community 
health services, mainly because of block contracts. In order to overcome some of the 
disadvantages of capitation systems, they can be adjusted for risk, as is the practice in 
some managed care arrangements in the US, for example for Medicaid patients; the 
reformed Dutch health system and in the health sector reforms in Columbia (Mills and 
Broomberg, 1998). Bartlett and Le Grande (1992) have noted the adverse effects of 
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block contracts to give the trusts both the incentive and opportunity to cream-skim and 
hence undermine equity objectives. 
Alper (1994) expressed concern at the impact of the rapid growth of managed care on the 
primary physician who is expected to act as gate-keeper and, because the capitation 
system exposed them to financial risk. Alper's fear was that primary care would become 
less attractive for physicians and that there would be a steady decrease in the quality of 
primary care. It was further observed that there was evidence that the capitation 
contracts for PHC, which excluded hospital care encouraged a higher rate of referrals. In 
contrast, capitation methods which included hospital care provided an incentive to 
provide care at the lowest cost level - usually the primary care level. 
Under service-based contracts with volume restriction, the providers are paid a fee per 
service, but the number of services to be performed is in some way restricted. The 
provider does not have to bear the risk for composition of services but does have to bear 
the risk that the rates per service which are agreed in advance will not cover the full 
costs. The provider is, therefore, focused on controlling costs, but mainly through 
keeping costs per unit of output below the preset fees. This contract type has another 
advantage in that the provider has no further incentive to induce demand beyond the 
specified volume limit and the public purchaser can anticipate and control the magnitude 
of expenditure. However, the level of detail required for service-based contracts is more 
than that required under block contracts, which introduced serious difficulties for 
providers. 
Service-based contracts without volume restriction attract more perverse reactions than 
those based on volume restrictions. For instance in the USA, medical procedures and 
individual service volumes are costed and then paid for when they are delivered 
(Howden-Chapman, 1994). Under this system, providers are paid on the basis of 
diagnosis of the patient. With such a system, the definition for diagnoses is clearly 
important. Providers may be tempted to classify patients with minor ailments into more 
complicated diagnosis categories (the so called DRG-creep) with a prospective higher 
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payment rate. Reimbursement based contracts carry an additional risk to providers: as 
reimbursement systems concentrate on the direct patient costs, tertiary and teaching 
hospitals may lose out since the costs of research and teaching may not be covered 
(Kirkman-Liff, 1997). The risk of fee-for-service contracts to result in provider induced 
demand has been noted (Harden, 1992; Flynn, 1996). 
Contract specification 
As identified in the section reviewing theoretical perspectives, contracts are a preferred 
option for transactions where the nature of the service/good is such that significant costs 
would be incurred were the exchange to be conducted in the market. In order to hedge 
against hazards of transacting with a specific party as opposed to the open market, where 
long term relationships are not necessary, contracts should ideally be detailed, ex ante, by 
being elaborate and formulating all possible eventualities. Where contracts are so 
formulated, the chances of contract failure are minimised. The assumption that contracts 
would be elaborate enough as to cater for all future eventualities were the original 
expectations that marked the implementation of the NHS internal market in the UK. It 
was hoped that as the market evolved over time, complete contracts would become the 
norm. However, this expectation was not achieved and various commentators on the 
NHS have observed that the contracts were incomplete, highly idiosyncratic and 
regulated (Allen, 2002; Le Grand, 1994) an observation that had been made about South 
Africa too (Palmer, 2000). For one thing, the purchasers and providers did not have a 
choice about who they could contract with. They were from the beginning locked in 
historical relationships, which rather than ease over time, actually became stronger. It 
became apparent to policy makers that it was not possible to have classical contracts in 
the internal health market and the trend has since been towards relational contracting. 
Walsh (1995) proposed two basic approaches to specifying the work to be done in a 
contract. The first states the outcome and leaves it up to the provider to determine how 
the work is to be done (ease for non-clinical, but less so for clinical services). The second 
states the methods to be used, for example a test to be done or even just the workload, for 
example number of procedures. Because of the difficulty of specifying outcome, Walsh 
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(1995) observes that contracts will generally be a mixture of method and performance. 
Indeed, recent research on contracts in the UK has highlighted that contracts are often 
broadly focused, informally worded, deliberately incomplete and reliant on informal 
mechanisms for dealing with disputes (Flynn and Williams 1997; Spurgeon et al 1997). 
They conforms more to what are termed "relational contracts" where the contract is less 
important than the relationship between the parties over time. 
Similarly, studies on contracting in the developing world have identified a number of 
problems in the design, management and implementation of contracts which may help to 
explain the failure in some to generate efficiency gains. Firstly, many of the contracts 
appear to have arisen in an ad hoc, with little explicit justification or evaluation of their 
likely costs and benefits and they were often very vague (Kutzin 1995, Bennet, Russel 
and Mills 1996, Hospital Strategy Project Consortium 1996, Gilson et al 1997). This 
suggest that contracting in a developing country environment may have generally failed 
to live up to one of its objectives, that of clarification of organizational objectives and 
increased transparency of resources allocation through an explicit trading relationship 
between purchasers and providers (Bennet, Russel and Mills, 1996). 
The effectiveness of the contracts had further been attenuated by the ineffectiveness of 
the rewards and penalties. In the UK, while a small number of fundholders had 
introduced a combination of incentive payments and penalty clauses into their contracts 
(mostly concerning the provision of specialized information by certain dates) the 
majority of fundholders did not wish to take their capacity for control in the contractual 
relationship to its logical conclusion - cancellation of contract. Rather they encouraged 
the relational contracting, where negotiation would govern their relationship as 
contracting parties. 
Walsh (1995) makes a distinction between punishment-based and co-operative 
contractual approaches. The former assumes that client and contractor have different 
interests, and each seeks to exploit the other. Sanctions are required to discourage the 
contractor from failing to deliver. A co-operative contract assumes that the two parties 
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have interest in common, and that events outside the contractors control are just as likely 
to affect contract performance. 
Transaction attributes and contracting difficulties 
The policy environment in which the policy of explicit contracts is implemented has a 
large bearing on how successful it is likely to be. For instance in the UK NHS, while a 
competitive environment was envisaged from the inception of contracting, this was 
attenuated overtime, with policy makers emphasizing cooperation between purchasers 
and providers. The originally commercial orientation of the reforms was diluted with 
more mild policy statements taking prominence: buyer became purchaser and then 
commissioners; seller became providers; budgets became funds; and marketing became 
needs assessment (Butler, J 1993). Although the government was originally not 
expected to be overtly involved in the health sector, the Department of Health maintained 
limits on capital expenditure, where they set external financing limits and regulated 
prices (Bartlett, W and Le Grande, 1994; Allen, 2002), and urged purchasers and 
providers to ensure a smooth take-off (Newchurch, 1993). Talking about the political 
environment, Anand (1995) observed that as in other health systems based on the need to 
ensure responsiveness to consumer needs, accountability in the NHS tended to be of an 
internal, hierarchical, ex post nature, whereas the prevailing ideology of patient choice 
emphasizes user involvement in the decision-making process. Similarly political 
influences have been registered in other settings where similar reforms have been 
attempted, for instance New Zealand (Phillipa Howde-chapman and Ashton, 1994). 
The myriad of non market influences was further manifested through members with 
powerful positions in the old organisational structure holding powerful positions in the 
new organisations. Because governments are concerned with both equity and efficiency, 
providers and purchasers were subjected to a range of regulations, policy guidelines and 
monitoring arrangements (Philtipa Howde-chapman and Ashton, 1994). For instance 
since government allocates resources in regulated markets, residual income is arbitrary, 
and lack of residual income means incentives to be efficient are weak (Propper, C, 1995). 
And to the extent that government funds providers, it also retains a monitoring role, 
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which, however, it is not able to discharge effectively and agents are likely to respond to 
controls and monitoring by reducing outputs of the non-monitored aspects. Because of 
such difficulties, Propper (1995) suggests that competition could be encouraged where 
this is possible and regulation supported where competition is unlikely. 
Because of the difficulties of replicating competitive market conditions, which has been 
observed by various authors (Palmer, 2000; Broomberg, 1994; Bennet et al, 1999), 
suggestion have been made regarding the use of market proxies. Such proxies for market 
conditions include voice, exit and loyalty, which are expected to exact similar responses 
by increasing the voice of consumers, threatening switching to alternative providers and 
relying on public loyalties to safeguard transactions. 
Contracting comes with a gradual evolution in the autonomy of contracting parties, 
ideally away from centralised management towards greater autonomy. How much 
autonomy is accorded reflects the environment in which these policy changes are taking 
place and also shows how keen the policy makers are on realising the stated policy 
changes. Slack and Savedoff (2001) have suggested a continuum of indicators for 
classifying degrees of autonomy: the decision rights; market exposure; residual claim 
over revenue; accountability; and social functions. 
Studies assessing control over inputs have illustrated the difficulties that providers and 
purchasers face in dealing with inputs that are centrally controlled. This is especially a 
problem with respect to control over labour inputs. The reform implementation problems 
recounted in the section on health reforms are in part explained by the limited control of 
contracting agencies over labour inputs. The problem of staff scarcities and institutional 
rigidities such as permanent employment conditions in reform settings has been 
acknowledged (Larbi, 1998; Bartly, 1997; Goddard and Mannion, 1998). Controls on 
revenue generation range from caps on how much returns can be earned on capital goods 
to restriction on the kinds of fees that can be levied. 
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Although the restriction on revenue generation may be taken to be interference with 
autonomous units, this could be justified such intervention serves to temper managerial 
objectives, which may be at the expense of social goals. The need to safeguard social 
needs, however, should be weighed against the necessity of giving managers enough 
autonomy to carry out their delegated mandate. Where social functions are explicitly 
stated and funded, there will be less confusion for providers, However, social functions 
are often left ambiguous and can be a serious source of confusion. What exactly 
constitutes a social function and the mechanisms used to carry this through, are subjects 
of debate and lead to varying principal-agent problems. 
The level of completeness of a contract is in part dependent on the characteristic of the 
service being contracted for. Because of the inherent difficulties of specifying and 
measuring health services, health service contracts tend to usually be incomplete. These 
difficulties are compounded by the myriad of factors which influence health outcomes 
and are beyond the ambit of the sector. Writers on internal contracts have highlighted 
such specification difficulties in the health sector (Allen, 2002; Ashton, 1997), which 
difficulties may in turn outweigh the expected gains from the policy of internal contracts 
(Bartlett, 1991; Dawson and Goddard, 1999; Roberts, 1993; Howden-Chapman and 
Ashton, 1994). Allen (2002) in a study on contracting of nursing services showed that 
the economic characteristics of nursing services were such that it was not possible to 
fully specify or to monitor them completely. District nursing services were a complex 
product, which consisted of a wide range of continuing activities, as opposed to a single 
intervention. This was compounded by the fact there was a moderate degree of 
uncertainty about the future. Furthermore, despite the fact that district nurses could in 
fact have been redeployed in a variety of other health care settings, it was found that the 
providers believed that the human assets employed in delivering services were specific to 
the transactions with their current purchasers, and could not be re-deployed elsewhere. 
Writing about mental health services, Lien (2003) acknowledged specification 
difficulties, exemplified by the difficulties of anticipating the frequency of demand for 
such services. 
79 
Partly arising from specification difficulties in the health sector, contracting parties can 
only act as well as the information they have allows them to. Where it is not in the 
interests of the contracting parties to willfully share such information, and in the worse 
situation, when one part actively distorts information to their advantage, there will be 
serious contracting problems. Allen (1997) in a study on internal contracts in the health 
sector illustrated the problems of service specification, which arose out of information 
asymmetries between purchasers and providers of health services. Interviews with 
purchasing staff revealed that they did not know what was going on inside the purchaser 
trusts. District Health Authorities were of the view that trusts acted opportunistically 
through taking advantage of the health authorities' lack of detailed knowledge of the 
trusts' activities. 
3.36: Conclusion 
Either explicitly or implicitly, various countries have instituted health reforms to improve 
efficiency, equity and ensure responsiveness to consumers. Contracting within the public 
sector through the creation of purchaser-provider splits is becoming commonplace. The 
supposed benefits of internal contracts include: improving services through the use of 
market based pressures; clarifying purchaser/provider roles; reduction of bureaucratic 
inefficiencies; and increasing accountability to the public. The extent to which the 
expected outcomes are realised, however, has to be judged against the difficulties of 
contracting such as direct management costs, perverse incentives of contract payment 
methods, agency problems and transaction costs. 
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Chapter 4.00: Analytical framework, aim, objectives and 
methods of the study 
4.10: Introduction 
This chapter combines the analytical framework and research methods that were used in 
the study. From the review of the theoretical and empirical literature on referrals and 
contracting, it was evident that in order to study referrals within the contracting 
framework, "incentive structures" and how they influenced referrals would be central. 
The analytical framework below outlines the interaction of environmental factors, 
transaction attributes, incentive structures, and rewards and penalties and their impact on 
contract outcomes. This is followed by a discussion of the aims, objectives and methods 
of the study. The chapter ends with a commentary on the quality of data. 
4.20: Analytical framework 
The analytical framework presented below uses insights from transaction cost economics 
and the principal-agent theory to trace contracting outcomes arising from the interaction 
of environmental factors, transaction attributes, incentive structures, and rewards and 
penalties. 
4.21: Environmental factors 
For purposes of this study, the environment factors which were deemed to be critical for 
assessing the difficulties of contracting were: the spatial distribution and ownership of 
health facilities, and capacity of health facilities to deliver services. Attention was 
directed at exploring the differences between NGO and public hospitals and to a lesser 
extent on upgraded and non-upgraded hospitals. 
4.22: Incentive structures 
Principal-agent analysis was performed by analysing four categories of actors and how 
they related to one another: districts, hospitals, frontline providers; and communities. 
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The principal-agent relationships were identified by assessing the flow of funds in the 
health sector and from interviews with respondents. From the identified principal-agent 
relationships, incentive structures and their impact on referrals were determined. There 
were three broad incentive structures identified: the financial incentives that arose from 
the contract payment mechanism; managerial incentives faced by both districts and 
hospitals; and social incentives to which the providers responded. 
4.23: Transaction attributes 
The key transaction attributes that would pose difficulties for the public sector are human 
asset specificities and behavioural attributes of bounded rationality and opportunism. 
Human asset specificities related to staff shortages and management difficulties. 
Scarcities of providers were explored in the context of upstream contracts with the 
CBOH, while staff management problems were analysed in the context of downstream 
contracts between districts/hospitals and frontline health providers. 
4.24: Rewards and penalties 
While the introduction of explicit policies is expected to impact on the delivery of 
services by recasting the role of the actors in an internal market, sometimes the expected 
outcomes do not materialise because of the lack/limited effects of reward and penalty 
systems. Such systems could be used to enhance the effectiveness of contracting through 
for instance ensuring the appropriateness of referrals between districts to hospitals. 
4.25: Contract Outcomes 
Deriving from the interplay of environmental factors, contract/transaction attributes, 
principal-agent relationships, incentive structures and rewards and penalties are a myriad 
of contract difficulties. Such contract difficulties may be reflected in problems regarding 
the mobilization and use of inputs, and costs for monitoring the process and outputs of a 
contract. 
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Figure 4.1: Analytical framework for the study 
Environmental factors 
Distribution of health facilities 
Ownership of health facilities 
Capacity for providing health services 
Incentive structures II Transaction attributes 
Financial Human asset specificities 
Socio-political Bounded rationality 
Professional & managerial Opportunism 
Rewards and penalties 
I 
Deter inappropriate behaviour 
Improve contracting policy 
Contract Outcomes 
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4.30: Aim and objectives of the study 
4.31: Aim of the study 
The aim of the study was to analyse the nature and difficulties of contracting between 
district health boards and referral hospitals in Zambia, using referrals as a tracer. With 
the aid of insights from New Institutional Economics, the study sought to explain the 
process and difficulties of contracting, patterns and levels of referrals by studying the 
interaction of environmental, contracting/transaction factors, principal-agent 
relationships, incentive structures, and contract difficulties. 
4.32: General objectives 
A: Describe the arrangements for managing referrals between districts and hospitals 
and assess how this has changed. 
B: Assess the levels and patterns of referrals under varying contracting 
environments. 
C: Explore the incentive structures facing districts and hospitals and how these 
explain the levels and patterns of referrals. 
Specific objectives under general objective A. 
Al. Describe the transaction environment and contracting difficulties between 
districts and referral hospitals. 
A2. Describe the type of contracts between districts and referral hospitals before and 
after the health reforms. 
A3. Assess the views of districts, hospitals and policy makers on the policy of 
contracting. 
Specific objectives under general objective 13. 
B 1. Assess the levels and patterns of referrals between districts and hospitals 
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B2. Determine the differences in referral levels and patterns under varying contract 
settings 
Specific obiectives under general objective C. 
Cl. Assess how the referral making process is supposed to work and how it works. 
C2. Explore the incentive structures facing districts and hospitals and how these 
impact on referrals 
Hypothesis 1: Locked -in relationships between DHBs and RHBs will lead to contract 
difficulties. 
A thematic analysis of the data was carried out, from which the most pronounced 
contracting problems between districts and hospitals were identified and examined by 
type of respondent, and type of contract. 
Hypothesis 2: Referrals are likely to be more appropriate under contracts with public 
hospitals than NGO hospitals. 
The hypotheses were tested using empirical data on referrals between districts and 
referral hospitals. The appropriateness of referrals was tested using expert opinion 
based , which was supplemented by the testing of differences in various indicator of 
illness severity using two tracer conditions of pneumonia and malaria. 
4.40: Selection of study sites 
The study sites were selected on the basis of varying referral policies (Table 4.1). A case 
study approach was adopted where hospitals with specified referral policies were 
purposively selected. The University Teaching Hospital, was selected on account of the 
health centre upgrading programme, while Ndola CH and Kitwe CH were included as 
control sites which did not have health centre upgrading programmes. Monze mission 
hospital was included in order to gauge the issues surrounding contracts with NGOs 
hospitals. 
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The UTH is located in Lusaka Urban district, which is the capital city of Zambia. 
Although the hospital was supposed to be the national referral hospital, it in effect acted 
as a district hospital, since the district did not have a first level referral hospital. The 
hospital had had to grapple with the problem of excessive demand for its services. As a 
consequence of this, various initiatives had been undertaken to address the problem. 
These initiatives included upgrading of health centres, which was expected to rationalise 
referrals to the hospital. However, instead of alleviating congestion at hospital, the 
upgrading of health centres was observed to have led to an increase in the uptake of 
services at health centres and no change in hospital level utilisation, a reflection of 
previous unmet need (Atkinson, 1999). At the time of data collection for this study, 
Lusaka DHB and UTH managers had entered into an agreement where the hospital OPD 
was turned into a HAHC, which was managed by the district. 
After UTH, Ndola and Kitwe CHs are the next biggest hospitals in the country, which 
cater for the Copperbelt region. Both are third level referral hospitals offering health 
services to districts on the Copperbelt province. Like the UTH, both NCH and KCH are 
located in districts which do not have district hospitals. Unlike iTTH, however, there was 
no upgrading of health centres in the two districts, thus making a good case for 
comparing with UTH, where health centres had been upgraded. A rural hospital, Monze 
mission hospital located in the Southern province was included in order to illustrate the 
difficulties of contracting with a mission hospital located in a rural setting. 
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Table 4.1: List of hospital and district study sites by pertinent referral rationalisation 
policy and type of hospital ownership 
Referral hospitals District Health Pertinent referral Hospital ownership 
Board rationalisation policy 
University Lusaka urban Upgrading of health Public 
Teaching Hospital Kafue centres 
By-pass fees 
Ndola Central Ndola No upgrading of Public 
Hospital Masaiti health centres 
One-off suspension 
of by-pass fees 
Kitwe Central Kitwe No upgrading of Public 
Hospital Kalulushi health centres 
By-pass fees 
Monze General Monze Hospital affiliated NGO 
Hospital Mazabuka health centre 
By-pass fee 
4.50: Qualitative data collection methods 
In order to understand the process and difficulties of contracting between DHBs and 
RHBs, the study used qualitative methods. Qualitative methods allow researchers to 
study the complex social settings of their subjects. These methods have been widely used 
in health services research and in health economics research, where their value has been 
recognised (Coast 1999). Coast (1999) observes that health economics has the 
opportunity to draw on innovative cross disciplinary ways of working and there is the 
potential to consider researching particular questions in what are generally considered to 
be unconventional ways by using qualitative methods. Qualitative research can be about 
persons' lives, stories, behaviour, and also about organisational functioning, social 
movements or interactional relationships (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Contractual 
relationships fall into this latter set of possible research subjects. A number of 
researchers studying contracting in the health sector have used qualitative research 
methods, using case-studies (Allen, 2000; Palmer, 2001; Broomberg, 1994). 
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There are arguments for and against the use of case studies. The use of case studies is 
often criticised on the basis that they are less amenable to generalisations. In general, 
case studies are a preferred strategy when "how" or "why" questions are being posed, 
when the investigator has little control over the events and when focus is on a 
contemporary phenomenon with some real life context (Yin, 1994). Although case 
studies have been criticised for lacking powers of generalisability, Seale (1983) observes 
that the criticism about qualitative methods lacking powers of generalisability arises from 
the common assumption that the only valid basis for making inferences is that which has 
been developed in relation to statistical analysis. However, case studies need to be 
selected for explanatory powers rather than their typicality as there is no attempt to seek 
generalisability from a case study method. The basis of theoretical generalisation lies in 
logic rather than generalisability (Seale 1999) and not typicality and must be looked for 
in the social context rather than in the case (Mitchell 1983). 
As Palmer (2001) observed, although the case study approach has been widely used by 
researchers in the health sector, one ought to keep the limitations in mind and aim at 
minimising their influence. Such limitations include the researcher's biases, loose 
application of the term case, and its bounded nature, which favours containment, control 
and causality rather than the complexity and dynamism of the real world (Yin, 1994). 
These shortcomings notwithstanding, case studies can provide stories to illustrate 
particular social contexts. Lincoln and Guba (1985) observe some of the key advantages 
of case-studies as being: validating and building upon the tacit knowledge that an 
investigator brings to inquiry; allowing for purposive sampling; incorporating the notion 
that the focus of the design can be adjusted as the process unfolds and issues of particular 
interest are identified. 
Where researchers have used more than one case study, the intention is not to achieve 
representativeness, but rather broaden understanding of the phenomenon under study. 
The rationale for having more than one case is what Yin terms "replication logic" rather 
than a "sampling logic". A replication logic seeks to find similar results between case 
studies (literal replication) or different results for predictable reasons (theoretical 
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replication). In replication logic, theoretical replication takes place when different results 
are observed for predictable reasons, by relating the case study to a theoretical 
framework, which analyses it differently and therefore would predict results from the 
different cases chosen. Replication of results across sites helps to ensure that findings 
are not due to characteristics of particular sites, hence it increases external validity (Keen 
and Packwoood 1999, quoted in Palmer, 2001) or analytical generalisability if not 
statistical generalisability (Walsh, et al 1997, quoted in Palmer, 2001). 
As identified above, a number of researchers on contracting (Allen, 2000; Palmer, 2001; 
Broomberg, 1994) have used case studies. They have collected data through record 
reviews and in-depth interviews (Ashton, 1994; Palmer, 2001; Broomberg, 1994). In 
addition, Allen (2000) used direct observation techniques. Direct observation enables a 
researcher to study the setting of meetings between contracting parties and get data, 
which could not be collected using the other methods. Almost all the researchers have 
supplemented their methods with repeat visits to study sites, where follow up meetings 
were held in order to follow up on leads as they developed during the course of data 
collection. 
Similarly, this study used a case-study approach to investigate the process and difficulties 
of contracting between DHBs and RHBs in Zambia. Four case studies of contracting 
under different referral policies were chosen not for the purpose of increasing the 
representativeness of the sample, but for theoretical replication purposes. This facilitated 
a better understanding of contracting under the different referral policy settings. The 
research aimed to contribute to knowledge on contracting in the health sector by 
providing information on the process in a developing world setting. To generate the data 
needed for meeting the study objectives, in-depth interviews were held with policy 
makers, district and hospital managers/directors, and frontline health providers. Policy 
documents on contracting/referrals and minutes of meetings between DHBs and RHBs 
were reviewed in order to augment the data obtained from interviews. 
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4.41: Interviews with policy makers, managers and directors 
Part of the qualitative data were collected through interviews with policy makers from 
the CBOH and MOH (Table 4.4). Similarly, interviews were held with District Health 
and Referral Hospital managers and/or directors. Data collected from these sources were 
further augmented with data from minutes of meetings between district boards and 
referral hospitals, where these could be accessed. The following section details each data 
collection method that was used in the study. 
Table 4.2: Methods of data collection/processing, aspects of contractual relationship 
assessed and role of author in the data collection/process and analysis 
Method of study Aspect of contractual relationship Data collection and analysis 
method was assessing 
Semi-structured interviews Views about contracting and Author 
with MOH/CBOH officials referral policies, 
Perceptions about contracting, 
Perceptions about referrals, 
prospects and roblems, 
Semi-structured interviews Perceptions about contracting, Author 
with district managers/ Experiences with referrals, 
directors prospects and problems. 
Semi-structured interviews Perceptions about contracting, Author 
With hospital managers/ Experiences with referrals, 
Directors prospects and problems 
Semi-structured interviews Knowledge and experience with Author 
with hospital and health process of making referrals 
centre staff 
Identification of issues on Author 
Document review relationship between DHBs and 
RHBs. 
Collection of hospital Determine referral rates, Clinical officers engaged for 
outpatient data disaggregated for chosen the study and supervised by 
diseases/health conditions author 
Collection of hospitals in- Determine appropriateness of Clinical officers engaged for 
patient data referrals to hospital. study and jointly supervised 
by Author clinician 
Validation of data from To improve quality of expert- Clinician engaged for the 
hospital patient records opinion based assessment of study and supervised by 
referral appropriateness. author. 
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4.42: Interviews with Policy Makers 
In-depth interviews were held with policy makers from the CBOH and MOH. The 
interviews were aimed at finding out the policy regarding contracting in general and 
specifically the policies and programmes on referrals between district health facilities 
and referral hospitals. The following policy makers were interviewed: Director, 
Planning and Development, MOH; Co-ordinator, Contracting, CBOH; and Specialist, 
Clinical Services, CBOH. 
4.43: Interviews with District and Referral Hospital Managers/Directors 
At the district and hospital level, interviews were held with managers and/or directors. 
District and hospital managers and/or directors were asked to explain how their 
relationship with hospitals had evolved over time, with specific reference to the changes 
that explicit contracting had introduced following the health reforms. Respondents were 
asked to identify issues of contention that had arisen between districts and hospitals, how 
such cases arose and how they were resolved. They were also asked about referrals, the 
changes in managing them, how they had been affected by explicit contracting and 
strategies that had been implemented to rationalise patient flows from district health 
facilities to referral hospitals. 
5.44: Interviews with hospital and health centre providers 
For each hospital, interviews were held with one frontline provider who dealt with 
referral cases. For participating districts, a listing of health centres was constructed, from 
which a purposive sample of one third of the health centers was drawn. The health 
centers which were chosen were those which were perceived by DHBs to be heavy 
referrers. Within the selected health centers, one frontline provider involved in making 
referral decisions was interviewed. The respondents were asked to state what they were 
expected to do and what they did when making referrals. The identified individuals were 
also asked to outline how factors causing inappropriate referrals could be minimized 
while those encouraging appropriate referrals could be encouraged. 
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Table 4.3- sources of nualitative data for the study 
Category Institution Interviewees and number 
Interviewee Number 
Policy Makers CBOH/MOH Director of Development 
& Planning, MOH. 
Specialist, Clinical 
Services, CBOH. 
Co-ordinator, 
Contracting, CBOH. 3 
Referral Hospital Hospital Managers/Directors from 
Directors/Managers Management four Hospital 
Board Management Boards 5 
District Referral Hospital Managers/Directors from 
Directors/Managers Management eight District Health 
Board Boards 8 
Frontline providers Hospitals and Doctors/Clinical 
District Health Officers/Nurses from one 
Centres third of each district's 
health centres and all 
hospitals. 48 
Table 4.4: Total number of adult malaria and childhood-pneumonia cases reviewed, by 
hospital study site 
Study site by tracer condition Number of patient rec ords reviewed 
Total Referred 
University Teaching Hopital 
Malaria in adults 239 121 
Pneumonia in children 702 679 
Kitwe Central Hospital 
Malaria in adults 367 309 
Pneumonia in children 34 34 
Ndola Central Hospital 
Malaria in adults 430 280 
Pneumonia in children - 
Monze Mission Hospital 
Malaria in adults 249 186 
Pneumonia in children 145 135 
Grand total 
Malaria in adults 
Pneumonia in children 1185 896 
881 848 
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4.43: Review of policy documents and minutes 
A review of policy documents was carried out aimed at understanding the policy 
environment on contracting/referral policies. Furthermore, at each district or hospital, 
minutes of meetings between districts and hospitals and copies of contracts were 
collected and studied. After the minutes were studied, issues needing further elucidation 
were taken up with either district or hospital managers. 
4.50: Quantitative data collection methods 
4.51: Secondary data collection from hospitals OPD and patient records 
Quantitative data were collected from routine hospital utilisation and inpatient data, 
which were used to calculate referral rates for six diseases/health conditions (Table 4.3). 
The data for this were collected from the hospital OPD registers which were kept at the 
hospitals. The data were disaggregated to show the number of cases that were referred by 
district health facilities and those that were self-referred. These data enabled the 
calculation of referral rates. 
Additional quantitative data, using two tracer conditions of malaria in adults and 
pneumonia in children were collected, which were used to assess referral 
appropriateness. The data were collected for a three-month period (January to March, 
2003). Given the vast distances among the study sites, one clinical officer was engaged 
to collect data at each of the hospitals. The data were then reviewed by one independent 
clinician in order to validate the expert opinion-based assessment of referral 
appropriateness. 
4.52: Referral rates and appropriateness 
As indicated above, in order to calculate referral rates, data on referrals were obtained 
from hospital OPD registers. The data on referrals collected for six diseases/ health 
conditions: malaria, Respiratory Track Infections (RTI), diarrhoea, tuberculosis (TB), 
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Aids Related Complexes (ARC) and anaemia12. The total number of referrals were then 
computed by disease/health condition, from which referral rates were calculated. All the 
other diseases/health conditions were lumped together under an `others' category. 
This method of calculating referral rates was deemed to be suitable for Zambia, on both 
practical and technical grounds. Hospitals keep OPD registers, from which referral data 
can be derived. A referred patient is given a referral letter, which they present at the 
hospital and their particulars are entered in the OPD register. The register captures both 
referred and non-referred clients, by diagnosis. From this register, calculations can be 
made of the total number of referrals by diagnosis. 
Simple calculations of referral rates though crude are an important indicator of how a 
health system is functioning and may provide indication of resource use in the health 
sector. Studies focussing on referral systems have ranged from a concern with high 
referral rates (Atkinson, 1999; Sanders, 19988); differences within the same system 
(Earwicker, 1998) to low referral rates (Font, 2002; Ohara, 1998). An a-priori 
identification of the direction of the problem is therefore a good starting point in 
investigations of referral systems. 
There are varied reasons advanced for variations in referral rates. Newton (1992) 
provided a useful guide to factors that may explain variations in referral rates. He broke 
these into two broad classes: clinical and non-clinical. The clinical factors were further 
subdivided into: episode specific (management options, judgement of risk, degree of 
clinical uncertainty, symptom-related, long term management, GP/specialist 
communication, and time-related); and background (lack of specialist option, GP 
attitude, medical history, and public health/resource concerns). The non-clinical 
explanations were also broken into two classes: episode specific (GP needs, patient 
feelings, patient attitudes, and GP-patient communication); and background 
12 The diseases/health conditions chosen were among the top ten contributors of DALYS. In a properly 
functioning health system and according to the BPC (MOll, 2000) most of these diseases/ conditions 
would not be expected to be presented at high referral hospital level. Thus a high level of referral at such 
hospitals would indicate a dysfunctional referral system. 
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(administrative, workload, psychological background, GP patient relationship, GP 
specialist relationship, GP characteristics and financial/legal factors). 
As indicated above, referral rates are a useful indicator of how a health system is 
functioning. To understand the reasons for the observed referral rate differences, 
investigations into clinical and non-clinical factors, involving policy makers, managers, 
providers and consumers would have to be undertaken. Studies on referral rates in 
isolation do not convey much. They only become meaningful when they are studied 
alongside referral appropriateness. 
The WHO (1987) has observed that PHC cannot work unless there is effective hospital 
support to deal with referred patients, and to refer patients who do not require the 
hospitals' attention back to other primary care services. Dysfunctional referral systems 
characterise much of the health systems in developing countries. Paradoxically there is a 
dearth of studies on referral systems in these countries (Font, et al, 2002). 
In the few countries where studies of referral systems were conducted, these used 
secondary sources of data from health service providers. Assessments of referral 
rates/hospital utilisation were done using hospital utilisation data (Atkinson, 1999; 
Oharah, et al, 1998) while referral/admission appropriateness had been assessed using 
tracers (Murray, et al, 2001; Font et at, 2002; Sanders, et al, 1998; Liu and Mills, 1999). 
Respiratory infections were used to measure referral appropriateness in Zimbabwe and 
unnecessary care in China (Liu and Mills, 1999; Sanders, et al 1998). In addition to RTI, 
malaria was also used in the Zimbambwe study. A study on referrals in Tanzania used 
general paediatric conditions to assess referral rates and appropriateness (Font, 2002). 
Patient record reviews were used in assessments of referral appropriateness in settings as 
diverse as Honduras (Ohara, et at, 1998); Zambia (Murray, et. at. 2001; Atkinson, et at 
1999), Tanzania (Font, et at, 2002). Liu and Mills (1999) used patient reviews to assess 
the extent of unnecessary care in China. These studies all focussed on specific 
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diseases/health conditions for which detailed data were collected to assess 
appropriateness of referrals/care provision. 
There are two approaches to the measurement of unnecessary care/inappropriate 
referrals, implicit and explicit methods. In the former, clinicians review the entire patient 
record and make a summary judgement about the appropriateness of referral/necessity of 
care. The validity of the results from this method depends entirely on the knowledge, 
skill and judgement of reviewers. The major weakness with this method is the high 
likelihood of discordance among the reviewers. 
In the explicit method, a set of criteria for judging what referral or care is unnecessary 
has to be developed. The major advantages of this method are that the results have better 
validity and the possibility that patient records can be reviewed by non-physicians. 
However, the explicit method is expensive to administer. Furthermore, developing a set 
of criteria for determining appropriateness may not be easy. 
This study used tracers of malaria in adults and pneumonia in children to assess the 
appropriateness of referrals. The study adopted a hybrid of the two methods for assessing 
referral appropriateness. The use of objective indicator-based methods supplemented 
and added rigour13 to the assessment of referral appropriateness, which would not have 
been achieved with a sole expert-opinion-based method. 
4.60: Methods of Analyses 
4.61: Qualitative data analysis 
The analysis of qualitative data was carried out at two levels: at the preliminary stage 
during the data collection and transcription processes, where themes were identified and 
13 Two important characteristics possessed by useful classification schemes are validity and reliability. 
Validity is the extent to which differences in scores on a measure instrument reflect true differences with 
respect to the characteristics one seeks to measure. Reliability refers to consistence over time (Horn and 
Horn, 1986). Whereas expert opinion may be biased, temperature readings for both malaria and 
pneumonia reflect the extent (ensuring validity) of the condition and such readings taken at different times 
for the same condition would be similar (achieving reliability). 
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arranged in analyses matrices. The matrices were developed and elaborated as the data 
collection and transcription process proceeded. At this preliminary stage of data 
analysis, the data were treated as empirical indicators. This allowed the listing of all 
possible themes/codes as they were reflected in the data. There were three broad 
matrices developed for analysing: the differences in difficulties of contracting between 
districts and hospitals, which were generic to all types of contracts; findings on the 
difficulties of contracts and referrals, segregated by the type of contract; and findings on 
the capacity, views and experiences of frontline providers. 
The analysis matrix of generic findings on the contract difficulties was subdivided into 
areas of agreement and disagreement between districts and hospitals. This allowed the 
probing of specific issues identified from data and thus permitted a process of 
simultaneous data collection and analysis. The second broad analysis matrix, in addition 
to showing common findings was disaggregated by the type of contracting environment 
(more attention was paid to the differences between NGO versus public hospitals, and to 
a lesser extent districts with upgraded versus those without upgraded health centres). 
The comparison allowed for the comparison of differences in contract difficulties that 
arose from peculiarities of the contract settings. The last set of analysis matrices showed 
findings on the capacity, views and experiences of frontline providers, contrasted by type 
of contract. 
The main themes which guided the matrices were: environmental factors, the difficulties 
of internal contracts; the employment and management difficulties of providers in both 
district and hospital facilities, the benefits and problems introduced by internal contracts, 
general problems with referrals between districts and hospitals; and frontline providers' 
capacity, knowledge and experience with referral decision making. Table 4.5 below 
shows the generic form of the analysis matrices (the full set of matrices are included in 
Appendices 9-12). 
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Table 4.5: Format of analysis matrices on the difficulties and experiences of referrals and 
internal contracts. 
Contracting aspect Public versus NGO contracts 
Views on internal contracts policy 
Environmental factors Contrasts of findings between public and NGO contracts 
Transaction/contracting factors 
Incentive/sanctions structures Contrasts in views of DHB and RHBs 
Referral policies and practices Contrast in views/experiences of frontline providers and managers 
The management of referrals 
Source of referral problems 
Solution of referral problems 
Referral strategies Findings common to upgraded and non-upgraded hospitals 
Views on referral strategies Findings common to contracts with public and NGO hospitals 
After the preliminary analysis, the second stage of analysis involved couching the 
findings within the analytical framework. The was done by subjecting the literal findings 
to a critical appraisal, through constantly asking how the findings could be explained 
using the analytical framework: environmental context; the contracting/transaction 
attributes; principal agent relationships and incentive structures; and how these affected 
the outcome of referral contracts. For purposes of this study, the environment factors 
which were deemed to be critical for assessing the difficulties of contracting were: the 
spatial distribution and ownership of health facilities, and capacity of health facilities to 
deliver services. 
For transaction attributes, the key factors which were considered were human asset 
specificities and behavioural attributes of bounded rationality and opportunism.. 
Scarcities of health providers were explored in the context of upstream contracts with the 
CBOH, while staff management problems were analysed in the context of downstream 
contracts between districts/hospitals and frontline health providers. 
Contracting in essence means dealing with principal-agent problems and finding ways of 
resolving these. From the first level analysis, the study showed that referral problems 
could be traced to three interfaces: district/hospital; district/frontline providers; and 
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frontline health provider/communities. The three interfaces were analysed in principal- 
agent terms by studying the underlying incentive structures. 
The interaction of environmental factors, contracting/transaction attributes, principal- 
agent relationships, and incentive structures on the outcome of contracts was illustrated 
with a presentation of levels and patterns of referrals against the forms of contracts 
included in the study. 
4.62: Quantitative data analysis 
From the data collected from hospital OPD registers, the levels of referrals were 
estimated using aggregated hospital utilisation data. The referral rates were estimated by 
dividing the total number of referred cases by the grand total of hospital attendances. 
The patterns of referrals were determined by showing the relative contribution of selected 
diseases/health conditions to morbidity, in relation to the corresponding DALYS profile 
of the same diseases/health conditions. 
The assessment of referral appropriateness used two approaches, the subjective expert- 
opinion based method and the objective indicator-based method. In the expert-opinion 
based method, clinical officers reviewed records, filled in questionnaires and made 
assessments about referral appropriateness, which were validated by a second medical 
expert review. The reviewers used data on condition of patients before and during 
presentation to the hospital to assess the appropriateness of each referral. The criteria 
used for gauging appropriateness can be broadly grouped into: whether an illnesses 
responded to initial lines of treatment at the health centre; whether the available 
diagnostic and management resources at the health centre were adequate for dealing 
with the condition; and condition-specific indicators of illness severity. 
For both pneumonia and malaria cases, referrals were deemed to be appropriate where a 
patient had not recovered after initial lines of medication. For malaria cases, the initial 
lines of treatment often included: chloroquine, halphan and/or fancidar, while for 
pneumonia, they included critaphen, amoxil and septrin. The availability of medical 
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requisites and management skills were also considered, for instance in the case of 
complicated malaria cases such as meningitis. Various condition-specific indicators 
were also used to gauge the appropriateness of referral, with temperature being a 
commonly used yardstick. 
The expert-opinion based assessment was supplemented with objective-indicator based 
assessments. The chi square test of association was then used to test if there was 
relationship between the types of contracts and the levels of appropriateness given by the 
various indicators. The objective-indicator based method included: 
1. Proportion of cases admitted=number of revealed cases which were admitted. 
2. The time taken for the temperature to normalise after admission to hospitals 
3. Survival status of admitted patients=proportion of admitted patients who died 
4.70: Commentary on the quality of data 
The first steps to ensure quality of the data were taken at the pre-testing stage, where the 
instruments were tested and data collectors trained. The pre-testing exercise enabled re- 
designing of the instruments. To ensure consistency in the method of data collection, all 
the qualitative data were collected by the author, in a tape-recorded format, which was 
subsequently transcribed and verbatim copies used for analysis. The transcribed data 
were further proof read, to not only get an in-depth knowledge of the subject but also aid 
in coding and preliminary analysis. This helped the process of open coding, which 
entailed taking the data as empirical indicators. In this way, all the major themes/codes of 
the data were captured. 
The process of collecting data for estimating referral levels and appropriateness in a 
setting of poor record keeping is imbued with numerous problems, which if not 
addressed could compromise the quality of the data. In studies of this kind, which use 
routine hospital data, numerous problems are expected. For one, locating and finding the 
data can be a difficulty. In almost all the hospitals even after the records had been 
identified, finding useful data from the same was not easy. Hence the final number of 
records reviewed was always less than the total identified. Close supervision of 
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recorders as they reviewed records was done in order to ensure that the recording was 
exhaustive and uniform. In two cases, because of divergence in the manner the data were 
entered, the whole record review process was redone. 
As already indicated above, assessing the appropriateness of referrals through expert 
opinion is subjective. One way of improving the validity is to subject the reviews to a 
panel of experts, and judgement passed on the basis of majority rule. While this 
improves the validity of the data collected, it is not full-proof, and as Earwicker (1998) 
has observed since each referral is a result of a decision made by a single and particular 
provider, it is impossible to assess how other providers might have reacted had they been 
confronted by that particular decision. If it were to be based on observational data, a 
completely fair comparison would require the impossible - that the same patient consult 
every doctor. 
Given the weakness of solely relying on expert-opinion based determination of referral 
appropriateness, a combination of validated subjective expert-opinion-based and 
objective indicator-based methods were adopted for the study. In the first instance, data 
from patient records are recorded on designed forms and an initial opinion reached about 
the appropriateness of each referral. Subsequently, the recorded data were given to 
another reviewer who gave an independent opinion on appropriateness. For an objective 
indicator-based classification of referral appropriateness, various methods were used 
which supplemented the opinion-based assessment. 
4.80: Conclusion 
The combination of qualitative and quantitative methods facilitated studying the process 
and difficulties of contracting between district health boards and referral hospitals. 
Despite the many initiatives that have been undertaken to harmonise links within the 
sector and address the issue of referrals between DHBs and RHBs, there has been no 
analysis of the institutional setting in which these programmes/policies have been tried. 
This study attempted to fill this gap by not only analysing the institutional setting, but 
also relating this to outcome variables of referral levels and patterns. 
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The study analysed the nature and difficulties of contracting between district health 
boards and referral hospitals in Zambia, using referrals as a tracer of that relationship. 
The study used a case study approach, in which four hospitals and eight districts were 
purposively selected, Multiple sources of data were used: in-depth interviews with 
policy makers and district/hospital managers/directors and providers involved in making 
referral decisions in health centres. 
Quantitative data on referrals was obtained from hospital registers and patient records. 
Since calculation of referral rates and appropriateness indicators was based on secondary 
data, strategies were taken to improve the quality of the data. This was done by 
subjecting the opinion-based decisions on referral appropriateness to a second expert 
view. The opinion based assessment was supplemented with objective-indicator based 
tests for determining appropriateness. 
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Chapter 5.00: The introduction of explicit contracts between districts 
and referral hospitals 
5.10: Introduction 
This chapter of the results section presents findings on the policy of explicit contracts 
between districts and referral hospitals. The chapter starts with an outline of the 
environmental context, under which the spatial distribution and ownership of health 
facilities are discussed. This leads to a discussion of the transaction/contracting context, 
which focuses on: the nature of contracts, provider autonomy, transaction attributes and 
problems of human resource scarcities and management difficulties. Thereafter the 
district and hospital respondents' views on the value of explicit contracts are illustrated, 
after which a comparison of contracting with NGO and public hospitals is made. 
5.20: The contracting environment 
5.21: District and hospital autonomy 
At the time of the study, the hospitals were run as autonomous facilities, while health 
centres were managed under autonomous DHBs. Prior to the introduction of DHBs, 
local authorities managed health centres, while referral hospitals were managed by the 
MOH through the PMO. With the introduction of the health reforms, the management of 
local health facilities was delegated to the DHBs, while referral hospitals became the 
responsibility of autonomous hospital boards. Districts were responsible for the 
provision of primary and first level referral health services, while autonomous hospitals 
were charged with the provision of specialised referral services. Where the districts 
lacked the capacity to provide first level referral services, they could contract with 
autonomous hospitals for such services. 
Although both DHBs and RHBs were autonomous and could contract with any 
district/hospital, they were restricted by spatial/historical circumstances to contracting 
with specific parties. The hospitals covered by the study were all owned by the 
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government, except for one NGO facility. The contracts between districts and hospitals 
were based on historical and geographical circumstances, whereby districts contracted 
with hospitals that were in close proximity. In some rural/peri urban settings, however, 
districts had the choice of contracting with both public and NGO hospitals. Although 
such districts contracted with both government and NGO hospitals, they were more 
likely to report satisfaction with the services provided by NGO than public hospitals. 
Given a choice, such districts would have preferred to contract exclusively with NGO 
hospitals, buy they were tied to specific hospitals on account of spatial factors, which 
predetermined the hospitals which communities could utilise with limited difficulty. For 
instance, the UTH, despite being a national referral hospital effectively acted as a district 
hospital for the surrounding areas and had limited utilization from other parts of the 
country. The situation was the same with other districts, where contracts were drawn 
with the local and surrounding districts. 
Although the devolved district and hospital management units were supposed to run as 
autonomous entities, managers complained that their decision making space was limited. 
The boards for both districts and hospitals were appointed by the minister of health, who 
retained his/her influence over their functions. In terms of financial freedom, although 
the boards were free to introduce fees, such were expected to be ratified by the local 
authorities. There were restrictions on how the money raised from user fees could be 
utilized. While hospitals could utilize all the money for their local needs, DHBs were 
allowed to use up to 80% of such resources. The mode of payment of hospital grants 
through the districts compounded the financial woes of the former, since districts had the 
upper-hand in determining how much to give hospitals. 
The granting of autonomous status to districts and hospitals was marked by the passing 
of the Health Services Act, under which boards were introduced in both districts and 
hospitals. In mission hospitals, which had a longer tradition of boards, government and 
mission appointed boards operated side by side. In addition to overseeing the operations 
of provider management units, the boards were supposed to act as a venue for 
representing community interests. However, there was debate about the effectiveness 
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with which the boards were able to do this. One consistent argument against the 
operation of boards was that they were more likely to serve political than social interests. 
However, the risk of high powered political influences ought to be weighed against the 
risks of managerialism. During the study, managers talked about how they desired to 
have more freedom. Much as managerial freedom may be beneficial, where it enhances 
autonomy, there is a risk of unbridled managerialism, which ought to be tempered with 
political intercession. One way in which managerialism presented difficulties was 
evidenced from the deployment of medical staff from clinical to administrative roles. 
Given a choice, doctors preferred occupying management positions, which attracted 
benefits such as access to vehicles, attending workshops and the accompanying financial 
incentives. Where such perverse incentives were manifest, boards could be used to 
protect the social good against the negative effects of managerialism. 
5.22: The specification of contracts 
As was indicated in the introduction, the MOH commissions the CBOH to provide 
services to the population. The CBOH in turn contracts both district and hospital boards 
to provide services on their behalf. The contracts between the CBOH and the 
DHB/RHBs reflect the range of services that providers are expected to provide in turn for 
funding. The contracts indicate the obligations of the CBOH, which are: commitment to 
provide funds to the providers; provision of guidelines and standards for the provision of 
services; and provision of technical assistance and backstopping services. The service 
providers, in turn are expected to: provide health promotion , preventive and curative 
services commensurate with their level of competency; and support services to lower 
level health service providers. The contracts include indicators and targets that the 
providers are expected to observe, such as ceilings on expenditure, and health service 
utilisation. The health service targets are further subdivided into: medical fees and 
collection; health service utilization and availability of medical supplies. 
The contracts stipulate sanctions for the non-attainment of targets. They state that the 
release of funds is conditional on the submission by the DHB/RHBs of timely, quarterly, 
satisfactory financial and progress reports and that expenditures are in accordance with 
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approved plans, budgets and ceilings. In the event of unsatisfactory financial and/or 
progress reporting, the CBOH may stop the transfer of all funds. And in the case of 
persistent failure of the boards to honour their contractual obligations, the CBOH may 
take over the functions of the boards after consultation with the Minister of Health. 
While the contracts formally identify the sanctions that could be imposed on both RHBs 
and DHBs, respondents observed that this had never been invoked, and was only meant 
as a guide to the boards. Similarly, the, providers had latitude with respect to varying 
expenditure lines, so long as such were justified. 
Table 5.1: Characteristics of the transaction environment and delineation of health service 
provision roles between districts and hospitals 
Transaction environment 
and delineation of roles Some key findings 
Transaction environment: 
-Spatial distribution of -DHBs and RHBs contracted along historical lines. All the 
hospitals and district districts around the UTH, that is Chibombo, Lusaka rural and 
health facilities. urban, Kafue, and chongwe districts contracted with the UTH. 
-Split of ownership -Districts around Ndola contracted with Ndola CH, those in 
between Government and Kitwe with Kitwe and likewise those around Monze. 
NGO sectors. -Weak financial position meant that DHBs and RHBs were 
-Capacity of district hardly able to employ staff on board conditions. 
facilities and hospitals to -According to the health services act, both public and NGO 
provide health facilities providers were governed by the MOH through the CBOH. 
-The districts had weak provider capacity, which resulted in a 
low quality of services, and consequently increased pressures for 
hospital services. 
Delineation of health 
service roles: 
-Clarification of service -Health reforms emphasised clarification of roles in provision of 
provision boundaries health services between districts and hospitals. 
among various providers. -Development of the BPC was supposed to guide the delineation 
-Capacity of providers. of health service provision. 
-Clarification of ls` and -However, overlaps in the provision of services were still 2°a & 3rd level referral common. 
services. -Delineation of service provision roles had been undermined by: 
-limited district/hospital capacity to provide services 
-limited capacity of frontline providers 
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When talking about the ceilings, a respondent from the CBOH said ".... the ceilings are 
there to guide how they [providers] should use the resources. They are not punishment, 
per se, if they go beyond or they spend under, but we expect them to mention why they 
have spent more on this level and less on the other level. For example, if they have an 
epidemic, definitely they will be expected to spend more money to fight that epidemic. 
... they are not a hindrance as such, but merely a guide [CBOH respondent]. 
The contracts between the CBOH and districts and hospitals served the purpose of 
formalising the relationships and were not accompanied by an effective system of 
sanctions that could be applied in the case of failure by either districts or hospitals. The 
nominal value of contracts was also reflected in the downstream contracts between 
districts and hospitals, which were closely modelled along the upstream contract formats. 
There were hardly any attempts to have detailed contracts. While the limited 
specification of the contracts between districts and hospitals may be positive in the sense 
that it encouraged a flexible relationship between them, there was a risk of such open 
contracts introducing difficulties, as will be discussed in detail below. 
5.23: The delineation of service provision roles 
As was indicated in the literature review section, the introduction of internal contracts is 
premised on the expectation that such a policy would improve efficiency by recasting the 
roles of various players involved in a transaction. Thus districts would concentrate on 
the provision of PHC and first level referral services, while the hospital providers focus 
on higher-level referral services. Such a delineation of responsibilities would improve 
service provision through the avoidance of overlaps. 
The introduction of internal contracts in the Zambian health sector was marked with the 
delineation of service provision at various service provision levels. The policy clarified 
the separation through: the payment of referral grants to districts, phasing out hospital 
OPDs and their replacement in some cases with HAHCs, and cessation of health 
promotion services by NGO hospitals. To recast, inappropriate referrals were one of the 
major causes and manifestations of inefficiencies in the health sector, which necessitated 
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the implementation of reforms. The delineation of service provision functions among 
providers was supposed to contribute towards the resolution of such inefficiencies. 
According to the health financing policy, which is detailed in the introduction section, 
DHBs were responsible for managing and providing primary and first level referral 
services, while RHBs managed and provided 2°d and 3`d level referral services. While 
the policy explicitly outlined the range of services that were supposed to be provided by 
districts and hospitals, there was often a discrepancy between what was expected and 
delivered. Inappropriate referrals in part arose from this discrepancy in service 
provision. The dysfunctional referral system was further illustrated by weak links 
between health centres and hospitals. Effective management of a referral system would 
entail that cases deserving referral are appropriately and timely assessed and referred to 
the appropriate higher level. After a referral is received, the referral institution should 
refer back to the sending institution for continuation of care, where this is needed. 
As was indicated above, although the national referral hospital was supposed to provide 
specialised level referral services, it effectively operated as a hospital for the local district 
and the surrounding areas. A respondent from the hospital said:... [the national referral 
hospital] is supposed to be a tertiary hospital or a national hospital where we expect 
referrals to come from provincial hospitals. But unfortunately because of the 
circumstances surrounding it, it has been forced to function at all levels: first level, 
second level and tertiary level. 
5.30: The transaction difficulties 
The literature on contracting identified two classes of factors that cause transaction 
difficulties: the behaviour of the transacting parties and transaction attributes of the 
service or good. The behavioural characteristics of bounded rationality and opportunism 
are important in understanding difficulties of contracting. For purposes of this study, the 
most relevant transaction attributes were human resource scarcities and health provider 
staff management difficulties. The study revealed that both districts and hospitals faced 
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such difficulties. A summary of the study findings on the health provider scarcities and 
management difficulties is shown in Table 5.3 below. 
5.31: The scarcities and difficulties of managing providers 
The study showed that both districts and hospitals faced difficulties with regard to the 
recruitment, retention and management of health providers. Not only was the number of 
health providers limited, most of them belonged to the PSC, which posed human 
resources management difficulties such as the inability to control transfer of staff 
between hospitals and districts. The rules for disciplining a PSC employee were so 
elaborate that managers of both RHB and DHB felt frustrated and did not bother to 
initiate disciplinary procedures involving such staff. The combination of scarcities of 
clinical personnel and personnel management difficulties, coupled with health service 
delivery constraints resulted in low provider capacity to deliver health services. 
The staffing problems were especially pronounced at the national referral hospital, which 
had multiple employee categories. This had created problems such as differences in 
conditions of service for the various categories of staff: MOH, MOE, and the CBOH. 
The UTH manager recounted how changes in the conditions of service for one category 
of staff had a demonstration effect on others and difficulties of ensuring providers 
observed the same working hours: "... we find it difficult to manage them. Even as 
regarding working hours, because we have [more] control over our own staff than we 
[have over] UNZA [University of Zambia, employees who fall under the Ministry of 
Education] employees, because they are answerable to their own administration.,. " 
(Hospital manager). 
The centralised employment of staff for both hospitals and districts had created 
difficulties of managing transfers between the two. The study found that there were 
movements of staff from the hospitals to the districts, which created staff deficiencies in 
the hospitals. Further probes around this issue revealed that staff were attracted to 
transfer from hospitals to districts by the training opportunities under the latter. To this 
end, the hospitals had had meetings with DHBs, where the matter was discussed and 
resolved that such transfers be managed in a manner which did not disrupt the operations 
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of health facilities. One way would have been to ensure a fair distribution of training 
opportunities in districts and hospitals.. 
Both RHB and DHB managers observed that the health reforms had generated new 
administrative roles, which required specialized skills. However, owing to the limited 
funding at the disposal of both districts and hospitals, they faced difficulties in finding 
and engaging the required personnel. The limited number of staff and inability of boards 
to recruit and retain staff with specialised skills had resulted in perverse effects where 
medical doctors were redeployed from clinical to administrative roles. 
Contributing to the debate on the utilisation of medical doctors by DHBs, a hospital 
manager observed, "... [simple medical conditions] can be dealt with by the district...! 
believe they have doctor X, there is doctor Y, who is manager, planning. Now these 
doctors can actually engage in clinical activities... " A respondent from the district 
acknowledged the problems regarding the utilization of doctors: "... unfortunately the 
doctors that we have are involved in management.... [initially they were involved in 
clinical work], but it was difficult, the time they are supposed to be in the clinic, there is 
an urgent meeting [and they have to leave for the meeting]... " 
Table 5.2: The transaction difficulties between district and hospital contracts 
Transaction attributes Some key findings 
Difficulties of employing -There are major staff problems, especially the scarcity of 
providers. doctors and clinical officers. 
Difficulties of managing -The management of PSC staff posed difficulties for both 
providers, district and hospital management. 
-Because of the limited control over PSC staff, hospitals 
recounted problems of staff moving from hospitals to DHBs. 
-Staff management problems were compounded in situations 
where there were multiple employee categories. 
-RHBs accused DHBs of making unnecessary referrals. RHBs 
further observed that the DHBs were not able to effectively 
monitor the activities of staff in their health facilities. 
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To the extent that referral problems were primarily attributed to the limited number of 
health provides, the policy of explicit contracts may exacerbate these by introducing 
administrative responsibilities, which would lead to the redeployment of staff away from 
clinical work. Both districts and hospitals experienced scarcities of skilled staff. In some 
cases, districts had attempted to resolve this problem by approaching students at colleges, 
who were offered scholarships, and in turn bonded to the sponsoring institutions. 
Further, both RHBs and DHBs observed that they had tried to solve the problem of staff 
shortages by allowing moonlighting. "... we allow what we call moonlighting [meaning 
overtime] sometimes..... say for instance somebody is on night off and that clinic has a 
critical shortage, somebody says, I would want to do moonlighting. So, we allow maybe a 
clinical officer or a nurse to go and cover the area that has a shortage, then we pay them 
something... [DHB respondent] ". 
A manager at a DHB recounted that they were planning to employ clinical officers who 
would be released after the closure of the hospital OPD. The urgency of employing 
clinical officers was however, tempered with fears of unionism, for which clinical 
officers were renowned: "... we have fewer clinical officers, and I think this is the 
problem that is haunting the whole country.. . we had gone to Chainama 
[college for 
clinical officers] to persuade the graduates to join us... Ndola Central [hospital] are 
trying to close OPD, they are trying to see if we can get clinical officers from Ndola 
Central [hospital] so that they can man our clinics. Our fear is that most of these 
clinical officers are involved in union matters and [when] you get one, you may have 
problems... " (DHB manager). As indicated above, the limited number of clinical staff in 
both districts and hospitals had accentuated the practice of clinical roles being performed 
by less qualified staff, which negatively impacted on the referral decision-making 
process. 
5.32: Manifestations of opportunism 
The behavioural attributes on which transaction cost economics is centred are bounded 
rationality and opportunism. Opportunism for districts manifested in relation to referrals 
decision making and corresponding referral grants. For hospitals, it manifested in the 
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care provided to referred patients, and provision of feedback to referring health centres. 
Both districts and hospitals had limited means for assessing and verifying the actions of 
the other party. The manifestation of opportunism and impact on referrals are discussed 
in detail in the subsequent chapters 6 and 7, which address the incentive structures facing 
districts and hospitals. 
Referral decision making 
Hospitals were of the view that districts made unnecessary referrals, because they wanted 
to shift costs to the hospitals or did not monitor the activities of frontline health 
providers. While the hospitals may have been justified in claiming that districts made 
unnecessary referrals, they were not able to back their claims. The districts on their part 
observed that the health centres had limited capacity and as such were not able to provide 
most of the basic health services. Districts, which did not have upgraded health centres 
observed that they did not have adequate facilities to enable them provide quality 
services. The scarcity of providers and limited diagnostic and management facilities 
resulted in referral pressures on the hospital. While acknowledging these limitations, 
districts noted that there were cases of frontline providers making inappropriate referrals. 
The districts had tried to resolve the problem through the holding of clinical meetings 
and rotation of doctors in health centres, whose impact was limited because of the gross 
provider inadequacies. 
On their party, the DHBs observed that the hospitals also exhibited opportunistic 
behaviours by not providing the requisite care for referred patients most of whom, they 
claimed, were often discharged without having been adequately attended to at hospitals. 
The districts were not able to ascertain the condition of discharged patients since they did 
not receive feed-back information from hospitals. Hospitals countered by observing that 
they had limited staff and therefore could not be expected to provide feed-back for all 
referred cases. The hospital were further accused of charging referred patients, who 
according to the health financing policy were not supposed to pay. 
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Payments for referrals 
As outlined in the introduction chapter, DHBs could spend between 20-40 percent of 
their grants on the purchase of hospital beds. In all the cases studied, DHBs kept to the 
lower end of the range, while hospitals preferred a higher proportion. While the hospitals 
consistently argued that the grants from DHBs were inadequate, the latter countered by 
observing that the overall grants that they received from the CBOH were limited. When 
deciding on how much of their grant to give the hospitals, the DHBs were limited by the 
low overall grant and the multiplicity of other financial needs. Invariably, they gave 
priority to meeting their immediate needs over paying for referral services. This situation 
was made worse by the lack of a method for relating the referral grant to the related 
hospital workload, which both DHBs and RHBs were mindful of. The hospitals were 
not able to demonstrate the extent of inappropriate referrals. They RHBs did not have 
the capacity for collating and analysing such data and hence were unable to demonstrate 
the level of referral appropriateness, let alone the associated costs. 
Table 5.3: Summary of findings on manifes 
hospitals 
tations of opportunism between district and 
Opportunism and Some key findings 
bounded rationality 
Bounded rationality: -RHBs accused DH13s of making unnecessary 
-Extent to which districts attempted to referrals, which arose as result of. 
cost shifting 
rationalise referrals. behaviours by districts, and 
inappropriate 
-Extent to which hospitals provided appropriate 
frontline provider practices 
care for referred cases. 
Opportunism: 
-Tendency of districts to make inappropriate -DHBs accused 
RHBs of cost shifting 
referrals, 
behaviours through paying limited attention to 
-Tendency of hospitals to provide minimal 
referred cases 
-DHB accused hospitals of not providing care. 
-Extent to which hospitals provided feedback requisite care 
for referred patients 
to districts. -DUBs accused RHBs of not providing feedback information for referred patients. 
Information limitations: 
-Lack of information to assess referral -The 
cost of collating and analysing 
appropriateness information made it difficult to rationalise 
-Lack of information for districts to assess 
referrals 
outcome of referred cases. -District used 
hospital lack of information to 
their advantage. 
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5.40: Views on the policy of explicit contracts 
The literature on contracting illustrated the value of explicit contracts to be: clarifying the 
distinction between funders, purchasers and providers; the appointment of 
boards/commissions to oversee management and represent social interests; granting of 
autonomy to providers; reduction of bureaucratic inefficiencies; and allowing purchasers 
to buy goods/services that consumers want at low price/best quality. This section 
discusses the views of both district and hospital managers on the value of explicit 
contracts in the health sector, which are summarised in Table 5.5 below. 
5.41: Contracts are assurance for grant provision and check on resource use 
The relationships among the CBOH, districts and hospitals were formalised through 
contracts. Both DHBs and RHBs signed contracts with the CBOH and between 
themselves for the delivery of health services. The format of contracts between the 
DHBs and RHBs were standard and drawn along the lines of upstream contracts with the 
CBOH. They indicated the range of referral services that were expected to be provided 
by hospitals, the number of beds purchased by DHBs and the percentage of the DHB 
grant that would be remitted to hospitals. The DHBs decided the number of beds to 
purchase and negotiated with hospitals on the corresponding grant for such beds. Both 
DHB and RHB managers observed that the introduction of explicit contracts had some 
advantages, The contracts, the respondents observed served an assurance role that grants 
would be remitted to providers, "... because we have budgeted, the contracts assist us in 
following up our outlined activities. But if we didn't have the contract, it means we were 
not going to have any money, but as it is now we have money in form of an action plan. It 
might not be there now, but we know it is coming. ... so when the money comes you are 
able to apportion that money. .. but if we didn't have this contract, it was going to be 
extremely difficult... (DUB respondent). 
A respondent from a DHB observed that contracts also helped in rationalizing the use of 
resources. In response to a question on whether contracts had made a difference, the 
respondent said "... I think so, before I think it was not very apparent, or it was not 
pressing, because perhaps the Government at that time had resources. So every health 
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centre, every hospital had facilities, manpower, expatriate doctors, nursing staff, 
equipment, and the buildings had just been erected- they were okay. But as the problem 
of scarce resources [became acute], we had to make sure that we use the little resources 
that [were] available optimally. And therefore, there is no way the district, for example, 
could have all its patients going to the hospital, hence the congestion, we had to provide 
services at lower levels. So a lot of clients are trapped there... it is expected that very 
few filter to the higher levels. Otherwise, it doesn't make economic sense to have a 
surgeon treating malaria, when that's something that can be treated at a health post or 
even in the community. So that's how this contracting came in, to ensure that the right 
services are provided at the right levels and by so doing, we [rationalise the utilisation 
of] the limited resources that we have.... 
Furthermore, the respondents from hospitals observed that the contracts enabled them to 
keep track of the people utilising their services, since patients were required to present 
referral notes at the hospital. In the words of one hospital manager "we are able to catch 
those who are not referred... those who do not have referral letters". Contributing his 
views on the value of explicit contracts, a DHB manager said: "... I would say the 
contracts have led to improvements, because that time [before explicit contracts] patients 
used to find it very difficult to go to the hospital. But now the community know that the 
district pays something to the hospital and they know that if I went to the [hospital, 
without passing through a health centre], I will pay, so when they get the referral 
[letter], they will not pay... they are treated as DHMT [Df18) patients. So there has been 
tremendous improvement in terms of patients accessing the health services at the 
hospital... " 
5.42: Contracts improve interaction between districts and hospitals 
A respondent from a district observed that with contracts, they were able engage mor 
with the hospitals, unlike in the past when they were not able to do this. "..... I think, 
there has been a difference because now [with] contracting, it means the district is able 
to give an input to the hospital. Because without the contract, its like the district just 
provides the services, they don't buy any beds in the hospitals and the hospital just gets 
money for second-level services. 
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Table 5.4: Summary of respondents' views about the value of explicit contracts 
Contracting attributes Some key findings 
-Value of explicit -Both DHBs and RHBs observed that limited funding had 
contracts. negatively impacted on their ability to provide services. 
-Contract payment -RHBs insisted on higher end of 20-40% range for purchase of 
method. hospital beds. 
-Delineation of -With contracts, there was a guarantee that funding would be 
responsibilities. provided, though there could be delays. 
-Explicit contracts ensured that providers strove to achieve targets 
as reflected in action plans. 
-Through the delineation of services, DHBs knew what services 
they were supposed to provide. 
-Contracts enabled RHBs and DHBs to meet and discuss referral 
issues. 
-Contracts acted as a control mechanism for access to hospitals 
-Without contracts, there would have been no restriction in 
accessing hospitals. 
Being purchasers of hospital services, districts observed that contracting had helped them 
to hold the hospitals accountable. One way in which this was done was through meetings 
with the hospitals, which were held frequently. Adding positive comments regarding the 
value of contracts, a DHB respondent observed: "... [contracts] have made things easier, 
because we have a say. Because we want to see that they [hospitals] provide the 
required first level services [meaning first level referral services] to our patients that are 
sent there, and because we are funding them for that purpose it [enables us to know 
how].. issues are run. If we are not happy, we sit with our colleagues [at the hospital] 
and say these are the complaints from the people. [For instance] when we started user 
fees, you know a person pays user fees at the health centre and referred to the hospital 
and is also made to pay, we sat down and resolved the issue.. " 
While the introduction of explicit contracts had resulted in some positive outcomes as 
indicated above, they were also marked with difficulties, which attenuated their 
effectiveness, such as: the limited funding to both districts and hospitals; perverse 
incentives regarding the utilisation of health providers; the lack of effective sanctions and 
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rewards; and provider scarcities and difficulties of managing providers. These 
difficulties are discussed below. 
5.43: Contracting was attenuated by funding difficulties 
While the respondents appreciated the advantages of explicit contracts, they also 
acknowledged that there were shortcomings, especially regarding the level and patterns 
of funding. For RHBs, the financial difficulties were compounded by the low referral 
grants from the DHBs. While hospitals consistently argued that the grants from DHBs 
were inadequate, the latter countered by observing that the overall grants that they 
received from the CBOH were low. As outlined above, DHBs could spend between 20- 
40 percent of their grants on the purchase of hospital beds. In all the cases studied, 
DHBs kept to the lower end of the range, while hospitals preferred a higher proportion. 
By paying a lower proportion of the grant for referral services, the DHB would retain 
more funding to themselves, while the same would apply for RHBs if they managed to 
get higher referral grants. 
Contributing to the difficulties faced by hospitals, CBOH/MOH interviewees noted that 
districts arbitrarily decided how much they would pay hospitals. ".... So some of them 
[districts] the way they are doing it, they just arrive at arbitrary figures. 1 think they 
need to sit and plan. ... Okay we 
have the population of so much, how many of our 
population need first-level services or if they review case records at the hospital and see 
how many of those were attended to in the previous year? 110w many of them were 
really first level patients? How many were second level patients? And then since [it's] 
the district's responsibility to fund first-level services, in those district where there is no 
first-level hospital and they have to contract a hospital, they should work it out on the 
basis of the population and what percentages they think are first-level. Now they are 
doing it like "Okay we will give you 10% of our grant or we will give you 20% of our 
grant. Such that in some cases you find that the hospitals are losing out. They attend to 
so many first-level cases, and yet what the districts contributes to first-level services is 
not enough ". (MOH/CBOH respondent). A policy maker from the CBOH had this to 
say: "... Because the districts are the ones who are giving to the hospitals, they are 
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usually reluctant to give a bigger percentage. So it really has to be a hospital, which is 
powerful, with a lot of bargaining power to convince the districts to release most of the 
funds. If you have weak management in a hospital who can't fight it out, that hospital 
ends up getting very little from the district... ". 
Being the purchasers of referral services, DHBs had an upperhand in determining how 
much they would pay the hospitals. While the contracts for referral services were 
flexible and supposed to give contracting parties latitude for negotiations, DHBs 
capitalized on their position as purchasers. Although both DHBs and RHBs observed 
that it was necessary to have a formula that would link referral grants to the 
corresponding hospital workload, they were also mindful of the difficulties of doing this. 
They talked about this in very general terms and were short on details regarding how it 
could be done. In one instance, where a district had attempted to devise such a formula, 
they abandoned the idea after they realized that by relating the grant to the corresponding 
referral workload, they would pay the hospital more than they currently were. 
Respondents from the hospital had strong views about the low grants from districts. 
They contended that districts paid them very little, while the workload was high. One 
such respondent said: "... I do agree the surrounding districts purchase beds per month, 
which is meant for first level care and second level. I am not sure about second level 
care. I do not think we are getting funding for second level care. For first level care, we 
get a certain percentage from the districts ... which is funded to do the first level type of 
care, but we only get less than 40% of that money to do the first level functions at [the 
hospital]. So, it is very difficult to appreciate really how much the [policy of) 
contracting services is helping as far as financing the hospital is concerned. The way we 
see it is that [the hospital] should be handled as it is.... as first level as well as for second 
level care ... for such services because we know it's a fact that the surrounding districts 
hardly provide first level health care and second level care... ". 
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5.44: Contracting was attenuated by lack of effective sanctions and rewards 
Some respondents suggested that the contracts should include sanctions against 
opportunistic tendencies. However, other respondents were conscious of the importance 
of leaving contracts open-ended, and flexible. "... the contract has got its [weaknesses]. 
When you go into issues of contracts, in other words you are saying you must [do as 
required by the contract] or there will be sanctions. ... 1 have never heard of a 
district 
that has been penalised by the C130H because it failed to perform. .. 
We always work 
things out and agree that things have got to move in that way... " (DHB respondent). 
While it was desirable to have contracts based on trust and goodwill, the relationship 
between districts and hospitals was marked by distrust. The absence of trust between 
districts and hospitals was compounded by the lack of knowledge by both districts and 
hospitals to ascertain the level of effort that the other party had put in to ensure 
successful contracts. The hospitals did not have much information on whether the 
districts had done all they could to achieve appropriate referral practices by providers 
under their remit. The DHBs on the other hand were not sure whether frontline providers 
had done all they could to achieve appropriate referral practices. The districts further did 
not know whether the hospitals had done the best they could do to provide quality health 
services for referred cases. This lack of information about the actions of each party 
increased the lack of trust and goodwill between the two contracting parties of districts 
and hospitals. 
Distrust was also evident from the behaviour of both districts and hospitals regarding 
referral grants. The hospitals wanted to have a higher referral grant from districts, while 
keeping the referral workload to the minimum. With such a relationship, there was a high 
probability of either party disappointing the other, From their previous experience, it 
was evident that there was very little reputation of trust built between districts and 
hospitals and the relationship remained strained. Each party consistently accused the 
other of inappropriate behaviours. Although the contracts explicitly recognized the role 
of arbitration for resolving difficulties between districts and hospitals, there were hardly 
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any cases where this was reported. Rather, DHBs and RHBs were left to settle 
differences between themselves. 
5.45: Contracting was attenuated by staffing scarcities and management difficulties 
The public health sector is generally bedevilled by staffing constraints, which negatively 
impact on the delivery of services. The low levels of remuneration and attrition of the 
workforce have resulted in a lean public sector workforce. The staffing inadequacies are 
further compounded by the restrictive employment conditions of the Public Service 
Commission (PSC), which made it difficult to discipline or dismiss a member of staff. 
While managers in public institutions faced stringent conditions related to PSC workers, 
those in NGO facilities had more latitude in dealing with such employees. The additional 
missionary sourced staff in such institutions eased staff inadequacies. In addition, NGO 
managers also had relatively better latitude for dispensing with PSC workers, something 
which public institutions were not able to do. 
5.50: NGO versus public contracts 
The following section discusses the differences between NGO and public contracts. The 
section specifically looks at: the delineation of service provision among providers; the 
impact of the social context on contracting; district perception of contracts with NGOs; 
and difference in the latitude to address provider inadequacies and staff management 
difficulties. 
5,51: Delineation of service provision among providers 
Before the advent of explicit contracts in the health sector, NGO facilities were self- 
governing units managed by mission boards. Missionary values of serving deprived 
communities resulted in the concentration of NGO health facilities in marginal areas such 
as rural settings. The missionary values were also reflected in a bias of the type of health 
services provided. For instance, the NGO facilities concentrated on the provision of 
primary health care services, since they took this to be an effective way of meeting the 
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needs of most of the vulnerable populations. So key was NGO concentration on health 
promotion activities that they were extended to the NGO hospital sector. 
Table 5.5: A comparison of transaction difficulties and views on contracting policy between 
NGO and public hospital contracts 
Transaction difficulties 
-NGOs were able to supplement government staff with those from mission agencies. 
-Almost all the doctors in the mission hospital were from mission agencies. 
-NGO facilities had more latitude for managing staff than public facilities. 
-DHBs were more likely to express satisfaction with NGO than public hospital services. 
Opportunism and bounded rationality 
-DHBs reported better feedback rate from NGO hospitals. 
-Because of prior experience with the provision of PHC services, NGO hospitals were more 
likely to have inappropriate referrals 
-Mission values dictated how service delivery was managed 
Value of explicit contracts 
-Contracts had delineated the provision of health services among various levels of the health 
system. NGO ceased provision of lower level PHC services. 
-Introduction of contracting with public institutions meant NGO hospitals effectively had two 
principals (mission and government). 
-The effectiveness of contracting had been attenuated by the limited control over staff, which was 
more pronounced among the public hospitals. 
-The NGO hospital had less operational difficulties because of the additional resources that 
mission agencies were able to mobilise 
However, and as was demonstrated in the introduction chapters, the provision of low 
level PHC services by the hospital sector was one manifestation of inefficiencies that the 
health reforms sought to resolve. As indicated above, the hospitals were required to 
concentrate on curative health services, while district facilities were to concentrate on the 
provision of primary and first level referral services. The NGO hospital included in this 
study for instance had been providing MCH services, which were subsequently stopped 
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in wake of the health reforms. Although there had been a shift from the NGO hospital 
provision of preventive services, the NGO staff who had been involved in providing such 
services may have developed ingrained practices, which could predispose them to 
accepting patients with minor illnesses. This combined with community expectations of 
better quality health services from NGO hospitals could work against the delineation of 
services among providers. Responses from a provider working from a hospital based 
health centre illustrates this point: "... We have not had any complaints from the hospital 
regarding the referrals that we make, at least they have accepted that and if they had any 
problem, they would have come back and told us you know your referring system is not 
good but we haven't had such, so we feel we're are doing what we are supposed to do... " 
5.52: The impact of the social context on contracting 
As was indicated above, the NGO facilities were based in deprived areas, which were 
characterised by poor social amenities and abject living conditions. Thus areas in which 
NGOs operated tended to have poor quality of health services, high levels of morbidity 
and mortality, and low-income levels. Although the NGO health facilities were 
perceived to provide better quality of health services, the corresponding services from the 
feeder government facilities were poor, which posed pressures on the hospitals. 
Having been long established in the rural settings, NGO facilities had earned the 
reputation of providing quality health services, toward which the communities were well 
disposed. This coupled with the ingrained provider bias toward low level PHC services 
could have perpetuated inappropriate practices and inefficiencies. The community 
preference for NGO services produced incessant demand from the population, even when 
public facilities could effectively provide such services. 
The constraints affecting the delivery of services in the public sector had been 
compounded by provider scarcities and management difficulties. While such constraints 
were generalised for both the NGO and public hospitals, these were more pronounced for 
district health facilities that referred to the NGO hospital. Being located in rural areas, 
the feeder health centres faced graver staff deficiencies than the urban located public 
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facilities. The relatively worse staffing situation in districts serving NGO hospitals had 
limited the capacity of feeder health institutions and created contract difficulties. 
5.53: District perception of contracts with NGOs 
As was indicated in the introduction, the contracts between districts and hospitals were 
based on historical circumstances, whereby districts contracted with hospitals that were 
in close proximity. In some rural settings, however, districts had the choice of contracting 
with public and/or NGO hospitals. Although such districts contracted with both 
government and NGO hospitals, they were more likely to report satisfaction with the 
services provided by NGO than public hospitals. As was explained above under district 
and hospital autonomy, given a choice, districts preferred to contract exclusively with 
NGO hospitals, but they were tied to specific hospitals on account of spatial factors, 
which predetermined the hospitals which communities could conveniently access. One 
of the reasons for districts preferring NGO over government facilities was that the former 
were more likely to provide feed-back for referred cases than the latter. And because of 
the high likelihood of receiving referral feedback from mission hospitals, one DUB had 
decided to formally recognise an NGO hospital as their referral facility over a public 
hospital. 
5.54: Better NGO latitude to addressing provider constraints 
The availability and management of service providers was another aspect in which NGO 
contracts differed from public contracts. The limitations in the absolute numbers of 
personnel in the ministry and difficulties of staff management had attenuated the 
effectiveness of contracting. These human resource difficulties were particularly rife in 
the public service, while the NGO sector had relatively more latitude in dealing with 
such. The mission hospitals had ameliorated the problem of staff shortages through 
attachments from church organizations. Furthermore, mission hospitals were better able 
to deal with personnel belonging to the PSC, whom they would surrender back to the 
MOH when such were found wanting. 
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5.60: Conclusion 
The introduction of explicit contracts in the health sector was expected to improve the 
delivery of services through granting of autonomy, the specification and delineation of 
roles in the delivery of services. The respondents observed that contracting played an 
assurance role that funding would be provided and had increased interaction between the 
contracting parties. However, the policy had been attenuated by: inadequacies of 
providers and difficulties of managing public sector staff; funding constraints; and 
locked-in relationships. Arising from the locked-in relationships, both DHBs and RHBs 
accused each other of opportunistic behaviours in relation to referral decision-making 
and payments. A comparison of contracts with NGO and public hospitals showed that: 
there had been changes with regard to delineation of service provision; NGO contracts 
were adversely affected by the deprived conditions of the communities in which they 
worked; districts well more disposed to contracting with NGO than public hospitals and 
NGO hospital facilities had more latitude in dealing with provider inadequacies and staff 
management difficulties. 
124 
Chapter 6.00: The levels and patterns of referrals from district 
health facilities to referral hospitals 
6.10: Introduction 
This chapter presents findings on the levels and patterns of referrals from district health 
facilities to hospitals. The chapter starts with an outline of the methods, which were used 
to assess the levels and appropriateness of referrals, which is followed by the results of 
the assessment. In presenting findings on the referral levels, six diseases/health 
conditions are used as tracers, while the assessment of referral appropriateness is done by 
using both expert and indicator-based methods. 
6.20: An overview of the data and methods of analysis 
As was detailed in the methods section, the study used quantitative data to determined 
referral levels. The quantitative data were collected from routine hospital records, using 
six diseases/health conditions of malaria, RTI, ARC, diarrhoea, tuberculosis, and 
anaemia. Although it would have been ideal to collect data prior to and after the health 
reforms, this was not feasible. Nonetheless, the data showed changes in referrals for a 
period during which the health reforms had been underway for close to a decade and 
would reflect the underlying policy change. As was illustrated in the methods section, 
the use of data based on routine hospital records is fraught with difficulties. The lack of 
data covering the period prior to the health reforms exemplified these difficulties. 
While data from hospital records showed the level of referrals, additional data to 
determine the referral patterns was collected from patients' records. As with the 
hospital-based data, those from patient records were similarly fraught with deficiencies, 
not least because the data collection templates were limited to the pre-existing format of 
the hospital patient records. In order to limit the effect of such deficiencies, two 
indicators of referral appropriateness were used: expert-opinion based indicators; and 
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objective-indicator based methods. Medical experts were recruited to review the patient 
records and results of the reviews are shown separately below. 
Table 6.1 shows the list of variables that were collected from patient records. Data 
collection templates were prepared on which details of patients prior to and after 
presentation at the hospital were recorded. For details of patients prior to admission at 
the hospital, the following variables were recorded: name of health centre and date 
visited, age, sex, referral status (whether somebody was referred with/without a referral 
letter, or by-passed the health centre), the provisional diagnosis, and reason for referral 
(either for management, investigation or both). On the second part of the template, the 
data collected were: name of hospital and date visited; general condition on presentation 
to the hospital; diagnostic tests done on admission (temperature, blood pressure, 
respiratory rate, and pulse rate); final diagnosis at the hospital; comments on 
management of the patient at the hospital; whether the patient was admitted, length of 
stay in hospital, whether the patient died; and changes in temperature during admission. 
Based on the information collected using the templates, the medical experts determined 
whether a referral was appropriate or not. The reviewers determined the appropriateness 
of each referral by: finding out whether cases recovered after initial lines of treatment; 
availability of diagnostic facilities and management skills; and condition-specific 
indicators of severity. The review method was supplemented by objective-indicator 
based methods such as: proportion of cases admitted out of those referred; mean 
temperature on presentation to hospital and changes during treatment; and the survival 
status of admitted patients. 
126 
Table 6.1: List of variables collected from inpatient records and methods for assessing 
referral appropriateness 
Sending health centre 
Name of sending health centre 
Date health centre was visited 
Age, sex of case 
Referral status (referred, by-passed, with/without referral letter) 
Provisional diagnosis (diagnosis done at health centre) 
Reason for referral 
Receiving referral hospital 
Name of receiving hospital 
Date hospital was visited 
General condition on presentation at hospital 
Diagnostic tests on admission (temperature, BP, HB, RR, PR) 
Final diagnosis (diagnosis done at the hospital) 
Comments on management of patient at the hospital 
Whether admitted, length of stay in hospital, whether died/alive 
Changes in temperature during admission 
Method for assessing the referral appropriateness 
Referral appropriateness (based on tracer conditions of malaria in adults and 
pneumonia in children) 
-Expert-opinion based: 
1. Inability of cases to recover after initial lines of treatment 
2. Availability of diagnostic facilities and management skills 
3. Condition-specific indicators of severity 
-Objective-indicator based: 
1. Proportion of cases admitted=number of revealed cases which were 
admitted/grand total of cases revealed 
2. Mean temperature on presentation to hospital and changes during treatment 
3. Survival status of admitted patients=proportion of admitted patients who died 
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6.30: Patterns and levels of referrals 
6.31: Patterns of referrals 
The following section presents the findings on the morbidity profile of the study 
hospitals by showing the relative contribution of the selected diseases/health conditions 
to hospital attendances (Table 6.31). The proportions of the diseases/health conditions to 
total hospital attendance were presented relative to the corresponding national level 
disease burden reflected by DALYS. According to the BPC, none of the six 
diseases/health conditions for which data was collected are supposed to be presented at a 
third level hospital, except anaemia. Similarly, only RTI and TB are recommended for 
referral to secondary level hospitals, while malaria, diarrhoea and ARC are supposed to 
be managed at the PHC/1` referral level. 
However, the study found that the disease profile of hospital attendances did not reflect 
the expected BPC referral norms (Table 6.2). The NGO hospital attended to more (48% 
for both 1997 and 2002) malaria cases that the public hospitals. Contrary to the BPC, 
malaria cases were presented at both public hospitals with upgraded health facilities 
(average of 32 % for both 1997 and 2002) and public hospitals without upgraded health 
facilities (average 33% for both 1997 and 2002). For diarrhoeal cases, there were 
relatively more cases attended to by public hospitals (24% and 15%) than the NGO 
hospital (9%) in 1997. There was a decline in the proportion of diarrhoeal cases 
presented to all hospitals between 1997 and 2002, with public hospitals having recorded 
the most marked decline (24% to 14%). There was a low level of ARC cases (average 
6%) in 1997 presented to the both the public hospital with upgraded health facilities and 
the NGO facility. 
The disease profile of hospital attendances showed that: all the conditions which were 
expected to be managed at the primary care level were presented to all the hospitals; 
although there was a reduction in the proportions presented between 1997 and 2002 for 
all the diseases, the NGO hospital had the highest proportion of malaria cases, and the 
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levels for all the hospitals remained stable between 1997 and 2002; while all the hospitals 
experienced a decline in the proportion of the diarrhoea, malaria and ARC, between 
1997,2002, ARC cases presented to public hospitals without upgraded facilities 
increased from 3% to 10%. 
In 1997, the proportional attendance attributed to TB for the NGO hospital was low 
(3%), while the corresponding proportion for non-upgraded hospitals (17%) and 
upgraded hospitals (10%) were higher than the corresponding national DALYs level 
(2%). All the hospitals registered increases in the proportion of TB cases between 1997 
and 2002. The contribution of RTI to hospital attendances declined for the upgraded 
hospital and non-upgraded hospitals, while it increased for the NGO hospital. In 2002, 
the proportion of RTI attendances to the NGO hospital was higher (33%) than the 
corresponding percentage to both upgraded (30%) and non-upgraded hospitals (19%). 
For anaemia, there was a higher proportion presenting at the NGO than at public 
hospitals. 
The overall assessment of the disease profile for the study districts showed that: the 
conditions which were expected to be managed at the PHC level and those expected to be 
referred to the secondary level of care were presented at all the three hospitals; in 
aggregate terms, there was a higher proportion of primary care cases presented at the 
NGO hospital than both upgraded and non-upgraded hospitals; upgraded hospitals had 
slightly more secondary level cases than non-upgraded hospitals. The dominance of 
malaria and RTIs as causes of hospital attendances was upheld across all the hospitals 
and both showed limited change between 1997 and 2002. 
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Table 6.2: Percentage distribution of hospital morbidity and national DALYs profile, 
1997 and 2002 
Disease/health NGO hospital Public hospitals Public hospitals DALYS 
condition (not-upgraded) (upgraded) 
1997 2002 1997 2002 1997 2002 1996 
Disease/health condit ions which are recommended for mans ement at primary level 
Malaria 0.48 0.48 0.33 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.37 
Diarrhoea 0.09 0.06 0.24 0.14 0.15 0.10 0.12 
ARC 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.18 
Sum 0.63 0.59 0.60 0.55 0.55 0.58 0.67 
Disease/health condit ions which are recommended for referral to secondary level 
RTI 0.23 0.33 0.22 0.19 0.32 0.29 0.30 
TB 0.03 0.04 0.17 0.23 0.10 0.15 0.02 
Sum 0.26 0.37 0.40 0.42 0.42 0.44 0.32 
Disease/health condit ions which are recommended for referral to tertiary level 
Anaemia 0.06 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.004 
ARC (Combined IIIVIAIDS and STI cases) 
6.40: Assessing the appropriateness of referrals 
As was outlined above, assessment of referral appropriateness was based on two tracer 
conditions of pneumonia in children and malaria in adults. The findings showed that the 
major purpose of referrals for both upgraded and not-upgraded hospitals was for 
"management", while for the NGO hospitals, it was for "management and investigation" 
(Table 6.4). 
6.41: Expert-opinion based assessment 
As was stated above, medical experts were engaged to review the patient records and 
determine the appropriateness of each referral. The reviewers used medical information 
of the patients on admission and during presentation to the hospital to determine whether 
a referral was appropriate or not. The criteria used for gauging appropriateness can be 
broadly grouped into: whether an illnesses responded to initial lines of treatment at the 
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health centre; whether the available diagnostic and management resources at the health 
centre were adequate for dealing with the condition; and condition-specific indicators of 
illness severity (the criteria are summarised in Table 6.5 below). 
For both pneumonia and malaria cases, referrals were deemed to be appropriate where a 
patient had not recovered after initial lines of medication. For malaria cases, the initial 
lines of treatment included: chloroquine, halphan and fancidar, while for pneumonia, 
they included amoxil and septrin. The availability of medical requisites and management 
skills were also considered, for instance in the case of severe malaria cases. Various 
condition-specific indicators were also used to gauge the appropriateness of referral, with 
temperature being a commonly used yardstick. 
Table 6.3: Purpose of referral and whether referral letter was attached or not by tracer 
cnnriitinn and tvnP of contract 
Public hospital NGO hospital 
Back round variable g With upgraded Without upgraded 
facilities facilities 
Referral letter 
Attached 52 51 91 
Not-attached 48 49 9 
(n) 100 578 183 
Purpose of referral 
Investigation 3 1 1 
Management 77 92 23 
Investigation & Management 20 7 76 
(n) 120 562 160 
Referral letter 
Attached 86 53 97 
Not-attached 14 47 3 
(n) 655 30 134 
Purpose of referral 
Investigation 8 0 1 
Management 74 80 26 
Investigation & Management 18 20 73 
(n) 669 10 125 
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Note: There differences in the "n" for the various variables arose from the varying levels of 
completion of the patient forms: for instance the total number of forms for which the purpose of 
referrals was indicated was different from those for which a referral letter was attached. 
Table 6.4: Summary of criteria used by medical experts to determine whether a referral 
was appropriate or not 
The medical reviewers contracted to assess referral appropriateness used information of 
the patient on admission and during treatment, The criteria used for assessing referral 
appropriateness could be broadly grouped into three classes: whether an illness 
responded or did not respond to initial lines of medication; whether the diagnostic and 
management resources at clinics were adequate for dealing with the illness; and disease- 
specific indicators of illness severity. 
Failure to recover after initial line of medications: 
The major indicator which was used to determine referral appropriateness was 
appropriate or not was whether a patient had recovered after initial lines of medication 
or not. Referral cases deemed to be appropriate where those for which no improvement 
of the condition was recorded after treatment with initial drugs such as chloroquine, 
coartem, halphan and fancidar, for malaria; and medication such as cristapen, amoxil 
and septrin for pneumonia. 
Availability of diagnostic and management resources 
Referrals were deemed appropriate for cases, which needed higher diagnostic 
equipment and management skills. For instance all cases of meningitis, for which the 
lumber puncture procedure was required were considered appropriate. Cases, which 
required intensive diagnostic and management resources were also appropriate: 
anaemia; investigation of sudden abnormalities such as high BP, convulsions, and 
jaundice. Conditions requiring investigation to ascertain the cause of an illness were 
also taken to be appropriate. 
Indicators of illness severity 
Various condition specific indicators were used to gauge illness severity, with 
temperature being a commonly used yardstick. Where the temperature had been 
consistently high, the referral would be deemed to be appropriate, especially where this 
was in combination with failure to respond to initial treatment. 
For pneumonia in children, nasal flaring was the most widely used sign for assessing 
referral appropriateness. Other indicators included: patients having high palor, those 
who were dyspnoeanic, difficulties in breathing, cases exhibiting subcostal/chest 
recession, those with jaundice, tachypnoea and respiratory gloating. 
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Based on the indicators described above, the medical experts determined whether a 
referral was appropriate or not. From the first evaluation, although there was a higher 
level of malaria referral appropriateness for non-upgraded hospitals (79%) than upgraded 
hospitals (73%), the relationship between these hospital types and referral 
appropriateness was not significant (p>0.05). The lack of a relationship between level of 
referral appropriateness and whether a hospital had upgraded facilities or not was upheld 
by the second evaluation. The findings on comparison of levels of pneumonia referral 
appropriateness between upgraded and non-upgraded hospitals upheld these results too. 
Both the first and second evaluations showed that there was no relationship between 
levels of referral appropriateness and whether a hospital had upgraded facilities or not 
(Tables 6.6 and 6.7 below). 
While the comparison of referral appropriateness between upgraded and non-upgraded 
hospitals showed that there was no significant relationship, a comparison of NGOI public 
hospitals showed statistically significant relationships. The level of malaria referral 
appropriateness was higher (78%) in public than NGO hospitals (38%), for both the first 
and second assessments. Similarly, the level of pneumonia referral appropriateness was 
higher (87%) in public than NGO hospitals (53%). Again, this was observed from the 
first and second evaluations. 
To summarise, the results on referral appropriateness based on expert opinions showed 
that there was no relationship between upgraded/not-upgraded hospitals and level of 
referral appropriateness for both malaria and pneumonia. However, there was a 
significant relationship between public/NGO hospitals and the levels of referral 
appropriateness for both malaria and pneumonia. A comparison of referral 
appropriateness by tracer condition showed that referrals were consistently more 
appropriate for pneumonia than malaria cases. 
6.42: Objective indicator-based assessments 
The expert opinion based assessment of referral appropriateness was supplemented by 
objective-indicators based on data collected from patient records. The indicators used to 
assess referral appropriateness included: the admission rate of referred cases; the survival 
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status of admitted cases; and the time taken for the temperature to nonnalise during 
admission. 
The admission rate of referred cases 
The proportion of referred cases that were admitted could be used as a proxy for referral 
appropriateness because the decision to admit is, among other factors influenced by the 
severity of an illness. Thus, in comparing the appropriateness of referrals across 
hospitals, the proportion of cases admitted out of those referred was used. A comparison 
of malaria admission rates showed that they were lower (86%) for upgraded hospitals 
than for non-upgraded hospitals (99%) (Table 6.35) and the relationship was significant 
(p<0.01). However, there was no relationship between pneumonia admission levels and 
whether a hospital had upgraded not non-upgraded facilities. 
A comparison of admission rates for NGO and public hospitals showed that they were 
higher under the latter. For malaria cases, 95% had been admitted under public 
hospitals, while 44% had been under NGO hospitals (p<0.01). Similarly, for pneumonia 
cases, 96% were admitted in public hospitals, while 54% were in NGO hospitals 
(p<0.01). The high levels of admission under public hospitals imply relatively higher 
levels of illness severity compared to NGO hospitals. 
A comparison of admission rates between the two tracer conditions of malaria and 
pneumonia showed that they were higher for the latter. More pneumonia cases were 
more likely to be admitted than malaria cases. These differences were consistent across 
all hospitals. 
The survival status of admitted cases 
A comparison of the survival status of the admitted cases revealed that there was no 
relationship between upgraded/non-upgraded hospitals and the death rate for pneumonia 
cases. The comparison of the death rate for malaria cases, however, showed that it was 
higher for upgraded (17%), than non-upgraded hospitals (5%) (p<0.00l). 
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In line with the other indicators shown above, a comparison of death rates between 
public and NGO hospitals showed that referrals were more appropriate under the former. 
For malaria, a higher percentage of referred cases died under public (7%) than (1%) 
NGO hospitals (p<0.05). Similarly, more pneumonia referrals died under public (22%), 
than NGO hospitals (4%) (p<0.01). 
The findings on the time it took for the temperature to normalise during admission, 
showed variations. There was a higher proportion of cases for which the temperature 
normalised within twenty four hours of admission in upgraded hospitals (49%), which 
was slightly lower than that for non-upgraded hospitals (46%). However, hospitals with 
upgraded facilities had a higher percentage (33%) of cases for which the temperature 
normalised after seventy two hours than non-upgraded hospitals (18%) (p<0.01). 
A comparison of changes in temperature recordings showed that cases from public 
hospitals consistently showed longer periods in which the temperature normalised 
compared to those from NGO hospitals. Given that it took longer for the temperature to 
normalise under upgraded than non-upgraded hospitals, it can be concluded that severity 
was higher under the former. A comparison of public and NGO hospitals showed that 
the differences in the time taken for temperature to normalise were significant (p<0.01). 
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Table 6.5: Indicators of referral appropriateness: first and second opinion, proportion 
admitted and survival status (malaria in adults) 
Referral appropriateness and Contracting context 
survival status Health Health Public NGO hospital 
facilities facilities not hospitals 
upgraded upgraded 
Was referral appropriate? 
(first opinion) 
Yes 73 79 78 38 
No 27 21 22 62 
(n) 118 583 701 185 
p>0.05 P<0.001 
Was referral appropriate? 
(second opinion) 
Yes 83 75 76 38 
No 17 25 24 62 
(n) 71 581 652 186 
P>0.05 P<0.001 
Proportion of revealed cases 
Admitted 86 99 95 44 
Not admitted 14 1 4 56 
(n) 111 304 415 185 
P<0.001 P<0.001 
Survival status 
% of referred dead 17 5 7 1 
% of referred alive 83 95 93 99 
104 579 683 79 
P<0.001 P<0.05 
Temperature normalises 
Within 24 hrs 49 46 47 21 
24-48 9 28 23 54 
48-72 9 8 8 18 
72+ 33 18 22 6 
(n) 86 221 307 66 
P<0.010 P<0.001 
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Table 6.6: Indicators of referral appropriateness: first and second opinions, proportion of 
admissions, and illness severity indices (pneumonia in children) 
Referral appropriateness Contracting context 
and illness severity Health Health facilities Public NGO 
facilities not upgraded 
u aded 
Was referral appropriate? 
(first opinion) 
Yes 87 97 87 53 
No 13 3 13 47 
(n) 678 34 712 135 
P>0.05 P<0.001 
Was referral appropriate? 
(second opinion) 
Yes 95 90 95 52 
No 5 2 5 48 
(n) 625 34 659 135 
P>0.05 P<0.001 
Proportion of revealed cases 
Admitted 96 100 96 54 
Not admitted 4 0 4 46 
(n) 644 34 678 133 
P>0.05 P<0.001 
Survival status 
% of referred dead 23 21 23 4 
% of referred alive 77 79 77 96 
(n) 647 33 680 69 
P>0.05 P<0.001 
6.60: Conclusion 
The proportion of the selected diseases/health conditions presented to both upgraded and 
non-upgraded hospitals were not very different. Both hospitals had high proportions of 
primary health conditions. Although the proportion of such cases declined between 1997 
and 2002, the ratio of malaria remained the same for both hospitals. The proportion of 
cases recommended for referral to the secondary level of care increased or remained the 
same for upgraded and non-upgraded hospitals. There was no major difference in the 
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proportion of cases presented to upgraded and non-upgraded hospitals. The disease 
profile for the NGO hospital was closer to the expected pattern of a secondary level 
hospital, but the hospital also catered for a high proportion of primary health conditions. 
Although referrals to upgraded hospitals were more likely to be appropriate than those to 
non-upgraded hospitals, the differences were not statistically significant. There were no 
major differences in the severity of cases that were referred to the upgraded and non- 
upgraded hospitals. However, a comparison of referral appropriateness between public 
and NGO hospitals showed consistent differences. The referrals were more appropriate 
for public and than NGO hospitals. 
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Chapter 7.00: The incentive structures facing districts and influences 
on referrals 
7.10: Introduction 
This chapter presents findings on the incentive structures facing districts and how these 
impacted on referrals. The chapter starts with a discussion of the perverse incentives of 
block contracts. This is followed by a discussion of managerial incentives such as the 
inclination to increase revenues, providers' preference for administrative over clinical 
roles and desire for expanded autonomy. A discussion of the socio-political incentive 
structures facing districts follows. The second part of the chapter discusses how the 
identified incentive structures impact on referrals from district health facilities to 
hospitals. 
7.20: The financial incentives 
7.21: Type and mode of reimbursements to districts 
The financial incentive structures facing districts and influences on referrals are 
summarised in Table 7.1. Districts were given block payments for the provision of health 
services to their client populations. Since the contracts were block payments, it provided 
the districts with no strong incentives for efficient behaviours because they were assured 
of payments irrespective of their performance. As was outlined in the section on the 
policy of explicit contracts, although the contracts stipulated that sanctions would be 
imposed on districts which did not perform well, such provisions had not been invoked 
before, and for the most part, districts were assured of payment irrespective of the level 
of performance. 
The limitations of the block contracts were further compounded by the mode of payment, 
whereby hospital referral grants were paid to districts, which in turn transferred the same 
to hospitals. The mode of payment disadvantaged the hospitals in the sense that in most 
cases the districts had an upper hand in determining how much of the grant would be 
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remitted to hospitals. In all the cases studied, DHBs paid hospitals minimal grants. 
While hospitals consistently argued that the grants from DHBs were inadequate, the 
latter countered by observing that the overall grants that they received from the CBOH 
were limited. Justifying the low grants given to hospitals, a DHB manager said: "... I 
think there are a number of things that have to be considered, and each district has its 
own unique problems like in our case, you will find that if we paid more than 30%, we 
might end up in problems because currently our wage bill is very high and there are a lot 
of members of staff who are not on government payroll... So you can see that if we say 
we increase to 30 %, then as a district we shall remain with very little money to run.. " 
(DHB manager) 
Table 7.1: The financial incentive structures facing districts and influences on referrals 
Financial incentives Influence on referrals 
-Block contracts do not -districts did not put in much effort to ensure efficiency in 
encourage efficient practices the delivery of health services 
-districts were assured of grants -this manifested in the persistence of inappropriate 
irrespective of level of effort referrals to hospitals. 
-Providing of more non-BPC -Districts cut costs through sending more referrals to 
services hospitals 
-Provision of more non-BPC -Non-effectiveness of sanctions perpetuated cost shifting 
more likely where monitoring is behaviours by districts 
limited -High referral levels to hospitals were compounded by 
-Tendency to spend more time limited control of district managers over frontline 
on those parts of the contract providers 
which are monitored -Districts did not pay much attention to rationalising 
-Where monitoring costs are referrals, in part because the HMIS did not capture this 
high, contracted party will act information. 
opportunistically -High cost of collecting and analysing information made 
it difficult to rationalise referrals 
-Districts used hospitals' lack of information on referral 
workload to their advantage. 
When deciding on how much of their grant to give the hospitals, the DHBs were limited 
by the low overall grant and financial needs. Invariably, the DHBs gave priority to 
meeting their immediate needs over paying for referral services. This situation was made 
worse by the lack of a method for relating the referral grant to the related hospital 
140 
workload, which both DHBs and RHBs were mindful of. As a result, the districts were 
taking advantage of their position as purchasers of health services, to the disadvantage of 
hospitals. Despite the persistence of this difficulty, nothing much had been done to 
resolve it and hospitals were on the losing end. 
7.22: The influence of financial incentives on referrals 
The levels and mode of payment of district grants impacted on referral levels by: 
tempting districts to limit grants to hospitals and encouraging complacency because of 
the lack of sanctions for deterring negative behaviours. Given the limited overall grant, 
districts were tempted to increase referrals to hospitals in order to reduce their costs and 
thus keep the "surplus". In such a setting, the district managers would be less fastidious 
about monitoring the referral practices of frontline providers. 
The problem of inappropriate referrals to hospitals was further exacerbated by the lack of 
sanctions for inappropriate practices. This limitation accentuated the perverse financial 
incentives from the districts. According to the health financing policy, which is detailed 
in the introduction section, DHBs were responsible for managing and providing primary 
and first level referral services, while RHBs managed and provided 2°d and 3`d level 
referral services. While the BPC explicitly outlined the range of services that were 
supposed to be provided by districts and hospitals, there was often a discrepancy between 
what was expected and delivered. Inappropriate referrals in part arose from this 
discrepancy and overlap in service provision. The dysfunctional referral system was 
further illustrated by weak links between health centres and hospitals. Effective 
management of a referral system would entail that cases deserving referral are 
appropriately and timely assessed and referred to the appropriate higher level. After a 
referral is received, the referral institutions should refer back to the sending institution for 
continuation of care, where this is needed. However, this as will be shown below was 
hardly the case and as a result referral problems persisted. 
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7.30: The incentives facing providers 
7.31: The providers' professional and social incentives 
The providers' professional and social incentives facing district frontline providers and 
their influence on referrals are summarise in Table 7.2 below. In order to gauge the 
motivations of frontline providers, they were asked to indicate what their career 
ambitions were. While the providers consistently talked about how they were driven by 
the need to serve their communities, they also observed that they had been attracted to 
work in public health institutions by the better training opportunities, which were 
available in the sector. But for such opportunities, most of them would have opted for 
the private sector, which offered better conditions of service. 
The public health sector was used as a ground for upgrading skills, attaining more 
qualifications and gaining professional experience for better employment opportunities in 
the private/NGO sector. This view was supported by findings on the career ambitions of 
the respondents, most of who aspired to join either the private sector or NGO 
organizations. The following excerpts from interviews with providers were illustrative of 
their career objectives. The results showed, and as is indicated above that the providers 
used the public sector to gain experience, acquire qualifications in order to achieve their 
career objective of being employed in the private sector. Although some of the 
respondents did not voluntarily say that they aspired to get a job in the private sector, 
they would, after further probing, indicate their preference for the private over the public 
sector. In response to a question about their professional ambitions, a provider said: 
.... I just don't want to end up as a mid-wife, maybe I would love to do post-basic 
nursing. 
Q: And then after getting your post basic nursing qualification? 
A: I would go in the area of public health nursing. 
Q: Within the public sector or outside the public sector? 
A: Within the public sector. 
Q: You have no ambitions of joining other organisations? 
A: Either of those [private and public organisations],... I can join the private 
sector. 
Q: What is your preference? 
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A: Okay, preferably, because now we are talking of greener pastures, the private 
sector would be better... it has more advantages... then I will join the private 
sector. (District health provider) 
Table 7.2: Professional and social incentives facing district frontline providers and their 
influence on referrals 
Incentives Influence on referrals 
Disposition to acting in socially expected 
ways: 
-emanating from providers' empathy for 
communities 
-shared experience of social deprivation that 
had affected communities 
Sanctions and rewards facing providers: 
-The institutional sanctions were weak and -The providers responded to social 
not able to deter negative actions incentives, which resulted in high referral 
-The institutional rewards were also volumes to hospitals 
ineffective and not able to influence provider -The relatively more effective social than 
behaviour organisational rewards resulted in providers 
-On the contrary, social rewards and acceding to community pressures for referral. 
sanctions were strong determinants of 
provider behaviour 
The motivation for personal advancement 
-Advancement of academic qualifications -By improving their academic and 
-Advancement of professional qualifications professional competency, the providers were 
-Gaining professional experience in the able to make better-informed referral 
public sector decisions. 
-Improved provider competency was 
however attenuated by public sector service 
provision constraints. 
Similarly, another respondent observed that they wanted to change their profession from 
a clinical officer to a pharmacist, because there were more opportunities for pharmacists 
than clinical officers: 
... because I have seen that as [clinical officers], we don't have so many 
avenues. It is either you remain a clinical officer general or you do 
psychiatry or you go for theatre nursing. But I would want something more 
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advanced...... for which I can get a degree, thereafter, proceed to PhD. So I 
thought pharmacy has so many avenues. 
Q: Once you get your Pharmacy qualifications, do you see 
yourself... remaining in the public sector or you would prefer working in the 
private sector? 
A: [The] private sector [is] better, because what we follow is money. 
(District health provider) 
Talking about his ambitions after retiring, a provider said: 
... Some years down the 
line, as a professional. ... I am just waiting for my [retirement]. I hope to establish a very good clinic. I want to go into the 
private sector... though I am already there. I should now consolidate....! 
have got my own clinic. Now i fl left work, I think 1 can solidify it. But before 
I go, I want to do some further training in counselling and management. 
Q: Why do you want to do those [counselling and management]? 
A: Why? Well, maybe one by one; counselling may be it will help me in 
future endeavours. Because whatever I will do, it will need counselling. 
Even if I left work, or even if I am here, it will still need a lot of counselling in 
my screening time -I will need counselling. Administration again if I left my 
employer, I run my own [clinic], I will need to have skills in management. 
The in-service training opportunities were a strong incentive for the workers, who 
observed that there were more of such opportunities in districts than hospitals. The most 
commonly cited seminars/workshops were: Integrated Management of Childhood 
Illnesses (IMCI); Syndromic Management of STIs; and Family Planning and HIV/AIDS 
management and counselling. The public sector was valued for the training opportunities 
it provided, which were not available in the private sector: "... I have never seen people 
who are working for a private surgery or who used to work for the mines [attending 
workshops]. There [the private sector], it is not a priority, capacity building is not a 
priority... " (District provider)" 
7.32: The influence of professional and social incentives on referrals 
Although ultimately the providers were motivated by the self interest to advance their 
academic and professional standards, these incentives impacted on referrals decision 
making. The acquisition of skills positively impacted on referral decision making by 
raising the competencies of providers and hence enabling them to make better- informed 
decisions. The providers observed that the workshops had had positive effects on their 
referral decision making practices. For instance, they reported that the workshops on 
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IMCI, which most of them had attended had improved their referral decision making by 
availing them with the skills for assessing illness severity using less technologically 
based methods. They observed that they were able to assess illness severity through such 
manual assessments as checking the rate of breathing, chest in-drawing and presence of 
convulsions in children presenting with pneumonia. 
Talking about how the training on syndromic management of STIs had improved his 
competency, a provider said: "... Like the syndromic approach to STIs, [before attending 
the course] we used to send patients to the lab fat the hospital], and some patients would 
never come back maybe because of the costs at the lab. So, with this approach, we are 
able to treat patients there and then. Even IMCI has made our work easier because it has 
restricted sending for unnecessary investigations. Now, just from the symptoms and 
using IMCI methods, we are able to come up with the diagnosis and treatment... " 
Similarly, another respondent said: ... I have liked this course 1 did in the IMCI, it has 
helped me to refer when necessary. I like it because before I was trained in IMCI, I used 
to get stuck......... when do you refer the child? ... IMCI taught me enough, I know when 
to refer (Frontline provider). The providers were unanimous in their view that in-service 
training opportunities had positively impacted on their capacity to referral appropriately. 
As with the syndromic management of STIs, so too with the management of childhood 
illnesses, training opportunities had availed the providers with knowledge on how to use 
less technologically based methods to assess the illness severity. The common indicator 
used for deciding whether a patient should be referred or not, both in cases of malaria 
and pneumonia were situations where the patient had not recovered after initial lines of 
treatment. The respondents observed: "... for pneumonia there is in-drawing of the chest, 
then fever... they are given cristaphen, if there is no improvement, that is when they refer 
to [the hospital]... " "... in malaria - they are given first line of treatment, [which is] 
coaterm [an ACT drug]... the new drug. [Alternatively, they could be given] fancidar 
[Sulphate Pyrimethenine]. If a patient doesn't improve on fancidar, maybe they do the 
slide is positive, again after doing the slide despite taking fancidar, it is still positive, 
then go to second line treatment. Then if it is quinine, let us say the patient is even going 
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unconscious, to cerebral malaria, then such... we refer... " "... we manage here and if, we 
don't have drugs, because the severest malaria we are talking of cerebral malaria, if we 
have drugs, we manage here because it is the same management that will be done at the 
hospital which will be done here. Only if we have the drugs here, we exhaust the 
management. If the patient is not improving, only then do we refer. But again, when we 
have got a doctor, we always refer to the doctor. ... but when there is no doctor, we have 
exhausted all the management of malaria, we simply refer... (various district frontline 
providers). 
Other than the history of medication taken, the providers observed that they used other 
indicators of illness severity. For assessing the severity of pneumonia in children, they 
would check for signs of chest-in-drawing, convulsions, and fast- breathing. ... For 
pneumonia, the first thing that we look at is if there is a general danger sign. Let us say, 
the baby comes with cough then difficult in breathing and you find that the baby has a 
fast breath. And when we also check on the chest, we find that there is chest in-drawing 
and then they also could have a general danger sign which is, maybe they are even 
convulsing or they are not able to drink or they are drinking poorly or there is a history 
of convulsions. Yes such babies .. mostly we refer.. . (Frontline provider). ... 
We look for 
chest in-drawing for those kids who are 2 months and above up to 4 years, then those 
below 2 months, we look for nasal flaring and also severe chest in-drawing.... Malaria, 
severe malaria, if we don't have quinine and medic fluids to use for quinine that is when 
we refer... (Frontline provider). 
While in-service training opportunities had resulted in improved competencies of the 
providers, this was sometimes undermined by the limited work environment in which 
they operated. Thus although they could be technically competent, such limitations 
negatively impacted on the effectiveness of their referrals decision making. Such factors 
included: limited staff, especially in peripheral health facilities, limited management 
facilities such as bed space and diagnostic facilities. Given the paucity of doctors and 
clinical officers, nurses often made referral decisions. And to this end, both nurses and 
clinical officers acknowledged that where nurses (especially enrolled nurses) made 
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referral decisions, these were likely to be inappropriate. A respondent from a health 
centre talked about problems encountered when making referrals: "... The difference 
[between clinical officers and nurses] is writing history. When you refer a patient to the 
hospital, you are supposed to put in all the patient's particulars, and you do everything 
required.... you are supposed to follow historical system, so that when the patient arrives 
at the hospital at least they must find [what the] initial treatment was. Now, the only 
difference is with our other friends [nurses], case history is bit of a problem. ... 
Actually, even about 3 weeks ago we had a seminar, they [nurses] also agreed that [they 
found it difficult to write history] ". 
Other than the pressures occasioned by the limited number of providers, workplace 
related factors were also contributory. Commenting on the problems of bed space in the 
clinics, one provider said: "... I remember one time I was on night duty and there came a 
case of gastro enteritis. We had no room here, all those examination rooms... there were 
people there. So I referred this case -I remember we received a telephone call [from the 
hospital] that why have you referred a gastro enteritis case. I said we have no room - we 
can hydrate the patient, but right now we have no room - definitely you can't put a floor 
bed for the patient. So, in most cases the referral issue is governed by the availability of 
rooms in the wards. 
In the words of a clinical officer: "... what I have discovered [is that] at a clinic level, 
you start the cases [from scratch] but when you are at the hospital you continue from 
where they ended at the clinic, so you will find that you handle the referrals... with the 
clinic, the advantage is that you handle cases from the first level, and you will be able to 
make your own decision before anyone sees that case, and then at the hospital its more 
like... when referrals have already been made, there are some other [provisional] 
diagnosis, so you will base your [judgement on this diagnosis]... at the clinic you have to 
start on your own. You have to think harder to come up with your diagnosis.... (Frontline 
provider). 
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7.33: Providers' motives: serving managerial or social interests? 
As was indicated above, in order to gauge the incentive structures that the providers 
faced, they were asked questions aimed at determining what motivated them to act in the 
way they did. The study results showed that the providers were striving to pursue their 
own interests, and also balancing the interests of their managers and the communities that 
they served (results summarised in Table 7.3 below). While the providers consistently 
talked about their interest in serving communities, very few of them talked about their 
obligations to their employers without prompting. District heath managers would usually 
only be mentioned after probing with specific questions about whether what they 
[frontline providers] did was in line with the district manager's expectations. From the 
probes, the providers indicated that they were aware of the constraints that their 
managers faced and how referrals sometimes complicated the management of health 
services. 
District managers in turn observed that the referral practices of the frontline workers 
were sometimes not in alignment with their expectations. One DHB respondent said: 
a... no... 1 would cite two examples for that: [instead of using the standard referral 
form].. some of the referral letters have been lacking information. [That is why], we want 
more clinical officers, because clinical officers are most specialized with the examination 
of patients and diagnosing the problem.. (DHB respondent). 
".... That [assertion by hospitals that districts make a lot of unnecessary referrals] could 
be true in the sense that we as a district do not have an x-ray so for such cases we refer 
to the hospital. ... currently some of the health centres do not have clinical ofcers who 
are supposed to handle the cases.. . so as a result they [patients] are seen by nurses 
(DHB respondent)... ". 
"... On the figures, what the district expects is not a true reflection of what the clinic can 
refer... because sometimes in the clinics, the referrals are done irrationally because the 
district expects real cases to be referred to the hospital. But on the ground you will find 
that even unnecessary cases go to the hospital, for instance if a clinical officer is not 
there, there are only nurses, you will find that some cases which are being referred don't 
merit being referred or indeed if the doctor is not there, the clinical officer might fail in 
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his work... he just refers unnecessarily. ... The other thing is we are under pressure as 
you have seen and we receive a lot of patients at one time, so, I think the other thing is 
staff - they are not enough. .. I think that can help so that maybe those who are not very 
serious can be treated in the community in order to decongest the clinics. So there are 
some patients who just come; but now..... at the same time, there is another serious 
patient, you are wasting time attending to someone who is just got a cough rather than 
attending to a patient [who is very sick]... "(DHB respondent) 
When asked whether their referral practices at health centres were in line with what their 
DHB managers would expect them to do, the providers answered in the affirmative, 
while District Managers were more likely to give contrary responses. The District 
Managers were more likely to acknowledge that the front line providers made 
inappropriate referrals. The tendency to make inappropriate referrals in part arose from 
the frontline providers' empathy for the communities, which led them to act in a socially 
accepted manner: for instance in talking about the difficulties communities faced in 
accessing health services, a provider said: ".... the hospital is 35 km from here, so 
looking at our community [where most of them] are poor, they cannot manage to bare 
the costs involved. So, I think we are having a big problem, the fuel cost and 
maintenance costs for the vehicle... patients are made to contribute a small fee towards 
that transportation, but not every one is able to manage.. "(District frontline provider). 
This quote illustrates the frontline providers' sympathy for communities. In this 
instance, the cost of travelling would be expected to reduce the likelihood of referral to 
hospitals. However, this was limited to remote rural settings, whereas elsewhere the 
providers' actions generally induced referral pressures on hospitals. 
In talking about the financial difficulties that communities faced, which sometimes 
limited their utilisation of health services, a provider suggested that communities should 
subscribe to the prepayment scheme, so that they did not have to pay at the point of need: 
"... So, I think that way we are supposed to help we are not supposed to say the 
community has done bad, but there are some patients who have been kept at home 
because they don't have the scheme [prepayment scheme]. So those people, the 
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community should also know that the better thing they should do to is to get the scheme, 
and if somebody falls sick, the scheme will help them. " (District frontline provider). 
Table 7.3: Managerial and social incentives facing providers and their influence on 
referrals 
Incentives Influences on referrals 
District manager interests: 
-Realise integrated district health system -Weak organisational rewards and sanctions 
-Ineffective organisational sanctions and perpetrated inappropriate referrals 
rewards attenuates effectiveness -Ineffectiveness of managers' control over 
-Limited district influence on frontline staff 
providers limits effect on referrals -The influence of political/social pressures on 
-Political influence manifest in the provision referrals 
of health services 
Providers social incentives: 
-Provider's empathy for communities 
-Strong social rewards and sactions 
In addition to empathising with the community regarding the financial difficulties that 
they faced, the providers also variously described how they enjoyed serving the society. 
Talking about the satisfaction that thy got when a patient they had attended to recovered, 
a provider said: "... What I would want is... ust like the health reforms at work.. . just to 
see people getting quality medical care because it just feels good when somebody comes 
to you very sick, you give that quality care, and the person comes back walking for 
himself and says thank you very much I am feeling better, It feels nice. So I strive just to 
give the best I can.. ". Another one narrated how working in a private surgery would not 
augur well with their beliefs: ... When I started work, I started with a [private] surgery 
and I saw that people have to pay a lot of money.... I realized not only am Ia Clinical 
Officer in this field, am also a Christian. So I feel if I had a [private] surgery, I woudn't 
be doing good. Working in a government clinic, there would be more security since I 
have to work with all my heart to help the people.. . and the money patient pays is minimal 
compared to the private surgeries. 
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The providers' devotion to serving communities was further evidenced by responses to 
questions regarding the work-related scenarios that they avoided most. An 
overwhelming majority said they would not want a patient to die in their care. In order to 
avoid this from happening, they stated that they strove to provide the best possible care 
for patients and effect referral for specialised care, where this was required. They 
observed that in cases where patients died in a provider's care, the latter were not usually 
at fault as no one would intentionally want a patient to die. The risk of getting infected 
was also mentioned as a work-related situation that they avoided. The risk had become 
particularly serious with the advent of HIV/AIDS and TB. ".... we are meeting quite a 
lot of TB cases, like what we are doing now, we are working in collaboration with TDRC 
(Tropical Diseases Research Centre) collecting specimens... so I am supposed to be 
cautious. You have to be very careful by using protective clothing there because if you 
just go there without protective clothing, you can get infected (Front line provider). 
Similar views were expressed by midwives, who by the nature of their work came into 
contact with blood and hence faced the risk of infection. 
While being wary of the internal work-related risky situations, the workers were also 
mindful of inappropriate pressures from the community. They expressed aversion to the 
risk of corruption at the work place. "... what I don't want is to be corrupted. A person 
comes saying here is K5,000 just give me seven days sick of .... I say my friend, I have 
enough money which is more than this K5,000. I know a person cannot be perfect, just 
as it says self praise has no recommendation but other people can even bear witness to 
say he tries by all means to avoid such practices... (Frontline health provider). The 
providers were mindful of the social implication of being labelled corrupt in the 
community, which they observed would tarnish their reputation. The following excerpt 
from an interview buttresses the providers' views about corruption: 
Q... In terms of your work environment, what.. . would you want not to happen to 
you? 
A. Corruption 
Q. How and what kind of corruption? 
A. You know, when you are working in clinics or in hospitals, it is easy for you to 
be biased. Some patients who come there are not just patients, they are patients in 
quotations... they are [important people] in society. So you will find that at the end 
of attending to them, they will give you something and if you get that money, you 
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will be biased. Each time that person comes, you will give him special care; and 
what about the poor who is not giving you anything. So you find that because we 
are prone to this kind of corruption. I wouldn't want it to happen to me and it is 
one thing I am avoiding ... 
1 would give you an example of what had happened when 
I was at X, this patient from the office of the President... he was a regular patient 
at our clinic, this time he just came and he said I am impressed with the way you 
work and he left K80,000. I said no! But he said I have given you from the bottom 
of my heart. I said there is nothing like giving from the bottom of my heart. With 
that it would help me not to be biased in my work. I do my work [regardless of) 
whether one is poor or rich.... they are all entitled to getting the same 
medication... " (District frontline provider). 
The tendency of patients to offer payments in return for preferential treatment seemed to 
be a widespread practice, which most providers alluded to. They, however, observed that 
they did not encourage this practice as it would compromise their professional standing 
and may lead to more affluent patients receiving preferential care, something which went 
against their professional ethics. They continued and observed that all patients that 
presented for health care ought to be accorded similar treatment irrespective of their 
social position. 
7.34: The influence of social and managerial incentives on referrals 
The excessive reference to social considerations when making referral decisions showed 
that social rewards were more effective in influencing provider behaviour than 
organisational rewards. Just as there were no effective organisational sanctions for 
deterring undesirable actions, so too there were no effective rewards to recognise positive 
provider actions. The salary, which was the major reward, accrued to all staff and could 
not be expected to be an effective incentive for influencing referrals. In contrast, 
however, the social rewards seemed to be very effective and this was exemplified by 
such provider observation as patients recovering and in some cases coming back to show 
their appreciation. The high value attached to community appreciation of the health 
providers' work may, however, generate a negative effect in the sense that providers may 
exert too much effort to gain social approval at the expense of meeting their managers' 
objectives. In terms of referrals, this may manifest in unnecessary referrals to hospitals. 
The provider's constant reference to the fear of patients dying in their care and the 
152 
concomitant social sanctions (spreading news that a patient had died in a providers' care) 
could have such effects. 
The study showed that provider behaviour was in part influenced by the socio-political 
pressures that were exerted. Social pressures for referrals were recounted especially in 
urban areas, where patients would present and demand to be referred to the hospitals. 
Such pressures impacted on referral through individuals directly requesting to be referred 
to hospitals, which they perceived to provide better quality of health care than health 
centres. "..... you know there are some patients who come and would want to be seen at 
the hospital. Sometimes they just go straight [to the hospital].... [where] they are told to 
go to the nearest health centre. And then when they come, even when there is no need for 
referral..... Sometimes it also depends on the type of patient, others think they are very 
important patients and they think they cannot be attended to here they want to go to the 
hospital but just because they were sent back now they want you to write a referral letter. 
If you haven't written a referral letter they would find others... they even report to the 
director.... others they would call the sister-in- charge. I have seen a patient who came, 
they wanted to be referred, we said no, we can manage you here but that patient went 
and called [rang] the sister- in-charge. Anyway we just suspected it was the patient 
because, he blasted us here and then he went away, he called [rang] the sister in charge 
that the clinical officer I found on duty was rude... [he accused us of neglecting patients] 
... not being serious with work but he refused to leave his name and where he was calling 
from. So there are such problems that we face... " (Frontline provider). 
7.40: Incentive structures and influences on referrals: NGO and Public 
contracts 
The major differences in the incentive structures facing districts that contracted with 
NGO versus those that contracted with public hospitals were in respect of: the social 
deprivation and poor health status of communities; the poor quality of NGO district 
health facilities which raised the urge to refer; the social/political significance of public 
hospitals and pressures arising from there; and the congruence of NGO managers' and 
providers' motivations. 
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7.41: Social deprivation predisposed districts to refer 
The districts that contracted with the NGO hospital were located in deprived peripheral 
areas, which posed difficulties for the delivery of health services. While resource 
limitations were common to district providers in both rural and urban areas, these were 
more acute in the former. The combination of poor public sector facilities, poverty and 
high morbidity burden in the rural settings increased the referral pressures on the NGO 
hospital. In urban areas, both the direct (such the health service fees) and indirect (for 
instance income forgone) costs of accessing health facilities impacted negatively on the 
utilisation of health services. In the rural areas, on the other hand, the overriding survival 
needs meant that delays in first contact with health facilities were common, which 
aggravated the health conditions of such communities and imposed pressures on the 
health system. 
There were differences in the health seeking behavior of rural and urban communities, 
which created pressures on hospitals. For instance, providers reported widespread use of 
traditional medicines, which sometimes resulted in communities delaying to access 
health services and in the process aggravating their conditions such that by the time they 
sought health care, complications would have set in, thus necessitating referral. NGO 
hospitals were affected by such practices to a greater extent than urban based hospitals. 
When talking about such difficulties, one provider said:... Yes, I think the major problem 
with the community is that usually people try to use traditional medicine. Its only after 
they see that the medicine is not working that's when they rush to the hospitals, by that 
time the condition might have worsened. Most of the maternal deaths are usually due to 
these reasons, that they come a bit late to the hospital. Even though we are talking about 
this, but it is difficult to change an attitude that has been there for some time. But, 
people are responding a bit, but there are always those cases that report very late at our 
health centres, and even though we refer them to the hospitals its very late to assist 
them... (Frontline provider, contract with NGO hospital). 
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Other practices that created referral problems included the tendency to bring patients in 
advanced illness stages. This practice was said to be more common with the advent of 
HIV/AIDS and associated conditions. The tendency of minders to bring severely ill 
patients to hospitals late may be explained by the widespread practise of home-based 
care for patients with chronic conditions. Such patients would normally be taken to 
health centres when they were at the point of death, since minders preferred that their 
patients died in health institutions. 
In other instances, families administered medication before taking patients to the 
hospitals and in the process complicating the patients' conditions. For instance, a 
respondent said: ".... I had a patient who was believed to have swallowed some poison. 
So, the relatives instead of [bringing] the patient to the clinic, they decided to give the 
patient what they thought was going to help at home. So by so doing they had made the 
patient to die. So the community also should be told when they're supposed to bring 
their patients to the clinic..... 
For maternity cases, the practice of women to wait until they were dilated before seeking 
health care was recounted. Providers observed that such practices were undesirable since 
they increased the risk of infection, which resulted in complications and added to referral 
pressures. "... In maternity wing there is, you know traditionally, they give African 
medicines and that can complicate delivery. The labour may start afterwards when that 
medication which they give at home stops working, the contractions may cease, but you 
know, that woman was having contractions when she carne and the dilatation of the 
cervix has already started.. . at a certain point, the contractions disappear. So, we have 
no doctors here, we work on our own as midwives... we should transfer that patient to the 
next level to be managed by a doctor. So, I would say that is where the community make 
a mistake... they are not supposed to give some medications which they give at home. 
They are supposed to leave the labour to follow the natural way... (Frontline provider). 
It ought to be mentioned that community pressures were also exerted in the opposite 
direction, where people resisted being referred to hospitals, preferring to either be treated 
at health centres or to be sent back to their homes. Such situations were reported in cases 
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of patients with chronic conditions, who had developed hospital fatigue. This was 
especially the case for public hospitals, which communities tended to shun because of the 
poor quality of care associated with these. 
7.42: Social/political pressures were exerted on public hospitals 
The political pressures exerted on hospitals/ health facilities in part arose because such 
institutions are recognized as important symbols of government and as such government 
would want to ensure that they acted in line with their wishes. The political significance 
of health institutions was more evident in urban areas. It would thus be expected that 
urban district facilities would be subject to more pressures than would rural based 
facilities. And the results of the study support this: respondents from urban areas 
reported more social/political pressure to refer patients to hospitals than did their 
counterparts in rural areas. 
Reporting on the pressures that communities exerted on health providers, a provider 
observed: "... some of the patients think they are very important and cant be attended to a 
clinic... so they want you to given them a referral note for the hospital. Sometimes, we 
refuse and say you can be attended to here. But sometimes you have these people who 
make noise and especially when you are busy and there is a long line.. . you just give them 
the letter. Of course you know that at the hospital they will be turned away... (Urban 
health provider). 
In consent with this view, another one observed: "... The community really gives us 
problems because they would sometimes not want to be at the clinic and instead prefer 
the hospital. Especially these apamwambas (well-to-do-people).. they are very difficult. 
But you have to put your foot down and say no.. " (Urban health provider). ".. and 
sometimes the politicians would boast that they were the owners of the clinics and we 
workers were employees. So they kind of try to use their political position in the 
community to get what they want.. (Urban health worker). 
While there were such political pressures exerted on providers in urban health facilities, 
these were not so pronounced in rural areas. In rural areas, however, there was evidence 
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of social pressures occasioned by the communities' dissatisfaction with public health 
services and preferences for NGO hospitals services. This was represented through the 
community' tendency to by-pass Health Posts, so that they could be given referral letters 
at health centers in order to obtain NGO hospital services. As was discussed above, the 
perceived better quality of care in such hospitals acted as a pull factor. 
7.43: Congruence of NGO managers and provider motives 
Respondents from the public sector recounted the inadequacies and management 
difficulties of public sector employees. The inadequacies in staffing levels were 
compounded by staff management problems arising from the restrictive PSC rules. Such 
difficulties were generalized in the health sector, but were especially pronounced among 
staff employed in the public sector. The managers under public contracts, therefore, 
found it difficult to control the activities of frontline workers because of the restrictive 
PSC conditions. 
Where a district dealt with public hospitals, such difficulties were more pronounced, 
since staff management problems were encountered in both districts and hospitals. In the 
case of NGO districts, however, they were limited since the NGO hospital had relatively 
more latitude of managing their providers and bringing the actions of providers in line 
with those of managers. As was recounted in the chapter on explicit contracts, NGO 
hospitals had more latitude in dispensing with workers whose performance was below 
par, whereas government units found it relatively more difficult to do this. Secondly the 
supplementation of mission provided staff alleviated provider scarcities and management 
difficulties in NGO hospitals. 
7.50: Conclusion 
The district health service capacity constraints limited the ability of frontline providers to 
effectively offer health services, which resulted in referral pressures on hospitals. The 
constraints were compounded by the limited ability of districts to manage and influence 
the actions of frontline health providers. While the providers were ultimately interested 
in advancing their own interests, at the time of their employment in the public sector, 
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they were more likely to respond to social than managerial rewards, which impacted on 
the referrals to the hospitals. The weaknesses/lack of incentives to shape providers 
responses had contributed to the preponderance of social over managerial incentives. 
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Chapter 8.00: The incentive structures facing referral hospitals and 
their influence on referrals 
8.10: Introduction 
This chapter presents findings on the incentive structures facing referral hospitals and 
how these impacted on referrals. The chapter starts with a presentation on the effect of 
block contracts and mode of payment. This is followed by a discussion of managerial 
incentives: disposition to increase revenues, and the difficulties of aligning managers' 
and frontline providers' objectives. This is followed by a discussion of the social and 
political pressures that hospitals face. The subsequent part of the chapter analyses how 
these incentive structures impact on referrals between district facilities and referral 
hospitals. A comparison of differences in the incentives structures facing public and 
NGO hospitals is included towards the end of the chapter. 
8.20: The financial incentive structures 
8.21: Type and method of payment of grants 
The financial incentives structure and influence on referrals are summarised in Table 8.1 
below. As with districts, hospitals were paid block contracts for the provision of health 
services, as defined in the BPC. Hospitals supplemented the grants through charging 
patients cost-sharing prices for the provision of basic health services, while non-basic 
health services were charged at (higher) cost recovery prices. The grant for referrals was 
paid through subventions to the districts, which would in turn remit referral grants to 
hospitals. The referral grants that districts paid hospitals followed historical patterns and 
were not related to workload. 
While the hospitals complained about the grants that they received from districts, they 
had low bargaining powers. As already indicated above, the hospitals were unable to 
demonstrate the impact of referrals on their workload and hence service provision costs. 
Given the relatively high costs entailed with the provision of health services at hospitals, 
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high referral volumes to hospitals effectively meant that hospitals were subsidising the 
districts by providing services for cases, which should have been treated from district 
health facilities. 
Table 8.1: Financial incentives structure and influence on referrals 
Incentives Influence on referrals 
Block contracts do not encourage efficient 
service delivery practices: 
-hospitals assured of receiving grants -hospitals had attempted to rationalise 
irrespective of level of effort referrals by: 
-relating the grant to referrals workload -introducing by-passing fees 
would result in hospitals paying districts -closing hospital outpatient departments; 
more than they currently were. -hospital preferred low referral levels and/or 
provided limited care to referred cases 
Block contracts well less likely to rationalise 
referrals from district facilities 
-referral rationalisation was more likely -Hospitals were limited in bargaining with 
where monitoring was strong districts by lack of information. 
-hospitals put more effort put in reporting -hospitals' inability to show the referral 
BPC services related workload disadvantaged them in their 
negotiations districts. 
Difference in the prices of basic and non- -the difficulties of collating and analysing 
basic package services would result in information made it difficult for hospitals to 
hospitals: convince districts 
-being tempted to increase revenues by 
providing more non BPC 
-hospitals would do this by providing more 
of the non-basic health services 
As indicated above, block contracts did not encourage efficient production behaviours 
since the hospitals were assured of receiving the grants irrespective of the level of effort 
expended. The perverse effects of the block contracts were further accentuated by the 
ineffectiveness of sanctions. Although the formal contracts explicitly stated that 
sanctions would be applied where a provider's performance was found to be poor, 
sanctions had never been invoked, and for the most part, hospitals were assured of 
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receiving their grants irrespective of the amount of effort they put into providing health 
services. 
The perverse incentives created by block contracts notwithstanding, hospitals further 
complained about the mode of payment. While the hospitals were paid directly for the 
provision of second and higher level referral services, grant for first level referral 
services were paid for through the districts. As was shown in the chapter discussing the 
policy of explicit contracts, the districts were given grants for the provision of primary 
health and first level referral services. Where a district did not have a first level referral 
hospital, they contracted with a referral hospital for the same. The districts in turn paid 
the hospital for the provision of such referral services. As indicated above, district 
payments to hospitals followed historical patterns. 
When deciding on how much of the grant to give the hospitals, the DHBs were limited 
by the low overall grant and the multiplicity of financial demands. Invariably, they gave 
priority to meeting their immediate needs over paying for referral services. As indicated 
above, this situation was made worse by the lack of a method for relating the referral 
grant to the related hospital workload, which both DHBs and RHBs were mindful of. In 
the words of a hospital manager: "... at the moment, the district is paying for 142 beds 
per month... so we want to try and see how many patients come from [the] DIIMT. If 
they are 200, we should have the figures, if they are 120, we should have the figures... 
But if the statistics are above this, then we will have a reason to say that no, you are 
paying us 35% when the maximum is 40%, why don't you pay us at 40%, because the 
number of patients we are seeing is more. So we can have that information, we can 
bargain properly. Because if you went now to say you are paying us less, they will say 
where are the figures?. And we have only figures of referrals, they will say no, no, but 
we want those you admitted. ... If we don't have it [information on admissions], we will 
be disadvantaged. " 
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8.22: The influence of financial incentives on referrals 
As indicated above, the difficulties that hospital providers faced in providing health 
services had led to some of them attempting to relate the referral volumes to workload 
and consequent service costs. Given the reported high level of inappropriate referrals to 
hospitals, it would be expected that hospitals would provide evidence of the referral- 
induced workload in their negotiations with districts. However, by the time of data 
collection for this study, they did not have such data to use for bargaining with districts. 
If they had been able to directly link referral volumes from the districts to the hospital 
workload, they would have been able to argue their case more convincingly. As it was, 
the districts used the hospital's lack of information on the referral-induced workload to 
their advantage and paid the hospitals on their terms. 
In frustration, some hospitals argued that the MOH should earmark referral grants, or 
send these directly to hospitals. However, while this may improve the effective allocation 
of funds to hospitals, it had pitfalls. Earmarking would worsen referral problems, since 
districts would no longer directly link the grant with referrals. It would further weaken 
the delineation of service provision functions between districts and hospitals and disrupt 
the functioning of contracts. Rather than earmarking referral funds for the hospitals, 
capacity development/strengthening programmes for district health services would 
generate better outcomes in improving referral appropriateness. 
Because the referral services were paid for through block contracts, which were not 
related to activity levels, and in part because of the low overall grants, hospitals were 
tempted to provide limited care to referred patients. This disposition was accentuated by 
the reported high level of inappropriate referrals from the district health facilities. The 
tendency of hospitals to provide limited health care services for referred patients was 
further exacerbated by the shortages of clinical staff and difficulties of managing public 
service workers. The responses from providers indicated that patients often complained 
about the limited care provided by hospitals. Although the districts complained that 
hospitals provided limited care for referred patients, the hospitals could be justified 
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where a high proportion of such referrals were inappropriate. If the hospital were to 
provide the same level of care irrespective of the severity of the referred cases, they 
would inadvertently be sending the wrong signals that may exacerbate the referral 
pressures. 
As was indicated in the introductory chapter on the financing policy, providers were 
financed for the provision of the BPC. Where a hospital provided additional services 
outside the BPC, these were supposed to be charged at cost recovery prices. While the 
provision of non-basic services may improve the financial situation of hospitals, it may 
lead to preserve effects such as tempting providers into maximising their non-BPC 
activities. Hospitals may use the distinction between basic package and non-basic 
packages services to their advantage and spend more of their time on non-BPC services 
in order to raise more revenue than they would if they provided more basic services. 
While the policy was clear regarding the distinction between basic and non-basic 
services, providers expressed ambiguities about the delineations. They observed that 
there were discrepancies between services that were expected to be delivered and what 
was actually done at the various levels of the health system. Inappropriate referrals in 
part arose from this discrepancy in delineations. Referral difficulties were further 
accentuated by the weak links between health centres and hospitals. Effective 
management of a referral system would entail that cases deserving referral are 
appropriately and timely assessed and referred to the appropriate higher level. After a 
referral is received, the referral institutions should refer back to the sending institution for 
continuation of care, where this is needed. However, this was hardly the case. 
Although the national referral hospital was supposed to provide specialised level referral 
services, it effectively operated as a hospital for the local district and the surrounding 
areas. A respondent from the hospital said: ... [the national referral hospital) is supposed 
to be a tertiary hospital or a national hospital where we expect referrals to come from 
provincial hospitals. But unfortunately because of the circumstances surrounding it, it 
has been forced to function at all levels: first level, second level and tertiary level. In 
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response to a question on the division between district and hospital activities, a 
respondent observed:... There should be a distinction between the first level patients, 
second level and third level... because we don't have facilities to [test that] a patient is 
having TB, those are not our patients. They automatically qualify to be at central 
hospital. And [theJ central hospital is actually paid for that patient. So, l think that is the 
distinction in referrals. There are those that we refer, but they are not our own patients 
... [they are] for central 
[hospitals]... [DHB Manager]. 
Although the BPC delineated between the cases that hospitals and district facilities were 
supposed to attend to, the respondents from both hospitals and districts highlighted 
ambiguities. A review of responses from hospitals and districts showed that there was a 
high level of distrust between them, which complicated the management of referrals. 
8.30: The incentive for professional advancement 
8.31: Utilisation of the public sector for professional advancement 
As with findings from district frontline providers, so too with those from the hospitals, 
health workers talked about how the public sector provided opportunities for their 
academic and professional advancement (Table 8.3). They observed that they had been 
attracted to the public sector by the better training opportunities, which were available 
there but not in the private sector. The public health sector was used as a ground for 
attaining academic qualifications, skills upgrading and professional experience for more 
lucrative employment opportunities in the private/NGO sector. 
Stating his ambition for attaining further training in HIV/AIDS counselling, a hospital 
provider said: "My ambition is to study counselling. There are too many STIs, especially 
IIIV related cases. [For instance], last week I had five cases [and out of those], four 
were infected... so automatically those need counselling. Then I can go for fiirlher studies 
at the University of Zambia (Hospital provider). There were many such providers who 
indicated that they would like to pursue counselling studies. The relatively wide 
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availability of HIV/AIDS related employment opportunities in the NGO sector had led 
many health workers into aspiring to be employed in the sector. 
Other than aspiring to work in the NGO sector, other health workers observed that they 
would want to work in other countries, which offered better conditions of service than 
local employers. "... Given a chance I would work anywhere. ... Probably going outside 
the country if I have a chance. I have friends who managed to get work in Botswana, 
Swaziland, the UK and South Africa. They all just applied and they finally made 
it... (Hospital provider). 
The majority of respondents interviewed indicated that they aspired to get employed in 
the private or NGO sector. The few who did not express such ambitions were 
constrained by lack of opportunities, age-related considerations and family 
responsibilities. Expressing such sentiments, a respondent said, "... I don't even wish to 
go and work outside and at my age, I feel time of going outside has passed. So 1 will 
continue until I retire. ... I enjoy [my work]. There was a time I was thinking of 
[going 
to work outside the country]. That was a long time ago when we were in rural 
areas.. . when I was in my twenties.... 
I was wishing if I was staying in town, I would 
leave the government, but the time I came I thought it was too late... [to look for 
employment outside the country] ". 
Others talked about the difficulties of accessing the means to enable them pursue their 
interests. Talking about the difficulties of accessing financial resources in order to 
realise training ambitions, one provider said: "The major problem is financial. 
Financially, you need to plan everything... the hospital has a lot of projects. * . 50 
resources are limited. If resources can allow, obviously I can go [to college for further 
training].. ". (Hospital provider). Others talked about the limited places in colleges, 
which hindered them from attaining their ambitions. In the words of one provider: 
".. you know sometimes you apply and they [college] only accept a few people, because 
they have limited places. You can apply, and maybe they don't pick you.. " (Hospital 
provider). 
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Table 8.2: Incentive structures facing frontline providers and their influence on referrals 
Incentives Risks and influence on referrals 
The motivation for personal advancement 
-Advancement of academic qualifications -Skills gained from training facilities 
-Advancement of professional qualifications enhanced the capacity of providers 
-Providers expressed empathy for the -Because of disposition to serve communities: 
community -providers were reluctant to perform 
filtering role of referred patients 
-The institutional sanctions and rewards were -this perpetuated referral pressures on the 
weak hospitals. 
-The adverse working conditions also -Weak institution rewards and sanctions for 
compounded the negative work environment, perpetuated referral problems 
-The social rewards and sanction had -Strong social reward and sanction also 
effective impact on provider behaviour perpetuated referral problems 
While they aspired to get employment outside the public sector, the providers who had 
previously worked in hospitals indicated that they preferred the district to the hospital 
working environment. For instance, a district provider, who had previously worked in a 
hospital observed: "At the hospital, we were just writing admission notes, treatment, 
same routine work everyday, it wasn't challenging. So it had become a routine, so 1 
wanted to refresh my mind by getting involved in general medicine, which I am doing 
now at the clinic (Health centre provider). 
In response to a question about whether he found the working environment at the clinic 
more interesting than at the hospital, a respondent said: Yes, it is more interesting here 
because am exposed to many situations and meet many people. Some come from Lusaka, 
like you have come yourself. If I were in the hospital, I would not have seen you, because 
you were going to end up in administration (Health centre provider). 
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8.32: The influence of professional incentives on referrals 
The providers' incentives to advance their academic and professional aspirations 
generated positive effects on referrals by raising their competencies and hence improving 
service delivery capacity. With the improved competencies, health workers providers 
would be more discerning in deciding on the appropriateness of referrals and provide 
appropriate care for appropriate referrals. Talking about the skills learned from such in- 
service workshops, a respondent said: "... Through the workshop that we attend, where 
there are senior doctors who discuss issues, we are able determine, for instance what 
needs to be done when you have a case. Such meetings have helped to improve our 
abilities as clinical officers in the hospital... (Hospital provider). 
Similarly another provider said: "... Nowadays because of the low standards in colleges 
you find that by the time you are graduating, you don't really grasp many of the issues, 
hence working here in the hospital, where you interact with many doctors, you learn 
from them, so the education kind of continues and that improves our skills. We are able 
to provide the necessary care when a patient comes from the district ... (Hospital provider) 
While in-service training opportunities had resulted in improved competencies of the 
providers, this was sometimes undermined by the limited facilities in their working 
environment. Thus although they could be technically competent, such limitations 
negatively impacted on the effectiveness with which they provided health services. Such 
factors included: lack of diagnostic facilities, and limited availability of clinicians. 
Hospital respondents also observed that limited competencies in district health facilities 
complicated their work, a point that was noted by district respondents too. 
Hospital respondents had strong views about the referrals from districts, most of which 
they thought were inappropriate. "... at the hospital, we feel that districts can do better 
to manage most of the cases they send here. The problem is that they are just used to 
sending patients to the hospital, even where it is not necessary. ... You find that a patient 
is sent here for simple things like malaria... now surely malaria can be handled at the 
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clinic, and it does not have to be sent here. But, it's like they just have a habit of sending 
anyone to the hospital, even where it is not necessary... "(Hospital provider). 
Another one echoed similar sentiments, but attributed the problem to both the patients 
and district providers: "... the problem is that some of the patients think they are too 
important to be attended to at the clinic. They would rather they carne to the UTH so 
that they see a doctor. What they don't realised is that providing health service at the 
hospital is expensive.... The nurses at the clinics complicate things by agreeing to refer 
such patients instead of treating them there.. " (Hospital provider). 
However, district respondents objected to the hospital allegation of inappropriate 
referrals to hospitals. In response to a question about why hospital staff held the view 
that health centres made unnecessary referrals, a respondent observed that ... 1 
don't know 
why they hold it but even us at this clinic we receive referrals from X or Y [feeder clinics] 
clinic, sometimes when you look at the condition, sometimes we also say that it is very 
unnecessary for them to have referred that particular condition. But there are also 
conditions that we see that this condition it is better managed here than at the smaller 
health centres.. " (District provider). 
Another respondent echoed similar views: "... I don't think it is very correct and I have 
had colleagues I have worked with at the hospital who think we are not doing as much as 
we used to.... I think the main reason why we send is for investigation purposes, like if 
we suspect it is meningitis, why keep a patient here when 1 know I won't do a lumber 
puncture. That is where the problem is, we lack some of the equipment, that is why it 
looks irrelevant to just send a patient for x-ray and ask a doctor to read it on the screen 
for us. Well, one very important thing is when you refer a case to hospital, it is either, 
you didn't know the diagnosis or you didn't know the management... ". (District 
provider) 
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8.40: Contrasts between public and NGO contracts 
This section discusses the differences in the incentive structures facing NGO and public 
hospitals (Table 8.4). The section outlines the socials and political significance of public 
hospitals, which makes them more vulnerable to political influences than NGO hospitals. 
Thereafter the problems caused by the divergence of objectives between managers and 
frontline health providers are discussed. The impact on referrals of the NGO objective to 
serve deprived communities and reported community perception of better quality of care 
in mission hospitals are also discussed. 
8.41: The preponderance of social/political pressures 
Hospitals are politically important symbols and governments have an interest in wanting 
to demonstrate that their involvement in the running of such institutions is to the 
advantage of the communities. The importance of hospital as symbols of political 
authority was evident from the interviews with hospital respondents. This incessant 
political intercession in the running of hospitals limited the autonomy of management 
who felt compelled to act in line with political dictates. Such pressures were more 
prevalent in government than NGO hospitals. This arose not only from the political 
importance of urban located hospitals but also because urban communities tended to be 
more vocal and demanding than rural populations. 
In such a setting, therefore, it would be expected that referral pressures would be more 
pronounced for urban than rural based hospitals. Indeed, a review of data showed that 
both social and political pressures where more evident among urban than rural based 
hospitals. It may be argued that both social and political influences need not necessarily 
translate into referral pressures on hospitals, especially where hospitals, in a bid to curtail 
unbridled access to hospitals acted to ensure that only appropriate referrals were accepted 
at hospitals. Although managers may be so disposed, however, the frontline workers 
were ultimately the ones responsible for filtering referrals. As will be demonstrated 
below, however, the actions of managers and frontline providers were hardly in harmony. 
And where providers did not act in line with their managers' interest to rationalize 
hospital attendances, referrals pressures on hospitals were perpetuated. 
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Table 8.3: Differences in incentive structures: comparison of NGO and Public hospitals 
Public hospitals NGO hospitals 
Public hospitals were strong symbols of NGO hospitals were less affected by 
power and were used as such by political influences, but by mission 
politicians. values. 
Reported referral difficulties emanating Reported referral difficulties emanating 
from communities: from communities: 
-preference for hospital over health -Providers indicated that communities 
facility level care preferred NGO over public hospitals 
-High morbidity and mortality level -Providers reported that communities 
exerted pressure on hospitals perceived quality of care in NGOs to 
be better than public hospitals 
The predominance of PSC workers in Divergences between managers' and 
public hospitals created management frontline providers' incentives were less 
difficulties exemplified by divergences likely in NGO hospitals, because: 
between managers and staff incentives: -were more likely to employ staff who 
-Multiple employer categories had shared denomination values 
complicated staff management -dispensed with staff relatively easily 
-Cumbersome PSC conditions of -had specially designated management 
service created difficulties staff 
8.42: Divergences in provider and managers' objectives 
It was noted above that referrals to hospitals could be rationalized if the managers' 
objective to reduce inappropriate referrals were backed by similar interest among 
frontline providers. However, the study demonstrated that the actions of frontline 
providers were hardly in line with their managers' expectations. For instance, whereas 
the managers were more likely to report the financial difficulties that they faced in 
providing services, the frontline providers reported the social and health service related 
costs that communities faced in accessing health services. From the responses of the 
providers, it was clear that they were performing a social function in the sense of 
acceding to community demands, as opposed to meeting their managers' objectives. And 
where such was the case, referral difficulties would be pronounced. 
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Whereas, there was a divergence of objectives between government hospital managers 
and frontline providers, this was not the case in mission hospitals. In mission hospitals, 
there was a high likelihood of managers' objectives being in line with those of frontline 
workers. This in part arose from the preponderance of mission governance bodies over 
government structures. As was indicated above in the chapter on the policy of explicit 
contracts, although all hospitals were supposed to be governed by government appointed 
hospital boards, in mission hospitals, these ran side by side with mission bodies, which 
had been there before the former and were more influential on the operations of the 
hospitals. The prominence of mission boards in such hospitals, served to ensure that the 
staff acted in a manner that furthered the mission objectives of providing services to 
deprived communities. Thus whereas in urban hospitals, the discordance in manager's 
and provider's objectives occasioned referral pressures on hospitals, for mission 
facilities, it was the accord in the objectives of managers and providers, in the sense of 
providing services to deprived communities that occasioned referral difficulties. 
That frontline providers in public hospitals were more likely to pursue objectives that 
were not in line with their managers' objectives was amply demonstrated by the case at 
one public hospital, were providers were accused of moonlighting. As was indicated 
above, the failure of the upgrading programme to relieve referral pressures on UTH was 
followed by a subsequent referral strategy, which entailed closing the hospital OPD and 
its replacement with a district managed HAHC. The HAIIC had just been instituted by 
the time of the study, but there were misgivings about its effectiveness. Managers at the 
hospital observed that closing the OPD had not helped matters since referred patients had 
switched from the OPD to the casualty wing. The doctors attached to the FIAHC at UTH 
were further accused of moonlighting and not spending much time there. The district 
was not able to effectively monitor activities of the doctors attached to the unit and even 
if they did, the restrictive PSC conditions limited the extent to which the problem could 
be resolved. 
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The difficulties which DHBs faced in controlling their staff could be extended to the 
health centre level, where hospitals observed that DHBs had done little to monitor and 
reorient the referral practices of frontline providers. While, this could be valid, it is also 
true that DHBs did not have effective systems for monitoring the referral practices of 
their workers. Even in cases where staff were interested in making appropriate referrals, 
capacity problems in the health centres limited the extent to which this could be done. 
8.43: Social deprivation of communities 
The mission hospital sector was established to principally cater for communities that 
were underserved in terms of social services. Such mission run health facilities 
therefore, tended to be predominantly located in rural areas. While resource constraints 
were common to providers under government contracts in both rural and urban areas, 
these were more acute in the former. The combination of poor public sector facilities, 
poverty and high morbidity burden in the rural setting increased the referral pressures on 
the NGO hospital. The hospital respondents observed that the problem of referral 
pressures from the district was a reflection of the high level of deprivation in the served 
communities and poor quality of health services in the feeder district health facilities. 
The combination of community deprivation and mission values of providing services to 
marginal areas led to referral pressures on the hospital being sustained, since frontline 
providers in mission hospitals were less likely to deter access to hospital services as that 
would go against the mission dictates of servicing communities. 
8.44: Reported perception of quality of health care 
According to the providers interviewed, the communities rated the quality of mission 
hospital services to be high, which resulted in high demand for such services. Because 
of the reported perception of better quality care in mission hospitals, communities were 
reported to be by-passing community health workers, in preference to health centers from 
where they could be referred to the hospital. The by-pass fees that health centres charged 
were too low and not able to discourage by-passers. 
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There were differences in attitudes towards the uptake of traditional medications between 
rural and urban areas. These practices were more pronounced in rural areas and to the 
extent that such practices delayed access to health services, they resulted in medical 
complications, which imposed referral pressures. NGO hospitals were affected by such 
practices to a much greater extent than public hospitals. ... Yes, I think the major problem 
with the community is that usually people try to use traditional medicine. Its only after 
they see that traditional is not working that's when they rush to the hospitals, by that 
time the condition might have worsened. Most of the maternal deaths are usually due to 
the reasons, that they come a bit late to the hospital. Even though we are talking about 
this, but its difficult to change an attitude that has been there for some time. But, people 
are responding a bit, but there are always those cases that report very late at our health 
centres, and even though we refer them to the hospitals its very late to assist 
them... (Frontline provider). 
In response to a question on the sort of referral problems that the hospitals faced, a 
provider said: "... Sometime back, there were patients who could be referred to this 
hospital just for a simple test. You ask them, why have you been let to come this far for 
malaria test... sometimes they would say the clinics don't have reagents. So in such 
cases, the patients were losing a lot of money spending on transport... just to do a 
malaria test or HP, which could easily be done at the clinic.. "(NGO hospital provider). 
Similarly another respondent said: "... many patients like corning here [to NGO hospital 
like] because the of availability of drugs and the doctors attend to them with 
patience ... (NGO hospital provider). 
Sometimes providers empathized with communities regarding the difficulties that they 
faced in accessing drugs from health centers. "... for instance at the moment, I think 
there was one issue whereby TB patients come to this clinic, but afterwards, they are 
supposed to go back after they are discharged to continue the medication. But there had 
been a problem whereby the prescribed drugs are not available at the clinic .... (NGO 
Hospital provider). In such cases, the communities would invariably exert pressure on 
hospital providers so that they were referred to the hospital. 
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8.50: Conclusion 
The type and mode of referral contract payments disadvantaged the hospitals because 
they provided referral services while they got minimum grants received from the 
districts. In reaction to inappropriate referrals, hospitals had implemented strategies such 
as: by-pass fees; and closing outpatient departments. However, referral difficulties had 
persisted because of the difficulties of managing frontline providers coupled with strong 
social rewards and penalties. A comparison of NGO and public hospitals showed that 
the latter had relatively less appropriate referrals because of the relatively high level of 
deprivation and lower quality of health centre services in rural areas. 
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Chapter 9.00: Discussion and conclusions 
9.10: Introduction 
This chapter discusses the methods, conceptual framework and findings of the study. 
The first part summarises the key findings of the study. This leads to analyses of the 
methodology, focusing on the value of combining quantitative and qualitative methods 
and difficulties of using routine hospital data to study referrals. This is followed by a 
discussion of the usefulness of New Institutional Economics (NIE) to studying 
contracting in a LMIC setting. The latter part discusses the findings on the policy of 
explicit contracts and how incentives structures impact on referrals. The last section of 
the chapter discusses the contribution of the study to knowledge on the subject of 
referrals and internal contracts. Each section of the chapter ends with conclusions on: the 
usefulness of combining qualitative and quantitative data; the net effect of explicit 
contracts between districts and hospitals; the incentive structures and their effect on 
referral decisions; the differences in the referral levels and patterns under varying 
contract types; and the contribution of the study to knowledge. 
9.20: Summary of the study findings 
Chapter 5 of the findings section presented findings on the policy of explicit contracts 
between districts and referral hospitals. The chapter outlined the environmental context 
in which contracting was undertaken by discussing the spatial distribution and ownership 
of health facilities. This led to a discussion of the transaction context, which focused on: 
the nature of contracts, provider autonomy, and transaction attributes. The introduction 
of explicit contracts in the health sector was expected to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of service delivery. The findings showed that contracting had resulted in 
the delineation of roles between hospital and district facilities; acted as a means for 
rationalising access to hospitals; played an assurance role regarding the obligations of 
contracting parties; and led to increased interaction between the contracting parties. 
However, the policy had been attenuated by: lack/weak penalties and rewards; staff 
scarcities and management difficulties; funding constraints; and locked-in relationships. 
Arising from the locked-in relationships, both DHßs and RUBS accused each other of 
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opportunistic behaviours in relation to referral decision-making and payments. A 
comparison of contracts between NGO and public hospitals showed that: there had been 
changes with regard to delineation of service provision; Contracts with NGO hospitals 
were adversely affected by the deprived conditions of the rural communities; districts 
well more disposed to contracting with NGO than public hospitals and NGO hospital 
facilities had more latitude in dealing with staffing difficulties. 
Chapter 6 presented findings on the patterns and levels of referrals between district 
health facilities and referral hospitals. In assessing referral level and patterns, six 
diseases/health conditions were used as tracers, while the assessment of referral 
appropriateness was done by using both expert and indicator-based methods. The 
findings showed that the proportion of the selected diseases/health conditions presented 
to both upgraded and non-upgraded hospitals were not very different. Both hospitals had 
high proportions of primary health conditions. Although referrals to upgraded hospitals 
were more likely to be appropriate than those to non-upgraded hospitals, the differences 
were not statistically significant. There were also no major differences in the severity of 
cases that were referred to the upgraded and non-upgraded hospitals. However, a 
comparison of referral appropriateness between public and NGO hospitals showed 
consistent differences. The referrals were more appropriate for public than NGO 
hospitals. 
Chapter 7 presented findings on the incentive structures facing districts and how these 
impacted on referrals. The chapter outlined the perverse incentives of block contracts, 
which was followed by a discussion of managerial incentives and social incentives which 
districts faced and how these impacted on referrals between districts and hospitals. The 
study findings showed that the district health service delivery capacity constraints limited 
the ability of frontline providers to effectively offer health services, which resulted in 
referral pressures on hospitals. The constraints were compounded by the tendency of 
frontline providers to respond to social than organisational incentives. The 
weaknesses/lack of rewards and penalties to influence the behaviour of providers 
accentuated the preponderance of social over managerial incentives. 
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Chapter 8 of the findings section presented findings on the incentive structures facing 
referral hospitals and how these impacted on referrals. The chapter discussed the effect 
of block contracts and mode of payment on referrals. This was followed by a discussion 
of managerial, provider and social incentives, and how these impacted on referrals. The 
hospitals were paid block contracts, which did not encourage efficient service delivery 
practices. While receiving high referral volumes from districts, the hospitals faced 
financial constraints. The hospitals were limited in bargaining with districts by the lack 
of information, which was made difficult by the cost of collating and analysing data. The 
hospital frontline providers responded more to social incentives than organisational 
incentives. Because of disposition to serve communities, providers were less likely to 
perform a filtering role of referred patients which perpetuated referral pressures on the 
hospitals. 
9.30: What were the benefits and difficulties of contracting? 
9.31: The benefits of contracting 
The introduction of explicit contracts in the health sector was marked by the granting of 
autonomy to provider units and delineation of functions among the various actors in the 
health sector. At the central level, such delineation entailed the separation of financing 
and purchasing roles between the MOH and the CBOH respectively. The MOI! was 
expected to concentrate on resource mobilisation and policy setting, while the CBOH 
was contracted to provide services. The CBOH was paralleled with boards at both the 
district and hospital levels. 
Delineation in the provision of health services was effected at the local levels too. Prior 
to the introduction of the policy of internal referral contracts, district health facilities 
were part of local authorities. However, with the implementation of health reforms, the 
responsibility of providing health services was taken away from local authorities and 
given to autonomous DHBs, which acted on behalf of the MOIL. It was envisaged that 
the creation of DHBs would strengthen the gate-keeping role of district facilities for the 
hospital sector. 
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The DHB was given the responsibility of purchasing health services on behalf of the 
local populations. Explicit contracts were entered into with providers, which included 
referral hospitals, for the provision of services that the districts were not able to offer. 
With the delineation of roles, districts and hospitals were expected to concentrate on their 
assigned responsibilities. Being purchasers of health services, districts were expected to 
act in the interest of the population, while hospitals would concentrate on providing 
referral services efficiently. To this end, the roles of districts and hospitals were 
rationalised through the cessation of promotional PHC service provision from hospital 
premises, an activity which was delegated to the DHBs. Accordingly, hospitals 
progressively closed hospital OPD units or turned over the management of OPDs to 
district authorities. 
As was indicated in the findings section, the introduction of explicit contracts provided a 
basis for discussion between districts and hospitals, a fact acknowledged by both DHBs 
and RHBs. The fact that DHBs and RHBs were able to use contracts as a basis of 
discourse on referrals, attests to the potential of explicit contracts being a tool for 
managing relationships among providers in the health sector. Associated with the 
delineation of responsibilities among providers were the accompanying changes in the 
payment systems. Although there were no effective means of assessing how much value 
they were getting in return for their referral grants, DHBs used other mechanisms such as 
demanding feedback from RHBs. The insistence on feed-back from the hospitals was 
consistent across the study sites and reflected the desire of districts to ensure that they got 
value for the money they spent on the purchase of hospital beds. 
9.32: The difficulties of contracting 
The districts and hospitals were in a locked relationship, from which they were not able 
to exit. Except in rural settings, where districts could contract with both NGO and 
government hospitals, there was no choice about the parties to contract with. The 
locked-in relationship resulted in opportunistic tendencies on both parties, such as the 
practice by hospitals not to provide feed-back to districts, and the habit of districts to 
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refer at will, regardless of how much they paid. As the chapter on referral levels and 
patterns showed, some referral were inappropriate and hence the minimum grants paid to 
hospitals effectively meant that the hospitals were subsiding districts. The high level of 
inappropriate referrals compounded the high costs of providing hospital services. While 
both districts and hospitals faced financial constraints, the impact was greater on the 
latter. Conventionally the unit costs for similar health services are higher in hospital than 
low level health facilities. It was apparent that the DHBs were not purchasing services 
even- handedly from referral levels but were preserving money for their `own' facilities, 
and did not seem to care much about the hospital's financing problem. The DNB's 
perspective was that of a district health service provider rather than purchaser of services 
for the district population. This was a flaw in the arrangement since the districts are 
ideally supposed to be purchasers of health services and use their powers as purchasers in 
their negotiations with hospitals. 
The type of hospital ownership - that is whether they were government or NGO owned - 
also had a bearing on the outcome of contracts. Although the church administered 
hospitals had been brought under the ambit of the CBOH and were supposed to have had 
government appointed boards, they had continued operating under church boards, which 
had more authority over the affairs of the hospitals. The preponderance of mission over 
government boards could, however, be cited as a source of greater autonomy as 
contrasted with government hospitals where management teams were appointed by the 
Minister of Health. 
The devolution of autonomy to districts and hospitals was supposed to be supported by 
the granting of corresponding authorities over the use of inputs. However, the supply 
and management of staff had remained problematic, causing difficulties for the 
implementation and management of the reform agenda. Both districts and hospitals 
experienced difficulties regarding the centralised recruitment, deployment and 
management of staff. The scarcities of staff in the public health sector reflects an 
underlying problem with upstream contracts between the CBOl1 and districts/hospitals. 
This was further compounded by the staff management difficulties at the local level. 
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Managers highlighted the difficulties of engaging and retaining staff and the 
accompanying restrictive employment conditions. These difficulties were for instance 
manifested in a divergence of incentives to which the managers and providers responded, 
as will be discussed further below. 
The effectiveness of referral contracts was further undermined by the lack of effective 
penalties and rewards. Such sanctions could have impacted on referrals by making both 
districts and hospital more responsive to contract provisions. For instance, penalties 
could have been imposed on districts which made inappropriate referrals. Equally, the 
hospitals would have been sanctioned for inability to provide the commensurate services 
for referred cases, and flouting the financing policy through, for instance surcharging 
referred cases. Although the contract formats formally stipulated that sanctions could be 
imposed on both districts and hospitals, that had never been done and the contracts were 
largely symbolic. 
Conclusion: The policy of explicit contracts was resulted in the granting of autonomy to 
provider units and delineation of responsibilities between districts and 2sýitals 
whereas the former purchased while the latter provided referral services, and enhanced 
interest in discussing referral issues. However, the policy was attenuated by the limited 
choice among contracting parties, lack of rewards and penalties to make it more 
effective, and differences in incentives acinnmanaeers and Providers. 
9.40: What were the factors that impacted on referrals? 
9.41: The effect of the contract payment method 
Both the hospitals and districts were budget holders and received block grants from the 
CBOH. As with other contracts, which are based on block payments, this posed 
difficulties for referral contracts. The respondents' reference to always being assured of 
grants (irrespective of what they did) was illustrative of such problems. The perverse 
incentives in-built in block payment methods were further accentuated by the lack of 
penalties and rewards. As was indicated above, although the contracts specified that 
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funding would be withdrawn from providers who faltered in meeting their mandates, the 
respondents observed that this had never happened, and contracting parties continued 
their business with no possibility of penalties or rewards for their actions. 
Both districts and hospitals bore the brunt of block contracts as they had to provide 
services for a fixed grant. As was indicated above, to the extent that hospitals provided 
services for referred cases, they could have been subsidising the districts, which referred 
at will, for a fixed amount. The risk was shifted onto the hospitals, because services were 
provided irrespective of the level of funding from districts. The hospitals received the 
same referral grant from DHBs, no matter the level of services provided and could not 
secure more by providing better services. The method of payment, similarly did not 
impact on the behaviour of hospitals. The hospitals were not compelled to provide any 
better referral services than they were doing. However, even if the hospital managers 
were to aspire to provider better referral services, the tendency of providers to respond 
more to social than organisational incentives limited the extent to which this could be 
done. 
9.42: The influence of rewards and penalties: the missing link? 
An overall assessment of the impact of the policy of internal contracts would indicate 
that it had limited effect on referrals. That the policy of internal contracts did not 
effectively impact on referrals between districts and hospitals could in part be attributed 
to the lack of penalties and rewards. This was also reflected in the way both districts and 
managers related to the central agencies of the CBOH and MOH. Although the 
authorities of districts and hospitals had been devolved, the CBOH could have played a 
better stewardship role, which coupled with effective penalties and rewards would have 
strengthened the referral contracts. 
Had the CBOH fulfilled its stewardship role effectively, it could have been more 
effective in resolving contentions between districts and hospitals pertaining to the level 
and timing of referral grants. Such a stewardship role would have entailed the MOF! 
supporting both districts and hospitals in carrying out their mandates. This would have 
been facilitated by the establishment of an information system to manage referrals 
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between districts and hospitals, which by the time of the study had, however, not been 
done. Supported by such an information system, sanctions would have generated better 
referral contracts. For instance, districts with higher referral rates could have been 
compelled to pay larger grants to hospitals, while there would also have been sanctions 
for hospitals not providing feedback and appropriate care for referred cases. However, 
and as the data showed, improving the referral system goes beyond the hospital and 
district managers and more importantly entails understanding the incentive structures 
facing the frontline providers, both at district and hospital levels. 
9.43: Frontline health workers 'referral behaviour: in whose interest? 
As the findings section showed, while the institutional rewards and penalties were 
ineffective in effecting the appropriate referral behaviours from frontline providers, the 
social rewards and penalties impacted on providers' behaviour. The lack of strong 
institutional incentives, and apparently strong social incentives created difficulties for 
managers. The managers were more likely to be concerned about the costs of providing 
services than the frontline providers. The managers often talked about the financial 
constraints that they faced, while providers were more likely to talk about the financial 
difficulties that communities faced in accessing health services. The interests of 
communities featured prominently in the referral decision-making process of the 
providers. 
The providers consistently made reference to acting in the interest of the community, and 
rarely mentioned acting in line with the wishes of their managers. The tendency to act 
more in accordance with the community interests was buttressed by the social reward and 
penalty systems that they identified (satisfied clients spread news about the competency 
of providers and likely news about negative health outcomes such as death were relayed 
in communities). This was in contrast with the absence/weaknesses of institutional 
reward/penalties, where the reward was a salary, which accrued to everyone, irrespective 
of effort. The only referral specific reward were commendations, which were directed at 
heads of health centres and not individual providers. 
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Although the predisposition of frontline providers to act in line with the interests of the 
communities they served could be taken to be a positive outcome in the sense of being 
responsive to community interests, the resultant referral pressures were disruptive to 
hospital service provision. The providers were more likely to give such expressions as 
"wanting to help the community", "feel part of the society" "doing my best [for the 
community]". The providers' obligations to the society were pitted against the objectives 
of their managers, who may have had different priorities. Where the district managers 
and providers shared the same objectives, it would be expected that referrals would more 
appropriate. However, where this was not the case, providers were more likely to 
positively respond to social incentives. 
While their responses suggested that they mostly acted in socially expected ways, the 
providers were also conscious of balancing the needs of patients with the objectives and 
constraints facing health facilities. Thus, whereas patients would expect to be referred to 
hospitals, which were perceived to provide better quality of care, the providers were 
mindful of the pressures inappropriate referrals posed on the health sector. However, the 
absence of effective sanctions for deterring inappropriate referrals by providers resulted 
in the patients' requests for referral being met by providers. 
9.44: Political influences 
The impact of provider behaviour on referrals was further buttressed by the political 
influences in the management of both district and hospital facilities. As was identified 
above, both the hospital and district boards were appointed by the minister, so too were 
the management teams. Thus, although both districts and hospitals were supposed to be 
autonomous, de facto they were managed by the political establishment and this meant 
that their decision making space was circumscribed. 
The influence of the political establishment in the appointment of boards meant the latter 
often acted in line with the political dictates. The boards were more likely to penalise 
actions that were perceived to be inimical to the fortunes of the political party in 
government. Any actions that won praise from the community were more likely to be 
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appreciated by the board (for hospitals, this would translate into high referral levels from 
the districts). 
The appointment of management teams by the minister left health services at the mercy 
of politicians and this was reflected in managers being rewarded for actions that appealed 
to the population and thus to the appointing authorities. In like manner, managers were 
also penalised for actions that were perceived to be against the general population 
interest and thus managers were more likely to avoid actions that could upset the 
appointing authorities. 
Conclusion: The factors accounting for inappropriate referrals to hospitals were, the 
effects of block contracts: differences in the incentives facing managers and providers: 
and ineffective rewards and penalties. 
9.50: Under what type of contract setting were referrals more 
appropriate? 
9.51: Upgraded versus non-upgraded district capacity 
The outcome of contracting is in part determined by the context in which it is 
implemented. For referral contracts, the delivery capacity of health units has a bearing 
on the referral outcomes. Referrals would be expected to be more appropriate for 
districts whose facilities had better delivery capacity, such as those with upgraded 
facilities. A comparison of referral appropriateness between upgraded districts and non- 
upgraded districts showed that there were no significant differences. 
While referrals would ideally be expected to be more appropriate for district with 
upgraded capacity, this was undermined by: resource constraints; scarcities and 
difficulties of managing providers; social incentives for referral; prior unmet need for 
health services and high levels of morbidity in the client populations. The problem of 
staff availability and management were recounted for both types of districts. Despite the 
augmentation of staff in upgraded facilities, referral pressures had persisted at the UT! i. 
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This had led to the implementation of a Hospital Affiliated Health Centre (HAHC). 
Although the HAHC had just been introduced at the time of data collection for this study, 
respondents observed that the strategy also had limited impact on referrals. The hospital 
respondents observed that doctors deployed to the hospital often absconded. The district 
did not have the capacity to effectively monitor doctors attached to the unit, and this was 
compounded by the restrictive PSC conditions. 
9.52: Public versus NGO hospitals 
As was identified in the findings section, NGOs tend to be predominantly concentrated in 
underserved areas. The NGOs are also renowned for producing services more efficiently 
than public providers. To the extent that inappropriate referrals are a manifestation of 
inefficiency, it would be expected that NGO hospitals would be more fastidious about the 
referrals appropriateness and hence engage the districts more in order to achieve this. A 
comparison of the appropriateness of referrals between NGO and public hospitals 
showed that there were significant differences. The referrals under public hospital 
contracts were more appropriate than those under NGO hospital contracts. The major 
factors accounting for these differences were: differences in the quality of health 
services; varying levels of deprivation and morbidity in the catchment populations; and 
community preference for NGO hospital services. 
The major reason for the high level of referrals from health centres to the NGO hospital 
was the relatively low quality of services in the former. This manifested in the lack of 
adequate diagnostic and medical facilities and acute shortages of providers. The poor 
quality of health services was compounded by the high incidence of co-morbidities that 
were reported to be prevalent in the rural area. The combination of low provider 
competence and high incidence of co-morbidities resulted in high referral levels to the 
NGO hospital. 
The low capacities in health centres were compounded by the limited level of supervision 
by district offices. While supervisory visits could be said to be rare for both urban and 
rural health facilities, this was more pronounced in the latter. The health centres in rural 
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areas were less likely to be visited by district managers, and thus had less opportunities 
of improving health service delivery capacity. Not only did the geographical distance 
limit supervisory visits, rural based health centres also faced more acute resource 
constraints than urban located facilities, which limited their service delivery capacity, 
and consequently resulted in high referral volumes to the hospital. 
The referral pressures on the NGO hospital could also have been occasioned by earlier 
low level PHC predisposition. Prior to the health reforms, NGO hospitals provided both 
health promotion and curative health services. This practice of providing such PHC 
services was supposed to have ceased following the introduction of health reforms. 
However, it is likely that the practice was perpetuated because of: the preponderance of 
NGO governing boards, which favoured provision of PHC; the remote location of NGO 
hospitals and thus limited interaction with policy makers on account of high monitoring 
costs; capacity limitations in feeder health centres; and community preference for NGO 
hospital services. Furthermore, the better quality of services in NGO hospitals was 
mirrored by low quality in public district health centres, which was exemplified by acute 
shortages of staff, especially clinical officers. 
Conclusion I: There were no significant differences in referral appropriateness between 
districts with improved capacity because of., scarcities and difficulties of managing 
providers; prior unmet need for health services and high morbidity levels, 
Conclusion I!: There was a lower level of referral appropriateness among NGO than 
public hospitals because of low quality of district health services: high levels o social 
deprivation: limited ability to monitor activities in rural areas NGO facilities' primary 
health care orientation. and community pre erence for NGO facilities. 
9.60: How useful was NIE in analysing referral contracts? 
The study used the theoretical body of NIE to analyse the findings. While NIE is an 
umbrella body encompassing four theoretical strands of public choice, property rights, 
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transaction cost economics (TCE) and principal-agent (PA) theories, this study mainly 
drew from the last two, TCE and PA theories. By virtue of contracting for referrals 
between district health facilities and referral hospitals, there is a transaction, to which 
transaction cost economics can be applied. The study of transaction costs entails looking 
at the facets of asset-specificity, opportunism, bounded rationality, and uncertainty. 
Opportunism on the part of DHBs was manifested in the practice of inappropriate 
referrals and paying hospitals minimum grants for hospital services. The districts used 
their knowledge that hospitals had no basis for demanding higher payments for referrals 
to their advantage. For hospitals, opportunism was manifested in the reported less 
effective treatment of referral cases and non-provision of feed-back to referring districts. 
There were information asymmetries both within and between districts and hospitals. On 
the part of the districts, while the frontline providers had more information regarding the 
condition of referral cases, the district did not, which created uncertainty. In like manner, 
there was also uncertainty between hospital authorities and frontline providers: the 
providers knew the condition of the referred cases on presentation to the hospital, but the 
hospital managers did not. There was also uncertainty between the districts and 
hospitals: the hospital had no way of ascertaining whether the district had the 
competencies to provide services for which referral was sought. These levels of 
information asymmetries resulted in uncertainty for both hospitals and districts, and as 
such led to difficulties in the management of referrals. 
Although, it was relatively easy to approximate the transaction cost attributes of bounded 
rationality, opportunism and uncertainty to referral contracts, adaptation of the 
transaction attribute of asset-specificity was not. For asset-specificity, the study 
concentrated on human resource scarcities and staff management difficulties. The 
problem of scarcities of medical staff and the related staff management difficulties were 
pervasive in the health sector and presented major problems for managers of both district 
and hospital health facilities. . 
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In identifying the principal-agent problems, reliance was placed on the flow of funds and 
results of interviews with policy makers, managers/directors and frontline health 
providers. The principal-agent relationships were traced at two levels, upstream contracts 
between DHBs/RHBs and the CBOHIMOH, and downstream contracts between DHBs 
and RHBs and between managers/directors and frontline providers. The other level 
where a principal-agent relationship was evident was between frontline providers and the 
community. 
Principal-agent problems between districts and hospitals arose from two angles. While 
both districts and hospitals shared a common objective of providing health services 
against limited resources, the gravity of resource constraints affected the relationship 
between them. The decision to refer and provide care for referred patients exposed an 
agency problem. The districts were consistently accused of making inappropriate 
referrals. The hospitals were unable to ascertain whether referred patients' conditions 
warranted referral. Districts on their part argued that hospitals did not provide the 
requisite services for referred patients and feedback to referring health centres. The 
problem of inappropriate referrals and lack of adequate care and feedback for referred 
patients at hospitals was compounded by the limited ability of both districts and hospitals 
to effectively manage the activities of subordinate frontline providers, who may pursue 
divergent objectives. As is discussed below under incentive structures and referral 
decisions, it was evident that frontline providers were more likely to respond to social 
incentives than serve managers' aims. 
Conclusion: The NIE was useful in understanding the difficulties of referral contract-v. 
By tracing the principal-agent relationships. it was possible to klentifv the incentive 
structures facing districts and hospitals and illustrate -how these affected referrals. 
9.70: How did the study contribute to knowledge? 
The study contributed to knowledge on the subject of internal contracts and referrals in 
two ways. Firstly, the study analysed the difficulties of managing referrals from an 
institutional perspective, and secondly it demonstrated how a combination of qualitative 
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and qualitative methods could be used to understand the difficulties of contracts and 
illustrate the extent of such problems. 
As was illustrated above, the qualitative methodology was chosen for its ability to 
explore the complexities of process issues, while the quantitative methodology permitted 
the empirical illustration of the levels and patterns of referrals. While the qualitative data 
were used to describe the difficulties of internal contracts, quantitative data were used to 
demonstrate the extent of differences in the patterns and levels of referrals. 
For the qualitative methods, data were collected from policy makers, district and hospital 
managers and frontline health providers. These sources of data on referrals illuminated 
the analysis of referral contracts. The quantitative data from hospital records were used 
to illustrate the extent of referral problems by quantifying the patterns and levels of 
referrals. While the difficulties of using routinely collected health facility data are well 
documented, the study showed how such data could be used to illustrate the problem of 
referrals, by comparing aggregated data by disease/health condition to describe the 
morbidity profile, and patient data to generate indicators of referral appropriateness. 
That referral problems are among the key causes and manifestation of inefficiencies in 
the health sector is illustrated by the various strategies that have been implemented to 
resolve these. However, previous assessment of referrals concentrated on structural 
determinants and health seeking behaviour of client populations, and implicitly assumed 
institutions away. This study adopted a different approach in investigating referrals by 
using NIE to focus on the institutional setting. This was done by studying the 
environmental factors; contracting/transaction attributes; principal-agent relationships, 
and incentive structures; and showing how these impacted on referrals. 
The study further demonstrated the impact on referrals of different contract settings. A 
comparison of districts with upgraded and those without upgraded facilities showed that 
there were no major differences in referral appropriateness. The ability of contracts with 
upgraded facilities to influence referrals had been militated by the social incentives 
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facing frontline providers; high level of unmet need prior to the health centre upgrading 
programme, and weak institutional rewards and penalties. 
While there were no major differences in the appropriateness of referrals between 
upgraded and non-upgraded districts, there were between public and NGO contracts. 
The NGO hospital consistently had lower levels of appropriateness than public hospitals. 
The relatively high levels of inappropriate referrals for the NGO hospital were caused by 
poor quality of services in district health facilities, high level of deprivation and 
community preferences. 
Conclusion: The study contributed to knowledge by undertaking an institutional analysis 
of referral contracts using a combination of qualitative and quantitative data. 
190 
Chapter 9.00: Study limitations and recommendations 
Limitations 
Although this study assessed the difficulties of referrals between districts and hospitals 
through the lenses of contracting, it should be pointed out the contracting is but one of a 
myriad of factors that impact on referrals. As was indicated in the literature section, 
there are individual/household; community; provider-based; and institutional 
determinants that affect referrals. A holistic study of referrals would entail assessing all 
the influences on referrals. This study took an institutional analysis of referrals, by 
looking at the incentive structures facing hospitals and districts, and thus left out the 
other factors. 
Having been based on case studies, the research could be criticised on the grounds of the 
findings not being generalisable. However, and as was demonstrated in the methods and 
discussion sections, there is no attempt to generalise from case studies. The study sought 
to have an in-depth understanding of the referral contracts, through the adoption of an 
appropriate analytical framework and research design. The qualitative data from in- 
depth interviews was supplemented with hospital based utilisation and inpatient data. 
While the qualitative data explored the processes surrounding contracting for referrals, 
the quantitative data was used to assess the levels and patterns of referrals. The data 
were based on secondary sources, which could be imbued with deficiencies. In 
recognition of these potential weaknesses, two complementary methods of assessing 
referral appropriateness were used: expert-opinion-based and objective-indicator based 
assessments. 
The study findings showed that both districts and hospitals exhibited opportunistic 
behaviours. While the problem of inappropriate referrals from districts dominated, 
inappropriate hospital behaviours were also reported. Exploring the reasons for these 
findings was achieved through interviews with selected providers among who were 
frontline workers. While district frontline providers were included in the study from the 
inception of the study, those from hospitals were originally not included. Data from 
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hospital frontline workers was collected after the major data collection had been 
completed, and thus there was a difference in the timing of the data collection phases. 
The design of the study was institution based, and did not as is typical of such studies 
include data collection from communities. The findings, however, illustrated that social 
pressures had a bearing on provider behaviour. The study could have been enriched by 
including focus group discussions to ascertain the influence of community factors on 
providers' referral behaviour. Although the study adopted an institutional approach, the 
influence of community level factors could have been achieving by adapting the 
theoretical framework through including the "external environment", under which non- 
institutional influences, such as "community level factors" could have been captured. 
This would have enabled the exploration of how the providers' behaviour was shaped by 
such factors. 
Recommendations 
The introduction of referral contracts is premised on the purchaser-provider model, under 
which roles are delineated among contracting parties. While the health service provision 
roles of districts and hospitals were defined in the BPC, the study showed that there were 
overlaps in the range of services provided. In part, the perpetuation of referral 
difficulties arose from the lack of a reward and penalty system that would have 
compelled the contracting parties to adhere to the provisions of the BPC policy. That 
there were no effective sanctions to make the BPC effective was in part a reflection of 
less active stewardship role on the part of the MOH towards districts and hospitals. In 
similar manner, there was also limited stewardship on the side of districts and hospitals 
towards frontline providers. 
The study showed that although contracting had been introduced, the referral behaviour 
of districts and hospitals had not been impacted much. While "soft contracting" is the 
norm in settings where both districts and hospitals belonged to the public health sector, 
the MOH ought to have been more involved in ensuring that the districts and hospitals 
endeavoured to minimise the contracting difficulties. 
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The need for effective sanctions towards both districts and hospitals was exemplified by 
the preponderance of social over organisational rewards. An enhanced stewardship by 
the MOH would have helped in clarifying the ambiguities that providers showed in their 
relation to communities. The lack of a clearly defined "social function" resulted in the 
providers adopting behaviours that increased the referral difficulties. 
While both districts and hospitals had been accorded some degree of autonomy, and 
some gains had been achieved, the freedom was limited. In order to improve the 
effectiveness of contracting, the autonomy ought to be expanded, for instance through 
letting hospitals and districts have more leeway in dealing with their staff. 
The relationship between districts and hospitals was marked by a high degree of mistrust, 
which was compounded by limited information on either side. The hospital managers 
argued that district frontline providers made inappropriate referrals, while districts 
maintained that hospitals that did not provide feedback and offered limited services to 
referred cases. Both DHBs and RHBs, however, did not have the data to back their 
arguments. At the time of this study, there was no information system for managing 
referrals between districts and hospitals and this contributed to the mistrust. 
Development of such a system would be useful in improving the management of 
referrals. This could be built into the existing HMIS system, which at the time of 
collecting data for this study did not capture referral data. 
Hospital managers/directors suggested that it would be preferable for the CBOH to 
directly fund them for referral services. While this could improve the effective allocation 
of grants to hospitals, it could lead to an increase of referrals from DHBs. Rather, efforts 
should be directed at measures that limit the extent of inappropriate referrals from district 
health facilities while simultaneously emphasizing the need for the requisite health care 
for appropriate referrals at hospitals. This could be achieved through improving the 
competencies of providers and implementation of provider reorientation programmes in 
health facilities. 
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For research areas, the study findings showed that further research in two areas would 
improve the knowledge base on contracting and referrals. This study concentrated on the 
difficulties of contracts between DHBs and RHBs. Given the novelty of contracting in 
the health sector, it would be worthwhile to investigate the problems related to 
contracting in the broader health sector. A study of upstream contracts would shed more 
light on the subject. 
Through the persistent referrals to hospitals, districts may be passing costs to 
communities, at a time when poverty levels are high, which may threaten access to health 
services. Studies assessing the extent to which economic factors affect utilization of 
hospital services would be valuable. The study showed consistently high levels of 
inappropriate referrals for the NGO hospital. Further exploration of the causes, levels 
and patterns of referrals to NGO hospitals would provider answers to the issue. Although 
not an explicit part of the study objectives, the findings consistently showed referral 
appropriateness for pneumonia than malaria cases. An investigation into this finding 
could unveil the factors accounting for this and provide policy makers with alternatives 
for improving the referral contracts. 
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Appendix 1: Interview guide for Central board of health and ministry of health 
Transaction attributes 
What freedoms do hospitals have regarding the districts that they could contract with and how 
has this affected them? 
Who employs the various categories of staff in districts and hospitals? What influence do the 
various employers exert on staff and how does this affect districts and hospitals? 
What opportunities and difficulties does this present for you? What have you done to reduce 
these difficulties? 
How do the scarcities of staff affect districts and hospitals (probe for problems related to 
scarcities of skilled staff and managers) 
What type of changes have hospitals made to OPDs and how has this affected the relationship 
between districts and hospitals 
Type of contract 
How did districts and hospitals manage referrals before the health reforms and how has this 
changed after the reforms? 
What changes has contracting introduced? How have districts and hospitals responded to these 
changes? Are these responses desirable? How have the changes impacted on referrals? 
What have been the main concerns in the process of developing contracts? How did these 
concerns arise and how have they been addressed? 
To what extent have referral problems figured? 
How do contracts/ contract negotiating process impact on referral patterns? 
(emphasising hospital-district contracts) Could they play a greater role? 
(If yes) what are the obstacles to developing stronger mechanisms to influence referral patterns in 
contracts? 
What constraints do the contracts place on inputs? How does this affect the levels and patterns of 
referrals? 
Referralprocess 
How is the referral system supposed to work? 
Who, at the district and hospital levels are the key actors in the referral process and what are their 
responsibilities? What do they actually do? 
Why do those with responsibilities act the way they do (both conformists and non-conformists) 
What has been done to ensure that the key actors' actions are in accord with the expected 
behaviors? 
What strategies have been tried to improve the levels and patterns of referrals between districts 
and hospitals? 
How effective have the strategies been? (contrast community, district and hospital focused 
measures) 
Information system 
What has been the trend in referrals between districts and hospitals? What explains the 
changes? How are you able to tell? 
To what extent does your information system capture data on referrals between districts and 
hospitals? 
Are you able to determine the appropriateness of referrals? How/why not? 
How is such information used to regulate levels and patterns of referrals? 
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How complete is the information supplied by districts and hospitals? How do you check for 
validity of the data? 
Incentive structure 
Why do the actors in the referral system act they way they do? (referring to the actors identified 
above) 
Are their actions aligned with district and hospital objectives? If not, what has been done to align 
their actions with district and hospital objectives? 
What is the range of freedoms enjoyed by districts and hospitals and how do these impact on 
referrals? How can the expansion/ reduction of freedoms affect referrals? 
How have districts, hospital and communities responded to referral rationalization measures and 
how has this affected referrals? 
Reward and penalties 
What rewards and penalties have been implemented to influence districts and hospitals regarding 
referrals? 
How effective have these rewards and penalties been in achieving desired behaviours and 
deterring perverse actions? 
What other important changes on rewards and penalties have been introduced since the health 
reforms? 
How have these changes affected referrals between districts and hospitals? 
213 
Appendix 2: Interview guide for District health boards 
Transaction attributes 
Does the district have a choice about the hospitals it can contract with? (If there is no choice) 
what difficulties does this present? 
Who employs the various staff in the districts? How do the actions of the employers affect your 
district? 
How do the scarcities of staff affect you (probe for problems related to scarcities of skilled staff 
and managers) 
Does the district have a hospital? Why does/doesn't the district have a district hospitals? (If it has 
a district hospital) what changes has it made in the hospital OPD? How has this affected referral 
patterns? 
Contracts 
How did your district manage referrals before the health reforms and how has this changed after 
the reforms? 
What changes has contracting introduced? How has the district responded to these changes? How 
have these changes impacted on referrals? 
What is your organisation's role in developing contracts between CBoH/MoH and districts and 
between hospitals and districts? 
What have been the main concerns in the process of developing contracts? How did these 
concerns arise and how have they been addressed? 
To what extent have referral problems figured? 
How do contracts/ contract negotiating process impact on referral patterns? (emphasising 
hospital-district contracts) Could they play a greater role? 
(If yes) what are the obstacles to developing stronger mechanisms to influence referral patterns in 
contracts? 
What constraints do the contracts place on the use of inputs? How does this affect the levels and 
patterns of referrals? 
tem Referral system 
How is the referral process supposed to work? 
Who at the HC level are the key actors in the referral process and what are their responsibilities? 
What do they actually do? 
Why do those with responsibilities act the way they do (both conformists and non-conformists)? 
How do the actions of these people impact on referral patterns? 
What are the problems with the referral system? 
Why do these problems occur? (Probe separately the role played by patients, 1IC and hospital 
staff) 
What strategies have been used to resolve the problems? 
How have these affected the situation? 
Does your organisation have a role to play to resolve the problem? What can it do? Does this 
happen? If it does not, what is the reason? 
Are there other organisations that have a role to play in resolving the problem? What can they 
do? Does this happen? If they do not, what is the reason? 
214 
Incentive structure 
Why do the identified actors in the referral system act they way they do? (referring to actors 
identified above) 
Are the actors' actions in accord with district objectives? If not, what has been done to align their 
actions with your objectives? 
How have you, hospitals and communities responded to referral rationalization measures and 
how has this affected referrals? 
Information system 
What has been the trend in referrals between districts and hospitals? What explains these 
changes? How are you able to tell? 
To what extent does your information system capture data on referrals between districts and 
hospitals? How is such information used to regulate patterns and levels of referrals? 
How comprehensive is your information system? How do you check for validity of the data? 
Are you able to ascertain appropriateness of referrals made by your staff? Do you have a system 
for finding out the outcome of patients referred to hospitals? How does it work? 
Reward and penalties 
What rewards and penalties have been implemented to influence districts and hospitals regarding 
referrals? 
How effective have these rewards and penalties been in achieving desired behaviours and 
deterring perverse actions? 
What other important changes on rewards and penalties have been introduced since the health 
reforms? What has been the effect? 
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Appendix 3: Interview guide for Referral hospitals 
Transaction attributes 
Does your hospital have a choice about the districts they contract with? (If no choice) what 
difficulties does this present? 
Who employs the various staff in the hospital? How do the actions of these employers affect 
your operations? 
How do the scarcities of staff affect districts and hospitals (probe for problems related to 
scarcities of skilled staff and managers) 
What type of changes have hospitals made to the Outpatient Department (OPD)? How has this 
affected referral patterns? 
Contracts 
How did your hospital manage referrals with districts before the health reforms and how has this 
changed after the reforms? 
What changes has contracting introduced? How have districts and hospitals responded to these 
changes? How have the changes impacted on referrals? 
What is your district's role in developing contracts between CBoHJMoH and districts and 
between hospitals and districts? 
What have been the main concerns in the process of developing contracts? How did these 
concerns arise and how have they been addressed? 
To what extent have referral problems figured? 
How do contracts/ contract negotiating process impact on referral patterns? (emphasising 
hospital-district contracts)? Could they play a greater role? 
(If yes) what are the obstacles to developing stronger mechanisms to influence referral patterns in 
contracts? 
What constraints do the contracts place on inputs? How does this affect the levels and patterns of 
referrals? 
Referral system 
How is the referral process supposed to work? 
Who, at the HC and hospital levels are the key actors in the referral process and what are their 
responsibilities? What do they actually do? 
Why do those with responsibilities act the way they do (both conformists and non-conformists)? 
How do the actions of these people impact on referrals? 
What are the problems with the referral system? 
Why do they occur? (Probe separately the role played by patients; HC staff; hospital staff) 
What strategies have been used to resolve the problems? 
How have these affected the situation? 
Does your organisation have a role to play to resolve the problem? What can it do? Does this 
happen? If it does not, what is the reason? 
Are there other organisations that have a role to play in resolving the problem? What can they 
do? Does this happen? If they do not, what is the reason? 
Incentive structure 
Why do the identified actors in the referral systems act they way they do? (referring to actors 
identified above) 
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Are these actions aligned with district and hospital objectives? If not, what has been done to align 
them? 
How has your hospitals, districts and communities responded to referral rationalization measures 
and how has this affected referrals? 
Information system 
What has been the trend in referrals between the district and hospitals? What explains these 
trends? How are you able to tell? 
To what extent does your information system capture data on referrals between districts and 
hospitals? How is such information used to regulate patterns and level of referrals? 
How comprehensive is the information system? How do you check for validity of the data? 
Are you able to ascertain appropriateness of referrals made by districts? Do you have a system 
for finding out the outcome of patients referred to your hospital? How does it work? 
Reward and penalties 
What rewards and penalties have been implemented to influence districts and hospitals regarding 
referrals? 
How effective have these rewards and penalties been in achieving desired behaviours and 
deterring perverse actions? 
What other important changes on rewards and penalties have been introduced since the health 
reforms? What has been the effect? 
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Appendix 4: Interview guide for Health centre staff involved in referring process 
Background 
What is your education background? 
What is your professional qualification? Have you attended any skills upgrading seminars since 
attaining your professional qualification? (If yes) what type and when did you attend this? 
What is your current job in this institution? How many years have you been here? 
Have you had to change jobs within the institution? (If yes) indicate when and why you changed 
jobs? 
What was your previous job before joining this institution? Why did you leave your previous 
job? Are you happy here? 
Motivation 
What are your work-related goals/Where do you see yourself years from now in professional 
terms? (Probe: career within institution; work outsideprivate business; potential alternative 
current and future job opportunities in other organisations including Non Governmental 
Organisations and International Organisations) 
Are there any examples of others who have achieved goals of the kind described? 
What strategies did they use to achieve those goals that were successful? 
Are these same strategies open to you? Have your tried to use these strategies before? What has 
been the outcome? 
Are there other strategies that could be successful to achieve the same goals? 
What are the work-related scenarios that you hope most to avoid/What work-related situation do 
you hope most to avoid, which if it happened would jeopardise your career progress? (Probe: job 
loss, transfer, demotion, stuck in dead end., ) 
Are there any examples of others who those things have happened to? 
What did they do that brought that about? 
Could that happen to you? What strategies are available to you to avoid that? 
Role in referral process 
How is the referral process supposed to work? 
What is your role in the referral process? What do you actually do? 
Is what you do in accord with expectations of your managers? (If not) what are the differences? 
What are the problems with the referral system? 
Why do these problems occur? (Probe separately the role played by patients; HC staff; hospital 
staff) 
Are there differences in the referral practices of nurses and clinical officers? What are 
differences and why do they arise? 
(Referring to seminars above) How have the seminars mentioned above affected the way you 
make referrals? 
How do you decide when a patient presenting with malaria should be referred? Are there case 
where you use other ? 
How do you decide when a child present with a respiratory track infection should be referred? 
Are there case where you use other ? 
Ideas on improving referrals 
What strategies have been used to resolve the problems? 
How have these strategies affected the situation? 
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Does your district have a role to play to resolve the problem? What can it do? Does this happen? 
(If no) why does it not happen? 
What role are you, hospitals, districts and communities playing to improve referral patterns? 
What else can these groups/you do to improve referral patterns? 
Relationship between hospital and district staff 
What is your view about the perception among staff in hospitals that people at health centres 
make unnecessary referrals? 
Is there a forum where staff from health centres and hospitals meet? (Ask the purpose and 
progress of such meetings and why if none, such meetings are not held) 
How would you describe the relationship between health centre and hospital staff? (Where there 
are differences, find out if there have been attempts to minimise these and what the outcome has 
been) 
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Appendix 5: Template for collection of data from inpatient records 
(data obtained from hospital patient records (Included all cases: with, without referral 
letters, and by-passers) 
Referring health centre/hospital: 
1. Referring health centre/hospital and distance: ............................................ 
2. Date ............................................................................................. 3. Card number and location: .................................................................... 
4. Age: 
............................................................................................. 5. Sex: []M[]F 
6. Place of residence and distance: ...................... ...................................... 7. Referral status: [] Referred [] Paid by-pass fee 
[] Prepayment scheme member 
(Other) ........................................................... 8. Prior visits to other providers: ............................................................... (Indicate what was done) 
9. Provisional diagnosis: ................................................... 
10. Reason for referring: ................................................... 
Receiving hospital: 
11. Hospital referred to: [ ]UTH [ ]Kitwe [ ]Ndola 
12 Date: 
13. Admitted: []Y[]N 
14. Diagnostic tests done and results 
Tests Temperature HP Hb RR/PR 
Results ........................................................................... 
15. Final diagnosis (indicate reason for discordance where this is the case) 
16. General condition (GC) ....................................................................... 
17. Comments on the intensity of management and diagnostic skills required for 
admitted patients (specify requirement and what was done) 
18. Admitted patient's details 
..,..... ,,..... Response .................. 
Length of stay ................. Dead/alive........ 
19. Was referral appropriate? 
(indicate the reason why referral was not appropriate using severity indicators, diagnostic and 
management skills required for the case) 
20. Was admission appropriate: 
(indicate the reason based on expert opinion and diagnostic and management skill 
requirements)Calculation of 
Severity indices (based on temperature): 
1. Admission 
Derive from temperature on admission 
II. Treatment criteria: temperature returns to normal within (pneumonia) 
1. Within 24 hrs 
2.25- 72 hrs 
3.72+ hrs 
II. Treatment criteria: temperature returns to normal within (malaria) 
1. Within 24 hrs 
2.24-48 hrs 
3.48-72 
4.72+ 
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Appendix 6: Template for collection of data from hospital OPD registers 
Disease/Condition DHB-referred Self-referred 
Malaria 
Diarrhoea 
RTI/Pneumonia 
STVARC 
Tuberculosis 
Anaemia 
Heart conditions 
Other diseases/conditions 
Total 
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Appendix 7: Format of contracts between DHBs and RHBs 
Contract for delivering hospital health services 
between the Hospital Management Board of 
(name) Central Hospital Board 
and the District Board of (name) 
1. Preamble 
The present contract is offered to the Hospital Management Board, hereafter called the HMB, by 
the district Health Board of...... hereafter called the DHB. The purpose of the contract is for the 
HMB to deliver quality and cost-effective hospital services to the population in the catchment 
area. 
The contracts is for the purchase of 18` level health services as designated in the formats. The 
services purchased will be available in their totality. The contract covers the period from 1" of 
January to 31"' of December (year). 
By accepting the contract, the HMB agrees to maintain transparent financial record relating to the 
1" level health services purchased. 
In addition to funding, the HMB shall provide technical support and backstopping for the 
implementation of the district annual plan. 
2. The Parties 
The HMB represented by the Executive Director 
Date: Name: Signature: 
The District health board represented by the District Director of Health 
Date: Name: Signature: 
3. Transfer of funds: 
Funds shall be transferred to the HMB bank account on a monthly basis or as the parties shall 
agree to 
3.1 Bank accounts held by the HMB 
Below is the bank account for transfer of funds by the DHB to the HMB 
Main account to which the grant should be transferred 
Name of bank account 
Bank account number 
Name of bank 
Branch 
Purpose of account 
4. Obligations of the District Health Board 
4.1 The District Health Board shall, in a timely fashion, disburse the funds to the HIML3 as 
follows: 
1. Funds will be disbursed monthly to the designated bank account as listed above, 
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2. In cases where services for 1 `level are wholly provided by the 2" or 3`d level facility 
from the whom the district shall purchase services in accordance with the per capita 
approach, the budget from the EDMS shall be similarly allocated. Negations shall be 
entered into with the DHB in order to determine the appropriate share of the 
decentralised drug budget to be allocated to the HMB. 
4.2 Availability of essential supplies 
The Central Board of Health will ensure the availability of essential drugs and supplies 
through the EDMSS 
4.3 Guidelines and standards 
The Central Board of Health will provide guidelines and standards for cost effective 
provision of hospital services. 
4.4 Technical assistance and back-stopping 
The CBOH will provide on site guidance, advise and technical back-stopping, primarily 
through its regional directorates, which will avail it health and management expertise for 
up to five man-days per three months for any subject related to implementing this 
contract. 
5. Obligations of the Hospital Management Board 
5.1 Clinical and diagnostics services 
The HMB will provide equity of access to quality health care service at the hospital as 
specified below. In providing these services, the HMB will choose the most cost- 
effective interventions, routines and procedures, while at the same time ensuring 
affordability, professionalism an ethical acceptability. 
Catchment population No of available beds No of beds purchased 
Tick Service Comments 
Outpatient 
General surgical/obstetrics 
(ceasarean section & minor operations) 
Paediatrics 
Dentistry 
Training and support, for health centres 
General surgery, more complicated cases (eg heard, 
chest, elective, traumatology, urology) 
General medicine (all complicated infections, heart, 
kidney, endocrine) 
Gynaecology/obstetrics 
Psychiatry 
Intensive care 
Training for first level hospitals 
5.1 Support to lower level hospital 
This contract agreement notwithstanding, the HMB will support functioning of the referral 
system, ie that first contact point for hospital care (expect for emergencies like road traffic 
accidents, etc) is the level 1 hospital and only if this hospital is incapable of providing the 
required diagnosis, treatment and care, is the patient referred to the nearest level 11 hospital which 
can provide the required service. Cases which cannot be treated at the 11 hospital will be referred 
to a level III or another level II hospital with the required facilities and competencies. 
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In addition to functioning as the second/tertiary referral level, the HMB will provide technical 
back-up for the first/second level hospital, eg in relation to clinical expertise, training, etc. 
Note: 
Level II and III hospitals should normally not provide general outpatient and other primary health 
care services. If, however, the hospital is providing these services (ref. 5.1 above), the hospital 
will keep separate accounts and staff for OPD/Primary care. 
6. Arbitration: 
Any disputes concerning this contract will be resolved amicably. Should this fail, arbitration will 
be sought from an impartial third party. 
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Appendix 13: Cross tabulations of referral appropriateness by contracting context 
CROSS TABULATIONS OF INDICATORS OF MALARIA REFERRAL APPROPRIATNESS 
BY THE TYPE OF CONTRACTING CONTEXT (UPGRADED OR NOT-UPGRADED) 
WAS REFERRAL APPROPRIATE (1'' EXPERT OPINIONS 
Contractin context Total 
Was referral appropriate? 
(ref 1) HCs HCs Not- 
1" opinion) Upgraded upgraded 
Yes Count 86 460 546 
% within reff 15.8% 84.2% 100.0% 
% within contract type 72.9% 78.9% 77.9% 
No Count 32 123 155 
% within ref 1 20.6% 79.4% 100.0% 
% within contract type 27.1% 21.1% 22.1% 
Total Count 118 583 701 
% within reff 16.8% 83.2% 100.0% 
% within contract type 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
HCs: Health centres 
Chi-nuara Tasts(c 
Value Df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
2-sided Exact Si 1-sided 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.066(b) 1 . 151 
Continuity 1.731 1 . 188 Correction(a) 
Likelihood Ratio 1.987 1 . 159 
Fisher's Exact Test 1180 . 096 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 2.063 1 . 151 
N of Valid Cases 701 
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WAS REFERRAL APPROPRIATE? (2"d EXPERT OPINION) 
Was referral appropriate Contractin context Total 
(ref 2)? 
(2"" opinion) HCs HCs Not. 
U raded u raded 
Yes Count 59 434 493 
within ref2 12.0% 88.0% 100.0% 
within contract type 83.1% 74.7% 75.6% 
No Count 12 147 159 
% within ref2 7.5% 92.5% 100.0% 
% within contract type 16.9% 25.3% 24.4% 
Total Count 71 581 652 
% within ref2 10.9% 89.1% 100.0% 
% within contract type 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
a Malaria pneumonia= 1.00 
Chi-Sauare Tests(c) 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
2-sided Exact Si 1-sided 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.421(b) 1 . 120 
Continuity 
Correction(a) 1.987 1 . 159 
Likelihood Ratio 2.601 1 . 107 
Fisher's Exact Test 
. 143 . 076 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 2 417 1 . 120 
N of Valid Cases 652 
a Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than S. The minimum expected count is 17.31. 
c Malaria pneumonia =1.00 
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DID THE ADMITTED CASE SURVIVE? 
Survival status of Contractin contest Total 
admitted case 
(Survstatus) HCs HCs Not- 
U raded u raded 
Dead Count 18 31 49 
within Survstatus 36.7% 63.3% 100.0% 
within contract type 17.3% 5.4% 7.2% 
Alive Count 86 548 634 
% within Survstatus 13.6% 86.4% 100.0% 
within contract type 82,7% 94.6% 92.8% 
Total Count 104 579 683 
% within Survstatus 15.2% 84.8% 100.0% 
% within contract type 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
a Malaria pneumonia = 1.00 
Chi_Snuare Tests(c) 
Value Df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) Exact Si 1-sided 
Pearson Chi-Square 18.917(b) 1 . 000 
Continuity 17.164 1 . 000 Correction(a) 
Likelihood Ratio 14.960 1 . 000 
Fisher's Exact Test 
. 000 . 000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 18.889 1 . 000 
N of Valid Cases 683 
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WAS REFERED CASE ADMITTED AT HOSPITAL? 
Was case admitted or Contractin context Total 
not? (admitted) HCs HCs Not- 
_____________________ 
U raded u raded 
Yes Count 95 300 395 
% within Admitted 24.1% 75.9% 100.0% 
% within contract type 85.6% 98.7% 95.2% 
No Count 16 4 20 
within Admitted 80.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
% within contract type 14.4% 1.3% 4.8% 
Total Count 111 304 415 
% within Admitted 26.7% 73.3% 100.0% 
% within contract type 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
a Malaria pneumonia= 1.00 
Chi-Sauare Tests(c) 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
2-sided Exact Sig. 1-sided 
Pearson Chi-Square 30.414(b) 1 . 000 
Continuity 27.625 1 000 Correction(a) . 
Likelihood Ratio 26.173 1 . 000 
Fisher's Exact Test 
. 000 . 000 Linear-by-Linear 
Association 30.340 1 . 000 
N of Valid Cases 415 
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HOW LONG DID IT TAKE FOR THE TEMPERATURE OF CASE TO NORMALISE DURING 
ADMISSION? 
Time taken for 
li 
Contracting context Total 
se temperature to norma 
(Treatment) HCs HCs Not- 
Upgraded u raded 
W24 Count 
42 102 144 
% within Treatment 29.2% 70.8% 100.0% 
% within contract type 48.8% 46.2% 46.9% 
24-28 Count 8 62 70 
% within Treatment 11.4% 88.6% 100.0% 
% within contract type 9.3% 28.1% 22.8% 
48-72 Count 8 17 25 
% within Treatment 32.0% 68.0% 100.0% 
% within contract type 9.3% 7.7% 8.1% 
>72 Count 28 40 68 
% within Treatment 41.2% 58.8% 100.0% 
% within contract type 32.6% 18.1% 22.1% 
Total Count 86 221 307 
% within Treatment 28.0% 72.0% 100.0% 
% within contract type 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
a maiana pneumonia = 1. uu 
Chi-Sauare Tests(b) 
Value df As 
. 
Si 2-sided 
Pearson Chi-Square 15.683(a) 3 . 001 
Likelihood Ratio 17.065 3 . 001 Linear-by-Linear 3.338 1 068 Association . 
N of Valid Cases 307 
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CROSS TABULATIONS OF INDICATORS OF PNEUMONIA REFERRAL APPROPRIATNESS 
BY THE TYPE OF CONTRACTING CONTEXT (UPGRADED AND NON-UPGRADED HEALTH 
CENTRES) 
WAS REFERRAL APPROPRIATE (ist EXPERT OPINION 
Was referral appropriate? Contractin context Total 
(ref 1) HCs HCs Not- 
(1'' opinion) Upgraded u raded 
Yes Count 588 33 621 
% within rec 
was reff 
94.7% 5.3% 100.0% 
% within 
Sppted 86.7% 97.1% 87.2% 
No Count 90 1 91 
% within rec 
was refs 
98.9% 1.1% 100.0% 
% within 
Sppted 13.3% 2.9% 12.8% 
Total Count 678 34 712 
% within rec 
was reff 
95.2% 4.8% 100.0% 
% within 
S ted 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
a malaria pneumonia = e. uu 
Chi-Sauare Tests(c) 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
2-sided 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) Exact Sig. 1-sided 
Pearson Chi-Square 3.101(b) 1 . 078 Continuity 
Correction(a) 2.243 1 . 134 
Likelihood Ratio 4.263 1 . 039 Fisher's Exact Test 
. 109 . 053 Linear-by-Linear 
Association 3.097 1 . 078 
N of Valid Cases 712 
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WAS REFERRAL APPROPRIATE? (2nd EXPERT OPINION) 
Contractin context Total 
Was referral appropriate? HCs HCs Not- 
(ref 2) (1`t opinion) Upgraded upgraded 
Yes Count 595 33 628 
% within rec 94.7% 5 3% 100 0% was ref2 . . 
% within 
Sppted 95.2% 97.1% 95.3% 
No Count 30 1 31 
% within rec 96 8% 3 2% 100 0% was ref2 . . . 
% within 
Sppted 4.8% 2.9% 4.7% 
Total Count 625 34 659 
% within rec 94 8% 5 2% 100 0% was ref2 . . . 
% within 
Sppted 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
a Malaria pneumonia = 2.00 
Chi-Sauare Tests(c) 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
2-sided Exact Sig. 1-sided 
Pearson Chi-Square . 249(b) 1 . 618 
Continuity 
. 007 1 934 Correction(a) . 
Likelihood Ratio . 283 1 . 595 
Fisher's Exact Test 1.000 . 516 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association . 248 1 . 618 
N of Valid Cases 659 
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DID THE ADMITTED CASE SURVIVE? 
Survival status of admitted Contractin context Total 
case (Survstatus) HCs HCs Not- 
U raded upgraded 
Dead Count 146 7 153 
% within 
Survstatus 95.4% 4.6% 100.0% 
% within 
Sppted 22.6% 21.2% 22.5% 
Alive Count 501 26 527 
% within 
Survstatus 95.1% 4.9% 100.0% 
% within 
Sppted 77.4% 78.8% 77.5% 
Total Count 647 33 680 
% within 
Survstatus 95.1% 4.9% 100.0% 
% within 
Sppted 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
a Malaria pneumonia= 2.00 
Chi-Sauare Tests(c) 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
2-sided 
Exact Sig, 
2-sided Exact Sig. 1-sided 
Pearson Chi-Square . 033(b) 1 . 856 
Continuity 
. 000 1 1 000 Correction(a) . 
Likelihood Ratio . 033 1 . 855 
Fisher's Exact Test 1.000 . 527 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association . 033 1 . 856 
N of Valid Cases 680 
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DID THE ADMITTED CASE SURVIVE? 
Was case admitted or not Contractin context Total 
(admitted) HCs HCs Not- 
Upgraded u raded 
Yes Count 616 34 650 
% within Admitted 94.8% 5.2% 100.0% 
% contract type 95.7% 100.0% 95.9% 
No Count 28 0 28 
% within Admitted 100.0% . 0% 100.0% % within contract 4 3% . 0% 4.1% type . 
Total Count 644 34 678 
% Admitted 95.0% 5.0% 100.0% 
within contact 100.0% 100 0% 100 0% type . . 
a Malaria pneumonia = 2.00 
Chi-Sauare Tests(cl 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
2-sided Exact Sig. 1-sided 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.542(b) 1 . 214 
Continuity 
. 639 1 424 Correction(a) . 
Likelihood Ratio 2.944 1 . 086 
Fisher's Exact Test 
. 390 . 230 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 1.540 1 . 215 
N of Valid Cases 678 
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CROSS TABULATIONS OF MALARIA REFERRAL APPROPRIATNESS CONTRACTING CONTEXT 
(GOVERNMENTAL AND NGO HOSPITALS) 
WAS REFERRAL APPROPRIATE (11t EXPERT OPINION 
Was referral Contractin context Total 
appropriate? Govt NGO 
(18` opinion) hospital hospital 
ref 1 Yes Count 546 70 616 
% within refs 88.6% 11.4% 100.0% 
% within contract type 77.9% 37.8% 69.5% 
No Count 155 115 270 
% within reff 57.4% 42.6% 100.0% 
% within contract type 22.1% 62.2% 30.5% 
Total Count 701 185 886 
% within reff 79.1% 20.9% 100.0% 
% within contract type 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
a Malaria pneumonia = 1.00 
Chi-Sauare Tests(c) 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
2-sided Exact Sig. 
_ 
1-sided 
Pearson Chi-Square 110.816(b) 1 . 000 Continuity 108.934 1 000 Correction(a) . 
Likelihood Ratio 103.372 1 
. 000 
Fisher's Exact Test 
. 000 . 000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 110.691 1 . 000 
N of Valid Cases 886 
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WAS REFERRAL APPROPRIATE? (2"d EXPERT OPINION) 
Was referral Contracting context Total 
appropriate? Govt NGO 
(2"d opinion) hospital hospital 
ref2 Yes Count 493 70 563 
% within ref2 87.6% 12.4% 100.0% 
within contract type 75.6% 37.6% 67.2% 
No Count 159 116 275 
% within rec2 57.8% 42.2% 100.0% 
within contract type 24.4% 62.4% 32.8% 
Total Count 652 186 838 
within rec was ref2 77.8% 22.2% 100.0% 
within NGO 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
a Malaria pneumonia = 1.00 
Chi-Sauare Tests(c) 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
2-sided Exact Si 1-sided 
Pearson Chi-Square 94.679(b) 1 . 000 
Continuity 92.964 1 000 
Correction(a) . 
Likelihood Ratio 89.969 1 . 000 
Fisher's Exact Test 
. 000 . 000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 94.566 1 . 000 
N of Valid Cases 838 
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DID THE ADMITTED CASE SURVIVE? 
Contracting context Total__ 
Survival status of case Govt NGO 
hospital hospital 
Survstatus Dead Count 49 1 50 
% within 
Survstatus 98.0% 2.0% 100.0% 
% within 
NGO 7.2% 1.3% 6.6% 
Alive Count 634 78 712 
% within 
Survstatus 89.0% 11.0% 100.0% 
% within 
NGO 92.8% 98.7% 93.4% 
Total Count 683 79 762 
% within 
Survstatus 89.6% 10.4% 100.0% 
I 
% within 
NGO 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
a Malaria pneumonia= 1.00 
Chi-Sauare Tests(c) 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
2-sided Exact Sig. 1-sided 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.032(b) 1 . 045 
Continuity 3.126 1 077 
Correction(a) . 
Likelihood Ratio 5.716 1 . 017 
Fisher's Exact Test 
. 051 . 025 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 4.026 1 . 045 
N of Valid Cases 762 
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WAS REFERED CASE ADMITTED AT HOSPITAL? 
Contracting context Total 
Was case admitted? Govt NGO 
(admitted) hospital hospital 
13 Admitted Yes Count 395 82 477 
within Admitted 82.8% 17.2% 100.0% 
within contract type 95.2% 44.3% 79.5% 
No Count 20 103 123 
% within Admitted 16.3% 83.7% 100.0% 
% within contract type 4.8% 55.7% 20.5% 
Total Count 415 185 600 
% within Admitted 69.2% 30.8% 100.0% 
% within contract type 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
a Malaria pneumonia =i . oo 
Chi-Sauare Tests(c) 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
2-sided 
Exact Sig. 
2-sided Exact Si 1-sided 
Pearson Chi-Square 203.067(b) 1 . 000 Continuity 199.958 1 000 Correction(a) . 
Likelihood Ratio 194.310 1 . 000 
Fisher's Exact Test 
. 000 . 000 Linear-by-Linear 
Association 202.728 1 . 000 
N of Valid Cases 600 
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HOW LONG DID IT TAKE FOR THE TEMPERATURE OF ADMITTED CASE TO NORMALISE 
DURING ADMISSION? 
Contractin context Total 
Time taken for temperature NGO 
to normalise (Treatment) Govt hospit 
hospital at 
W24 Count 
144 14 158 
% within Treatment 91.1% 8.9% 100.0% 
% within contract type 46.9% 21.2% 42.4% 
24-28 Count 70 36 106 
% within Treatment 
66.0% 34.0% 100.0% 
% within contract type 22.8% 54.5% 28.4% 
48-72 Count 25 12 37 
% within Treatment 
67.6% 32.4% 100.0% 
% within contract type 8.1% 18.2% 9.9% 
>72 Count 68 4 72 
% within treatment 
94.4% 5.6% 100.0% 
% within contract type 22.1% 6.1% 19.3% 
Total Count 307 66 373 
% within Treatment 
82.3% 17.7% 100.0% 
% within contract type 100 0% 100.0 10010% . 
a Malaria pneumonia = 1.00 
Chi-Sauare Tosts(b) 
Value df As m. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 40.531(a) 3 . 000 
Likelihood Ratio 40.229 3 . 000 Linear-by-Linear 
. 053 1 818 Association . 
N of Valid Cases 373 
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CROSS TABULATIONS OF PNEUMONIA REFERRAL APPROPRIATNESS BY TYPE OF CONTRACT 
(NGO AND PUBLIC CONTRACTS) 
Was referral appropriate? Contracting context Total (ref 1) 
1`t opinion) Govt hospital NGO hospital 
Yes Count 621 72 693 
% within reff 89 6% 4% 10 
100.0 
. . 
% within contract type 87.2% 53.3% 81.8% 
No Count 91 63 154 
within refs 59 1% 40 9ß/, 
100.0 
. . 
within contract type 12.8% 46.7% 18.2% 
Total Count 712 135 847 
within reff 84 1% 15 9% 
100.0 
. . 
" within contract type 100 0% 100.0% 
100.0 
. 
a Malaria pneumonia = 2.00 
Chi-Square Tests(c) 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Exact 
Sig. 
(1- 
sided 
Pearson Chi-Square 87.595(b) 1 . 000 Continuity Correction(a) 85.332 1 . 000 Likelihood Ratio 72.389 1 . 000 Fisher's Exact Test 
. 000 . 
000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 
87.491 1 . 000 
N of Valid Cases 847 
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WAS REFERRAL APPROPRIATE? (2"d EXPERT OPINION) 
Was referral Contracting_ context Total 
appropriate? 
(ref 2) Govt NGO 
2nd opinion) hospital hospital 
rec was ref2 1.00 Count 628 70 698 
within ref2 90.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
within contract type 95.3% 51,9% 87.9% 
2.00 Count 31 65 96 
within ref2 32.3% 67.7% 100.0% 
% within contract type 4.7% 48.1% 12.1% 
Total Count 659 135 794 
% within ref2 83.0% 17.0% 100.0% 
% within contract type 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
a Malaria pneumonia = 2.00 
Chi. ChIrnrn TAQfQ(e 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
2-sided Exact Sig. 1-sided 
Pearson Chi-Square 198.964(b) 1 . 000 Continuity 194.897 1 000 Correction(a) . 
Likelihood Ratio 148.539 1 . 000 
Fisher's Exact Test 
. 000 . 000 Linear-by-Linear 
Association 198.713 1 . 000 
N of Valid Cases 794 
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DID THE ADMITTED CASE SURVIVE? 
Survival status of Contractin context Total 
admitted case Govt NGO 
hospital hospital 
Survstatus 1.00 Count 153 3 156 
% within Survstatus 98.1% 1.9% 100.0% 
% within contract 22.5% 4.3% 20.8% type 
2.00 Count 527 66 593 
% within Survstatus 88.9% 11.1% 100.0% 
% within contract 77.5% 95.7% 79.2% type 
Total Count 680 69 749 
% within Survstatus 90.8% 9.2% 100.0% 
within contract 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% type 
a Malaria pneumonia = 2.00 
f`hLQnnere Tnetc/r1 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
2-sided Exact Si 1-sided 
Pearson Chi-Square 12.518(b) 1 . 000 Continuity 11.441 1 001 Correction(a) . 
Likelihood Ratio 16.692 1 . 000 Fisher's Exact Test 
. 000 . 
000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 12.501 1 . 000 
N of Valid Cases 749 
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WAS REFERED CASE ADMITTED AT HOSPITAL? 
Was case admitted? Contr actin context Total 
(admitted) Govt NGO 
hospital hospital 
Yes Count 650 72 722 
% within Admitted 90.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
% within contract type 95.9% 54.1% 89.0% 
No Count 28 61 89 
% within Admitted 31.5% 68.5% 100.0% 
within contract type 4.1% 45.9% 11.0% 
Total Count 678 133 811 
% within Admitted 83.6% 16.4% 100.0% 
% within contract type 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
a Malaria pneumonia = 2.00 
Chi-Sauare Tests(cl 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
2-sided Exact Sig. 1-sided 
Pearson Chi-Square 198.232(b) 1 . 000 
Continuity 193 983 1 000 Correction(a) . . 
Likelihood Ratio 144.407 1 . 000 Fisher's Exact Test 
. 000 . 
000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 197.987 1 . 000 
N of Valid Cases 811 
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